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This study investigates the concept of the gestural body as a site for communication in performance, using 
autobiographical practice to examine the influence of invisible disability on the perception of physicality and 
meaning. It adopts a practice-based methodology, locating me as creative practitioner at the heart of the 
investigation, enabling me to generate a deeper epistemological understanding as I engage reflexively through the 
research process (Barrett and Bolt, 2007). My psychosomatic approach means that my performance training and 
experience of living with ME influence the notion of embodiment, and I investigate how this impacts perception of 
what is performed (Grosz, 1994; Leder, 1990). The study explores ways in which shifts in the performance space 
and time, including the displacement of the embodied space and the experience of chronic time, may influence 
perception for both the performer and the audience (Morris, 2008). The research also explores the process of 
coming out as invisibly disabled in performance, and how this contributes to perceptions of the gestural body 
(Fassett and Morella, 2008). Ultimately, the thesis seeks to establish a foundation of knowledge relevant to the 
research of embodiment and lived experience, and to those investigating the previously neglected area of invisible 
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This thesis investigates factors which influence perceptions of the invisibly disabled body in performance using 
lived experience of the chronic illness myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME) as a specific example. It examines the 
construction of performance by generating autobiographical movement material, and uses elements of time and 
space to frame the body as a site for communication. This process reveals the different influences on the 
production of meaning for both audience and performer. 
The thesis begins with Chapter 1: The Research in Context, which situates the research in the interdisciplinary field 
of performance art/live art through its embodied approach (Johnson, 2013), sharing themes with body art, theatre 
and postdramatic theatre. It outlines the ontology of the research following Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological theory of the body as prism of perception (1962, 1964, 1968, 2004) drawing on cognate fields 
including spectatorship, somatic practice and feminist theory to argue for the body as an intersubjective site in 
performance. The chapter discusses the cultural production of disability as an identity status (Hadley, 2014) and 
the existing viewing strategies of disabled bodies in performance, to address how these contribute to the concept 
of chronic illness as an invisible disability. It suggests that invisible disabilities exist in a liminal state in the binary of 
visible disability and able-bodiedness (Lindemann, 2010; Cosenza, 2014b), arguing for a view of embodied 
differences as existing on a spectrum, and implicating queer theory in the research through the need to come out 
as invisibly disabled (Fassett and Morella, 2008). The core research questions are introduced and an account is 
given of how invisible disability impacts the embodied approach to concepts of space and time, addressing the 
production and reception of meaning through studies of spectatorship and witnessing, and theories surrounding 
looking and the gaze. 
The thesis continues with Chapter 2: Methodology, detailing the practice-based approach that generates data 
through the researcher’s subjective position (Barrett and Bolt, 2007). It describes how the research uses 
autobiographical material generated through phenomenological reflection, and that it crosses borders with 
autoethnographic practice through a consideration of the influence of society and culture on embodied identity 
(Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011). The chapter goes on to discuss the pervasive privileging of the visual sense in the 
West (Classen, 1993) and how embodied and sensorial practice is particularly suited to this research by bringing 
visceral sensation into the visual realm (Banes and Lepecki, 2007). It sets out some of the key theories of somatic 
awareness that the research hinges on, including Drew Leder’s concept of the dys-appearing body (1990), and how 
somatic and psychophysical techniques guide the practical research. Next, an account is given of how journaling is 
used as a reflexive strategy through the enquiry, which enables the researcher to develop a personal voice and 
provides a picture of the ongoing learning journey (Cunningham and Carmichael, 2018). Finally, the chapter details 
the research design and the influence of chronic illness on this process, including the separation of data collection 
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into three case studies, the choice of setting and the gathering of data from both the researcher’s personal 
experience and from audience members.  
The following three chapters are case studies, detailing the development of three workshop performances and the 
data gathering process of each. Chapter 3: Case Study 1 - Untitled describes the early stages of practical research 
through explorations of space, time and repetition. It explores how the bodily ideals of classical dance training, as 
well as the experience of chronic illness affected the researcher’s somatic approach and influenced her 
interpretation of concepts such as performance and the performer’s identity. It details the development of a 
gesture for performance drawn from the researcher’s phenomenological experience of ME, and how body imagery 
assists in the communication of alternative experiences of embodiment (Grosz, 1994; Welton 2012). The chapter 
sets out the methods of framing the body for performance through space and time, including representation of the 
kinesphere to communicate displaced space and the use of a clock to link movement to the passage of time, and 
sets out the initial findings of how these elements contributed to perceptions of physicality and meaning. 
Chapter 4: Case study 2 - (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See, draws on early findings from Untitled, reframing the 
gesture by considering how nudity can be used as a device to communicate lived experience (Jones, 2004). It also 
explores how echoing objectifying and fetishistic conventions of framing and viewing female and disabled bodies 
could be used to question the visibility status of invisible disability and as a method of outing the performer (Jones, 
1998; Millett-Gallant, 2010). The chapter describes how including elements of audience interaction by requesting 
the audience’s help in the process of undressing, affected perceptions of the body through implications of the 
gender divide (Grosz, 1994; Jones, 2012) and introduced potential risk for both performer and audience 
(McConachie, 2008; White, 2013). An account is given of how the audience’s choices of movement and proximity 
in the performance event were influenced by awareness of social rules of touch and barriers of safety, with 
particular consideration to the impact of nudity on spectatorship (Classen, 2005; Garland-Thomson, 2009; Grosz, 
1994). This case study also addresses how the performance explored ways of destabilising perceptions of time to 
present the researcher’s subjective experience of chronic time, by linking the deteriorating gesture in space with 
the use of sound (Jones and Heathfield, 2012).  
Chapter 5: Case study 3 - Screening My(Self): Reflections responds to data gathered from (In)Visible: Tell Me What 
You See, exploring how theatrical devices such as veils, screens and mirrors could be used to direct the audience’s 
gaze as a new way of framing the body in performance (Garelick, 1995; Jonas, 1970). A description is given of how 
this created a physical barrier between the performer and audience, both to increase the audience’s comfort in 
viewing the performer’s body and to lessen the performer’s sense of exposure from the previous case study. The 
chapter identifies how two-way mirrors provided a unique material to explore the merger of subjectivity and 
objectivity for the performer (Bleeker, 2008; Kulik, 2004) and how they investigated concepts of the vanishing 
point by revealing and reflecting the performer’s invisibly disabled body (Phelan, 1993; Schneider, 1997). This case 
study also explored the complex merger of authenticity and representation in autobiographical performance 
9 
 
(Heddon, 2008), and how the notion of identity as an ongoing act of identification is affected by the changing 
interpretation of embodiment in chronic illness (Jones, 2012). The chapter gives an account of how Screening 
My(Self): Reflections investigated concepts of duration and endurance, moving towards a subjective and embodied 
understanding of time that reflected minimal forms of performance in Europe, and the need for more diverse 
representations of lived experiences in performance art (Heathfield, 2004; Lepecki, 2004; Shalson, 2013). 
Finally, Chapter 6: Conclusion gathers information from the case studies to review the research and present the 
key findings. Firstly, that the invisibly disabled body’s subjugation by the experience of chronic illness promotes 
somatic awareness through its unusual experiences of spatiality and temporality (Charmaz, 1990; Leder, 1990; 
O’Brien, 2014). Secondly, that the invisibly disabled body carries queer theories through its otherness, the need for 
it to be performed to be recognised, and that this need for repeated identifications reinforces the instability of its 
identity category (Butler, 1990). The research calls for the recognition of a spectrum of embodied experience in a 
move away from binary distinctions of ability and disability, and draws on Tobin Siebers’ disability aesthetics 
(2010) to call for a new aesthetics of invisibility that acknowledges embodied experiences rather than just visual 
manifestations of disability. The chapter then addresses the limitations of the study, and suggests possible 






Chapter 1: The Research in Context 
 
1.1  Contextual overview 
This practice-based research into perceptions of physicality and meaning through the invisibly disabled body takes 
embodied experience as both focus and method of the research. I use autobiographical material to create three 
case studies, each of which is centred on a workshop performance offering opportunity for data collection, and 
forming part of my ongoing reflexive research. Through the focus on the lived experience of the body in the 
performance event, the form of my performance practice is most easily recognised as performance art (Johnson, 
2013), however in this chapter, I identify that the research operates interdisciplinarily, situated at the intersection 
of fields of performance art, live art, theatre and postdramatic theatre (Heathfield, 2004; Shalson, 2013; White, 
2013). I provide an account of how these practices come together through a focus on the body’s lived experience 
(Jones, 1998, 2012; Lobel, 2013), and how performance and live art have come to be seen as a welcoming practice 
for those with alternative lived experiences, such as my own experience of the chronic illness ME (Gómez-Peña, 
2004). I explore how embodied practice takes a view of the body/self as both subject and object (Grosz, 1994; 
Leder, 1990), and generates an intersubjective understanding of the body in performance (Bleeker, 2008; Conroy, 
2010; Fraleigh, 1987; Grosz, 1994; McConachie, 2008; Ravn, 2010).  
The autobiographical strand of the research means that it crosses borders with disability studies, particularly 
disability performance, and I identify some of the current theories around the social and cultural production of 
disability as an identity category and how disabilities are presented in performance (Garland-Thomson, 2017; 
Hadley, 2014; Henderson and Ostrander, 2010; Lindemann, 2010; Lobel, 2013; Marsh and Burrows, 2017). As ME is 
a disability that does not manifest visibly, I also draw on the intersection between disability studies and queer 
theory to examine concepts of passing as able-bodied and outing myself as disabled in performance (Bunzl, 1997; 
Fassett and Morella, 2008; Lindemann, 2010; Marsh and Burrows, 2017; Quinlan and Bates, 2010). I address the 
liminal state that invisible disabilities occupy between disability and able-bodiedness due to the fluctuating pattern 
of health and illness that ME entails (Cosenza, 2010, 2014; Lobel, 2010; McRuer, 2006), and argue for a new view 
of disabilities which encompasses a spectrum of embodied experience over binary identifications of ability (Marsh 
and Burrows, 2017; Henderson and Ostrander, 2010; Jones, 2012; Siebers, 2010). 
Finally, I detail how I research the production and reception of meaning through the body in performance, setting 
out the key research questions and examining theories surrounding looking, the gaze and spectatorship (Bennett, 
1997; Bleeker, 2008; Fischer-Lichte, 2008; Garland-Thomson, 2000, 2005b, 2006, 2009, 2014, 2017; Grehan, 2009; 
McConachie, 2008; White, 2013). I describe how the experience of chronic illness, including manifestation over 
long periods of time (why chronic illnesses can be classified as disabilities) influences elements of space and time in 
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performance, including concepts of duration and endurance, which impacts perceptions of physicality and 
meaning (Cosenza, 2010, 2004b; Heathfield, 2004; O’Brien, 2014; Vannini, Waskul and Gottschalk, 2012). 
 
1.2 Interdisciplinary research and performance art  
Performance art is an interdisciplinary genre that shares themes of artist presence, performativity, and 
performance as event with other arts practices such as live art and theatre, but has its own history of over 100 
years of performance practices, beginning in the early 1900s as a deliberate disruption to traditional artistic 
assumptions at the time (Goldberg, 2004). In her brief history of performance art, Rose-Lee Goldberg argues that 
performance art practices are difficult to categorise, partly due to the ephemeral and transient nature of the 
genre, which leaves little material to exhibit or archive (2004). Live art carries the same problematic intangibility, 
yet it is this very quality that gives live art its name. Emerging as a sector in the interdisciplinary art scene during 
the 1950s and 1960s, it was also a reactionary move against the dominant ideologies of the time, in particular as 
an antiestablishment reaction to the Conservative government (Johnson, 2013). Live art experimented with time in 
performance and focused on concepts of immediacy, immersion and interaction, as does performance art 
(Heathfield, 2004), but was seen as a more inclusive practice than performance art, which foregrounded the body 
and its visceral nature (Johnson, 2013). Performance art’s fascination with the body and live art’s call for inclusivity 
have attracted artists from diverse backgrounds, often those that have been considered ‘other’ to the majority, 
subjugated for reasons of sex, race, sexuality or physical difference, but who have found in performance a platform 
to share their experiences and claim their identity in a way that may resonate with others (Jones, 1998). Live art’s 
emergence from and questioning of the social contexts in which it is produced (Johnson, 2013) create what Bree 
Hadley describes as “productively live spaces” (2014: 14), which removes art from the fictional world of traditional 
theatre and brings it into the social realm. This creates a blurring of the boundaries of interaction between 
performer and spectator, one of the hallmarks of contemporary live art, which seeks to confront the illusion of 
performance with the immediacy and tangibility of a live act by drawing attention to “the elusive conditions of the 
real” (Heathfield, 2004: 9). 
The intertwined history and different interpretations of the terms performance art and live art means that today 
there is much overlap between the two practices, and the terms are often used interchangeably both nationally 
and artist-to-artist. Johnson draws attention to the ambiguous boundaries between performance art as a tradition 
and live art as an emerging sector from within it, arguing that the two areas allow crossover, and that attempts to 
make these definitions more clear run the risk of reducing either category or disallowing the interdisciplinary 
nature that is vital to both (2013). The diverse and destabilising explorations of performance or live art are not 
likely to emerge from other more conservative or more easily categorised disciplines (Johnson, 2013), making it 
“amongst the most challenging forms of practice to create, present or indeed to analyse” (Hadley, 2014: 23). The 
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difficulty in extricating one genre and set of practices from the other could be attributed to the conceptual overlap 
of the body and the effects of its status as ‘live’, perhaps because, as diverse performance practitioners and 
academics have shown, bodies are experienced within and through time, a central contention of my research 
(Charmaz, 1991; Fischer-Lichte, 2008; Jones, 2012; Jones and Heathfield, 2012; Ravn, 2009). In this thesis, I draw 
upon this conceptual overlap, using the term performance art to focus on the body and its liveness as the key 
concept of my practice. 
The body’s central position in performance art highlights the way bodies are perceived by others (Lobel, 2013). As 
Amelia Jones and Adrian Heathfield, academics in the fields of art and art history contend, “Live and/or 
performance art enact and engage bodies across time”, going on to note the renewed interest in the body in live 
and performance art since the turn of the millennium (2012: 15). Jones’s book Body Art: Performing the Subject 
(1998), addresses the body as both subject and object of the artwork, charting the shift in focus toward embodied 
experience and the conception of subjectivity that has taken place since the mid-twentieth century. She uses the 
term ‘body art’ to emphasise the body as a locus between the body/self and its cultural context, a point which is 
vital for the production and reception of meaning in my research. The body in performance, she argues, has no 
inherent meaning in itself, but meaning is ascribed through the context in which it is viewed and the specificity of 
the viewer perceiving it through his or her own embodied experience, in an “interpretation-as-exchange” of ideas 
(Jones, 1998: 9). I explore this interpretation through an investigation of how framing my body for performance 
through spatial and temporal factors such as proximity, speed and repetition contribute to or alter perceptions of 
the body, with both my own and the audience’s perceptions brought together for analysis. It is Jones’s central 
concept of an exchange of ideas that drives the research, with the body as the point around which the concepts of 
perception and embodiment are focused. As Jones argues, working with materials that envision the body 
(including the body itself) creates an embodied encounter that reflects both the artist’s relationship with her own 
body and her relationship with the viewers’ bodies, either in the present moment, or with embodied encounters 
that the artist anticipates in the future (Jones, 2012). The body therefore, is the point for shared interpretation and 
understanding, as while there is a vast spectrum of bodily experience, experience itself is predicated on living 
within and through a body (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). 
The body also proves to be the meeting point between performance/live art and its neighbouring performance 
practice, theatre, with “porous” borders between the two disciplines (White, 2013: 2). Laura Shalson (2013) argues 
that theatre is both close and removed from live art, suggesting that the reality of the body and its experience of 
endurance or suffering is the only distinction between the metaphor of theatre and the literalness of performance 
art, a literalness that has often been said to be the key feature of performance art as a field. It can also be argued 
however, that theatre has a literalness, seen in bodies in labour and the live presence of both performers and 
audience, elements that create theatre’s own sense of duration or endurance. Endurance then, is “either the limit 
that distinguishes the two forms or the principal point at which they overlap” (Shalson, 2013: 158). Shalson 
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identifies that the common point of performance is the act which in one way or another makes clear its 
mechanism of performance, yet in general, endurance tends to be viewed as the real and therefore to come out as 
a feature of performance art, rather than theatre. This unique crossover between performance art and theatre has 
become known as postdramatic theatre, a term which describes the memory of dramatic theatre but operates at 
its breaking point, recognising that, as Shalson argues, theatre remains something which is both endured by and 
endures within live art: “Dramatic theatre typically seeks to exclude the realities of the theatre situation, while 
performance art dwells on them” (159). The body’s lived experience, including that of endurance, is my starting 
point in this research, which draws together the varying disciplines of my background and training, across which I 
now work. As Johnson notes, it is hard to find a live artist whose work is confined to the performance or live art 
sectors, as artists draw on many other cross-disciplinary practices, and many artists have formal training and 
artistic practice from other more discrete disciplines (2013). My own training is in the theatre, with a heavy 
emphasis on classical and commercial dance, which has been influential on my understanding of concepts such as 
embodiment, subjectivity and performance, themes which I investigate in this research.  
As I have shown, performance art encompasses a range of artistic practices and backgrounds and has given rise to 
new terms and sectors including live art, body art and postdramatic theatre. The broad “conceptual territory” of 
performance art has made it a welcoming arena for artists with diverse backgrounds and experiences, one in which 
fluctuation and ambiguity are prevalent, and contradiction and paradox encouraged (Gómez-Peña, 2004: 78). 
Performance artist Guillermo Gómez-Peña asserts, 
Every territory a performance artist stakes is slightly different from that of his/her neighbour. We 
converge in this overlapping terrain precisely because it grants us special freedoms often denied 
to us in other realms where we’re mere temporary insiders. (Gómez-Peña, 2004: 78) 
This notion of inclusion in an arena that allows for greater creative expression through its adaptive practices and 
willingness to incorporate contradiction strikes a chord with my journey to the field thus far. My experiences in 
dance training and performance have been contrasted with ME, a chronic neurological condition, that has exerted 
a fluctuating but constant presence in my life since my early teens. ME affects multiple organ systems, producing 
symptoms of muscular fatigue, pain and spasms, poor immunology, a lack of temperature regulation, digestive 
issues, cognitive dysfunction including difficulty processing and remembering information, and heightened 
sensitivity to light, noise and touch (The ME Association, 2016). These embodied experiences starkly contradict the 
high levels of physical strength and stamina expected of dancers, and threaten to pull attention away from the 
illusory world created to the subjective experience of negative bodily sensations (Gray and Kunkel, 2001; 
Whiteside and Kelly, 2016). Gómez-Peña’s notion of being a “temporary insider” is familiar (2004: 78), as my sense 
of belonging in the dance community is always under threat from a chronic condition that could expose me as 
lacking in the requisite physical ability, and remove me to an outsider position. Similarly, the invisible nature of ME 
prevents me from being recognised as disabled and becoming an accepted member of the disabled community 
unless I mark myself out as such. Kurt Lindeman argues that disabled persons can occupy a position of liminality, 
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not entirely part of the able-bodied world, but neither are they removed from “the physical spaces and discursive 
formations embedded in able-bodied society”, arguing that embracing this liminality may be a form of resistance 
to the standard binary of able-bodied and disabled (Lindemann, 2010: 112). Julie Cosenza contends that these are 
socially constructed categories and that the fluidity of “betweener” identity offers unique embodied experiences 
and value (2014b: 2). For those with invisible disabilities, this sense of liminality is compounded by conditions 
which place them in an outsider position while allowing them to ‘pass’ as part of the able-bodied majority 
(Lindemann 2010; Quinlan and Bates, 2010). As Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell argue, the impact of social 
interaction surrounding embodied difference contributes to identity and the identification of self amongst others 
(2006). Invisible disabilities therefore, give rise to the concept of outing oneself from queer theory, consciously 
making the choice to communicate one’s lived experience with others and drawing attention to one’s difference 
(Branfman, 2015; Bunzl, 1997). This means that I must ‘perform’ my invisible disability to make this aspect of my 
lived experience visible to others. This area of my research draws on Erving Goffman’s theories of the 
performativity of self (1990) alongside queer theory to examine how the disclosure of my disability in performance 
may influence my self-perception as well as the audience’s perception of me. I use a variety of methods to perform 
my disability, including gestures derived from embodied experiences, methods of outing or ‘uncovering’ myself 
and a number of time-based strategies, all of which I will explore in detail in the case study chapters.   
The overlapping areas of performance and the performative, representation, reality and authenticity are brought 
together in a conceptual melting pot in performance art, with live art and theatre treading similar territory but 
with different approaches, codes and practices (Shalson, 2013). The focus that my research takes on embodied 
experience situates it most clearly within the performance art tradition, although my use of live performer 
presence, duration and endurance holds strong ties with live art (Johnson, 2013; Jones, 1998). I recognise, 
however, that I also make use of forms of representation in my use of autobiographical tropes such as the 
performance of past iterations of the self and the layering of both past and present selves in performance (seen 
particularly in the third case study), which situates me across the boundaries of performance art and theatre once 
again (Heathfield, 2004; Shalson, 2013). This research must be viewed then, as emerging from within and through 
my own context of embodied experience and history of performance practice (Johnson, 2013), taking in forms of 
representation and reality in an interdisciplinary practice that centres around the body and its potential for 
embodied, intersubjective knowledge exchange.  
 
1.3 The intersubjective body  
For many artists including myself, body-based performance practice is a way for the personal paradigm to intersect 
with the social (Gómez-Peña, 2004) as the body is used to express personal identity and experience and to share 
this with others through performance (Jones, 1998). This paradigm, common throughout performance and the 
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visual arts, is predicated on a fundamental understanding that the body is the site through which subjectivity 
arises, a theory derived from phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962). Merleau-Ponty’s major 
publications, Phenomenology of Perception (1962), Primacy of Perception (1964) and The Visible and the Invisible 
(1968), brought about a paradigmatic shift in theories of perception, as he argued that because our body is the 
medium through which we experience the world, it should be seen as central to experience, rather than as a 
separate object under control of the mind, a widely accepted dualist perspective previously set out by René 
Descartes (1596-1650). Merleau-Ponty’s contribution to contemporary academic thought has been enormously 
influential,  described as “the most detailed example of the manner in which phenomenology can interact with the 
sciences and the arts to provide a descriptive account of the nature of human bodily being-in-the-world” (Moran, 
quoted in Banes and Lepecki, 2007: 48). Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theory views the body as a lens for 
our perception of the world, meaning that it is the basis for all judgement as well as the means by which we 
generate a sense of subjectivity and selfhood (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Elizabeth Grosz adroitly summarises how 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of experience unites the physical body and conscious mind by existing between them:  
He locates experience midway between mind and body. Not only does he link experience to the 
privileged locus of consciousness; he also demonstrates that experience is always necessarily 
constituted, located in and as the subject’s incarnation. Experience can only be understood 
between mind and body – or across them – in their lived conjunction. (Grosz, 1994: 95) 
In Merleau-Ponty’s understanding therefore, the body is not merely a biological organism, but a uniquely conjoint 
entity comprising physical, mental and emotional exigencies. It is in living through a body that we gain sense-
information about the world around us and generate a response to this information. In short, our lived experiences 
make up our sense of self, a vital understanding in my research, which leans on this notion of embodied 
experience as a form of knowing and from which performance material can be generated. 
It is also through our bodies that we have a sense of personal identity – we are recognised and experienced by 
others as our body (Leder, 1990; Grosz, 1994). Drew Leder describes how Merleau-Ponty uses the phrase ‘lived 
body’ or ‘body’ to encompass the entire embodied self, with no intention to “impoverish our sense of humanity, as 
if the self were “just” a body” (Leder, 1990: 8). Leder goes on to extrapolate that if the body is the lens through 
which we perceive and experience the world, we are likewise, perceived and experienced as our body, a point that 
my performance practice relies on as a method of communicating my lived experiences and identity with others. 
Leder articulates,  
Within this perceptual world the body can itself appear as but another object to be perceived 
and scientifically described. However, this never exhausts its meaning. The very possibility of 
objects as we know them... refers us back to that body on the other side of things, the body-as-
experiencer. (Leder, 1990: 5) 
Leder’s statement warns against a view of the body as “but another object”, a concept that feminist and disability 
theorists have worked hard to counteract for being too ready to slip towards using the body, and bodily difference, 
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as the basis for judgement of others (Diamond, 1997; Schneider, 1997; Grosz, 1994; Jones, 1998, 2012). Elizabeth 
Grosz’s corporeal feminism (1994) calls for a move away from dualist notions that subordinate the body to the 
mind or bring about essentialising views of bodily difference, but instead uses the body’s experience as a source of  
knowledge, linking body and mind as one and the same entity, and in so doing, preventing a view of the body 
solely as object. She uses the model of the Möbius strip to describe the torsion between mind and body, with one 
existing alongside and through the other, each affecting the other in a never-ending series of twists and influence. 
Grosz argues that the body’s status as object therefore is questionable; it is an object and yet cannot be reduced to 
just this category because of its unique experiential ability. 
Thus it is both thing and a nonthing, an object, but an object which somehow contains or coexists 
with an interiority, an object able to take itself and others as subjects, a unique kind of object not 
reducible to other objects. (Grosz, 1994: xi) 
In body-based performance practice, the body’s position as subject of the art means that it is the object of 
attention, yet it can never be reduced to only this objectivity. It is through the body’s status as uniquely 
experiential object that we achieve subjecthood – as Grosz asserts, it is an “object able to take itself and others as 
subjects”. This ability to take others, not just as body-objects, but as fellow body-subjects is brought together in 
the live act of witnessing, in which performer and spectator share the experience of the performing body (Sheets-
Johnstone, 1966: 12). Collette Conroy explains that each person who shares in the act of performance, whether 
performer or witness, occupies a physical perspective: 
Whenever I watch or analyse a piece of theatre I occupy a physical perspective, and I rely on my 
own physical body as the vantage point of my analysis. So my analysis is always subject to the 
restrictions or possibilities that my own body imposes or opens up. (Conroy, 2010: 6) 
This means that the witness relies on her own lived experience in the interpretation of the performer’s body - she 
adopts an embodied perspective. Maaike Bleeker, examining visuality in the performance encounter, contends 
that the ‘looker’ always carries her subjectivity and embodied perspective into watching performance, leading her 
to argue that the “locus of looking” is the embodied self (Bleeker, 2008: 16). For her, performance is always 
mediated through the witness, in the specificity of her location and subjectivity, meaning that witnessing a 
performance event allows the viewer to share in the event in a real, embodied way. This is partly due to the effects 
of mirror neurons which contribute to our perception of movement by activating the same areas of the brain as 
when we perform the movement ourselves, so even when passively watching a performance we experience the 
movement in an embodied way (McConachie, 2008). This generates an understanding that witnessing bodies in 
performance is intersubjective, as somatic practitioner Susanne Ravn argues: 
this intertwined cycle between perception and motility does not amount to the body-subject in 
the process of becoming in a singular sense, but includes the fact that perception-action cycles 
extend beyond individual to include the other. (Ravn, 2010: 31, my emphasis) 
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Ravn’s research into dancers’ phenomenological experience demonstrates that their understanding of movement, 
sensation and embodiment is influenced by other dancers’ movement and expressions of subjective sensations in 
a participatory arena. I similarly argue that witnessing a performance event constitutes a shared practice, which 
my investigation into the body as site for communication hinges on, as the performer’s sense of space, time and 
sensation is interpreted by the audience and contributes to their understanding of embodiment. This point is 
examined by Gail Weiss: “To describe embodiment as intercorporeality is to emphasise that the experience of 
being embodied is never a private affair, but is always already mediated” (quoted in Jones, 2004: 135). Many 
contemporary performance artists rely on this understanding of intercorporeality as a method of communication 
between performer and witness, including artist Marina Abramović, whose work has centred on embodied 
experience since the 1960s. Scholar Peggy Phelan suggests that the success of Abramović’s work lies in her 
insistence that “the only subjectivity worth celebrating is an intersubjective and profoundly social and collective 
one”, a point that I approach through bringing my embodied experiences of invisible disability into the public 
realm (2004: 16).  
The joint witnessing of the performance event and the shared experience of embodiment has led somatic 
practitioner Sondra Fraleigh (1987) to argue for the use of the collective pronoun ‘we’ to describe the body in 
performance, explaining that despite specific bodily differences, the performer communicates through the body, 
which creates a shared consciousness: 
The art of dance draws upon both the personal and the universal body – tending, I believe, 
toward the latter as it becomes a source for communion, testifying to our bodily lived 
experience, our mutual grounding in nature, and our shared bodily acculturations. (Fraleigh, 
1987: xvi)  
The sharing of a body by audience and performer through the joint act of witnessing is reliant on the performer’s 
initial choice to use her body in her art, what Jerzi Grotowski believed to be the performer’s ethical duty (1968). In 
my research, investigating perceptions of meaning and physicality in the body using this understanding of 
intersubjectivity is complicated by the invisibility that governs my lived experience of ME. While disability culture 
activist Petra Kuppers contends that the disabled performer’s difference throws her into “hypervisibility and 
instant categorisation” (2001: 25), my own experience of disability is in being overlooked, assumed to be part of 
the able-bodied majority. In my performance, I interrogate this issue by revealing the invisibly disabled body that 
passes as an apparently able performing body, questioning whether the inherent invisibility of chronic illnesses 
prevents them from being recognised and how the physical experience they entail affects perceptions of meaning 
through the body. Communicating this personal lived experience holds further challenges. As Howes’ publication 
Empire of the Senses: The Sensual Culture Reader (2005) attests, despite the fact that perception itself is not 
“private, internal, ahistorical and apolitical” but “a shared social phenomenon”, individual sense perceptions are 
unique and can be problematic to communicate to those with alternate experiences (4-5). The difficulty of bringing 
my perception of invisible disability into the shared space of visual performance art then, comments on the 
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construction of disability as easily identified, demonstrable, and predictable (Kuppers, 2004; Millett-Gallant, 2010). 
As Jones accedes, 
We think we see and know differences as these seem to be visible in, on and through the body 
and its representation. We come to feel the difference. Our sense of our own bodies, as much as 
our beliefs about others' bodies, is over-determined by ideas about difference and identity 
pivoting often around visual cues. (Jones, 2012: 176, original emphasis)  
My research explores whether the potential for knowledge exchange that intersubjectivity allows will help in 
communicating my subjective experience with others in a visual medium, while acknowledging a culture-wide 
tendency to determine difference based on visual cues (Garland-Thomson, 2000; Jones, 2012; Kuppers, 2001; 
Marsh and Burrows, 2017; Siebers, 2010). 
 
1.4 The disabled and invisibly disabled body 
That publication of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theories were matched with the advent of body art in the 
1960s is no coincidence; as Sally Banes and André Lepecki contend, performance art also worked against 
outmoded notions of embodiment and toward a unified perspective of bodily experience (2007). This growing 
value for embodied forms of knowing precipitated a rise in autobiographical performance work, influencing other 
fields that reflected the deep connection between the body and culture, including the emergence of 
autoethnography (Bochner and Ellis, 2016). Physical forms of representation are an ideal method of both 
communicating cultural influences and influencing culture in return (Govan, Nicholson and Normington, 2007), and 
the body itself is able to demonstrate not just the knowledge gained through embodied practice but its sense of 
emplacement in culture and nature; as Ann Cooper Albright argues, the body can tell us a lot about its social value 
within a particular culture (Albright, 1997). Grosz similarly asserts that bodies are not simply inscribed by our social 
and cultural setting, but “are the products, the direct effects, of the very social constitution of nature itself” (1994: 
x). The body’s representation in art, history, and social settings does not simply image the body; these factors 
create the body in specific forms.  
The predominant body image represented in Western society is one of wholeness, which Jones argues is mythic as 
the body cannot be fully known through vision (1998). Bree Hadley  identifies that the notion of the whole body is 
“always already structured by the sexist, racist and ableist framework that articulates, and affirms, the binaries 
between one and other, male and female, able and disabled, that subtend Western cultural logics” (2014: 40). She 
goes on to contend  
It is this aspiration to wholeness - and the disabled person’s inability to achieve this wholeness 
they are taught to aspire to – that makes it difficult, both privately and publicly, for disabled 
people to accommodate the images by which Western culture defines bodies. (Hadley, 2014: 40)  
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Hadley’s argument holds sway, even when applied to the developing self-image of those with invisible disabilities. 
When the invisibly disabled person compares her own body to the representation of the whole body, there is no 
Freudian sense of the uncanny to raise a red flag of mismatching visual identity; the discrepancy between the 
idealised and real bodies runs deeper however, to embodied experience, where a chasm of difference is apparent. 
My body passes as the whole, able, capable body of Western culture but does not perform in the predictable 
patterns and rhythms embedded in ableist society (Cosenza, 2014a; Charmaz, 1991; Lindemann, 2017; O’Brien 
2014). Chronic illnesses as a group (a politically contentious task in terms of representation and inclusion in itself) 
challenge the able-ness implicit in the notion of the whole body. Grosz contends that representation of many 
bodies by one abstracted idea of the body is unrealistic, and calls instead for  
A plural, multiple field of possible body “types”, no one of which functions as the delegate or 
representative of the others... which, in being recognized for their specificity, cannot take on the 
coercive role of singular norm or ideal for all the others. (Grosz, 1994: 22) 
Using autobiographical and autoethnographic methods to express my personal embodied experience of invisible 
disability takes a step towards recognising this plurality of body types and embodied experiences. My body 
provides a point of contact between what is knowable only from within and what can be perceived from without, 
through the understanding that the body is subject of both cultural productions of the body and lived experience 
itself (Grosz, 1994).  
Hadley (2014) discusses how the ontological idea of being disabled emerges from societies in which the person’s 
lived experience is measured against the ‘mythical norm’, originally noted by Audre Lorde in 1984 (Lorde, 2017). 
This subjectivity gives rise to the notion that the disabled person is seen only as an antecedent, lacking or 
otherwise unable. Disability emerged as a social status in the UK and US during the mid-twentieth century, 
coinciding with a philosophical focus on the body and the introduction of ‘welfare state’ provisions such as the 
NHS, which began to view different bodily configurements in medical terms, rather than as oddities for spectacle 
as seen in the ‘freakshows’ of Victorian society (Hadley, 2014). The medical model of disability has focused on the 
visible, evidential aspects of bodily difference (Siebers, 2015), presenting disability variously as a traumatic 
situation to be handled privately (Hadley, 2014), a tragedy for its victim (Kuppers, 2004), a physical difference 
creating spectacle (Millett-Gallant, 2010), a role in which because the individual is sick they cannot participate in 
society (Quinlan and Bates, 2010) or a non-normativity to be overcome (Kuppers, 2001). However, there is a 
growing view that points to disability as a socially constructed category (Garland-Thomson, 2017; Hadley, 2014; 
Henderson and Ostrander, 2010; Lindemann, 2010; Lobel, 2013; Marsh and Burrows, 2017). Rosemary Garland-
Thomson notes that a sociocultural perspective engenders disability as a politicized term, but goes beyond physical 
difference to an understanding of what it means to be human: 
What we think of as disability is the transformation of flesh as it encounters world, as our body's 
response to its environment. This call and response between flesh and world makes disability. 
The discrepancy between body and world, between that which is expected and that which is, 
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produces disability as a way of being in an environment. So disability is certainly an index of 
capability in context but it is also a witness to our inherent receptivity to being shaped by the 
singular journey through the world that we call our life. Although our modern collective cultural 
consciousness denies vulnerability, contingency, and mortality, disability insists that our bodies 
are dynamic. We evolve into disability. Our bodies need care and assistance to live. Disability is 
the essential characteristic of being human. (Garland-Thomson 2017: 328) 
Hadley points out that disabled performers must find a way to address the practices and prejudices in “the 
continuing cultural labour of defining and policing bodies”, a task particularly fraught for the invisibly disabled 
performer, who must first make her condition recognised (2014: 35-36). Against the present climate of change in 
regards to the visibility, opportunity and scholarship of people with disabilities, I argue that those with invisible 
disabilities are taking a place as the ‘new other’, struggling to be recognised as disabled because of a condition 
which lacks the visibility that conventionally entails a disability. 
The social construction of disability is a fragile model which is liable to crumble when considering embodied 
experiences such as acute illness, chronic illness or invisible disabilities that do not immediately present in the 
demonstrable manner that the term disability has for so long implied (Lindemann, 2010). As Brian Lobel suggests, 
awareness of these subjectivities is now prompting a re-examination of the category of disability, to envision 
instead a curve of human experience that all of us will move across at various times in our life. He reminds us 
The frightening truth is that eventually everyone makes it over to this side of the illness/wellness 
equation... As the world of medicine and wellness changes, so do our experiences of illness and 
all its accoutrements. As we add more diverse, truthful, and generous voices, it will become 
impossible for others to stereotype the experiences, abilities, opinions, and attitudes of a person 
with an illness. (Lobel, 2010: 159)  
Disability theorists Bruce Henderson and Noam Ostrander agree that whether we consider ourselves disabled or 
able-bodied, each one of us has a relationship to disability whether through others, through ourselves or through a 
future for ourselves, as “we are all one step (or misstep) away from being (re)positioned in the world of disability” 
(2010: 1). This change in thinking about the social processes of identifying as disabled has led to the theory of 
disability as a performative act, which Henderson and Ostrander explain: ‘If disability, like gender and like sexuality 
in Judith Butler’s works, is always in the process of becoming, then disability is something we do rather than 
something we are’ (1-2). They suggest that disability studies are already involved within performance studies as 
performance seeks to display and explore a range of human experience and bodily subjectivities. Disability, then, 
should be viewed not as a loss or lack, but as “a variety of ways of being in the world” (3).  
The performance of disability by individuals with a range of embodied experiences can disrupt the notion of 
disability as a fixed and stable category (Lindemann, 2010). This process of performing lived experience and 
acknowledging belonging to an identity category as part of one’s art (albeit a fluid, shifting or temporary category), 
has been described by Lobel as “locating oneself while creating” (2013: 121). He admits that this process is 
especially problematic when dealing with invisible disability if one has previously been passing as non-disabled, 
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either consciously or not, a situation my performance practice explores (Lobel, 2013). There is already conceptual 
cross-over between disability studies and queer theory (Cosenza, 2010; Henderson and Ostrander, 2010; McRuer, 
2006), and I contend that invisible disabilities can be located at this intersection, carrying queer theories of 
otherness, performativity, and the requirement to out oneself to be recognised. My challenge then, is to 
communicate authentic knowledge, knowledge that is acquired through embodied being (Jones 2002), and present 
this experience as a multi-layered performance of ‘body fact’ in ‘body act’ (Henderson and Ostrander, 2010: 2).  
An aspect of my performance relies on me making visible some of the embodied experiences of living with a 
chronic illness, in a form of outing (Bunzl, 1997; Fassett and Morella, 2008; McRuer, 2006). Matti Bunzl notes that 
in the gay and lesbian community, the same system which protected its members “by a silencing veil of the 
unspeakable” also contributed to their discrimination (Bunzl, 1997: 131). Invisible disabilities are similarly veiled, 
not by the unspeakable, but the un-seeable, perpetuating discrimination through a lack of visibility, leading to a 
lack of awareness and representation. If the invisibly disabled are invisible, they are also unknowable to each 
other, so the process of recognising themselves as a group and articulating their collective identity consciousness is 
difficult, although online forums such as The Mighty (2019) go some way to address this issue.  Robert McRuer 
(2006) considers how visibility might affect coming out as 'crip', a theory which emerged alongside queer theory, 
both of which use pejorative terms in a fluid way, claimed by people from wider embodiments than the terms 
originally signified. He argues,  
Visibility and invisibility are not, after all, fixed attributes that somehow permanently attach to 
any identity... the relations of visibility in circulation around heterosexuality, ablebodiedness, 
homosexuality, and disability have shifted significantly. (McRuer, 2006: 2)  
Although I acknowledge the truth of McRuer's statement, I use the term invisible to acknowledge that my disability 
does not make a permanent visible mark on my body. In the invisibly disabled body, the evidence that Bunzl 
identifies is a pre-requisite of coming out, is subjective, tacit and experiential (1997). The visibility of my condition 
is shifting, contingent with the fluctuations of my symptoms and the way they are embodied and displayed 
through my behaviour. Deanna Fassett and Dana Morella (2008) argue that it is in coming out to others, the 
“repetitious actions... or utterances” that we are marked by our condition and which “constitutes one’s identity as 
disabled” (150). So, it is this action rather than inaction that creates the notion of being disabled. As Jones (2012) 
stresses, our sense of self is brought about through identifying not identity. 
Cosenza also draws on queer theory in her performance and academic practice to out herself or “make visible” the 
work that she, as a queer dyslexic graduate student has to undertake to match other students’ access, what she 
terms “invisible labor” (2014b: 1-2). She questions the assumption that disability is visible, or rather the 
assumption that that which cannot be seen does not exist, asserting that this affects the individual through issues 
of self-advocacy, a form of invisible labour itself. Invisible labour is likely to be different for each individual, as 
much of it derives from the awareness and management of sense data and the complicated “somatic work” 
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involved in making sense of it (Vannini, Waskul and Gottschalk, 2012: 19). For many, the work of monitoring and 
managing chronic illness is carried out privately, at home, where the environmental factors that exacerbate 
symptoms can be kept to a minimum, contributing to the invisibility of chronic conditions. Chronic illnesses, which 
manifest through time, also require a re-thinking of normal time constraints meaning that individuals may have to 
remove themselves from public spaces and “the hidden rhythms of privilege” - the time it takes to achieve day-to-
day tasks according to expectations of normal functioning and activity levels (Cosenza, 2014a: 156). As studies 
have shown (Charmaz, 1991; Morris, 2008; O’Brien, 2014) this privileged time is not compatible with the "chronic 
time” of invisible disability; the experience of time enforced by rhythms in the management of chronic illness, such 
as timed administration of medication, the longer time taken to achieve basic activities, or for periods of rest 
(Morris, 2008: 411).  
Kate Marsh and Johnathon Burrows’ publication Permission to Stare. Fresh Perspectives on Arts and Disability 
(2017), a collection of open letters from members of the disability arts community together with Marsh and 
Burrows’ editorial writings, explores the changing definitions of disability and the many ways that disabled artists 
navigate the complex terrain of performing their identity as disabled. They demonstrate that disability 
performance is becoming recognised in a much broader view and as “one of the creative opportunities of our 
time” (6) in which different experiences and perspectives produce uniquely insightful art works. A central intention 
of the publication is that “nobody has to declare their authenticity” (9) or prove themselves to belong to any 
particular identity category; an important step in recognising the struggle for legitimacy that many disabled 
individuals experience. As someone with a fluctuating condition, I have questioned whether I am disqualified from 
identifying as disabled when I am not symptomatic. This point is similarly addressed by dancers Welly O’Brien and 
Annie Hanauer who consider how the shifting visibility of their bodily differences prompts different reactions from 
their audiences and influences their categorisation as disabled dancers, and how this informs their self-perception. 
Hanauer considers herself a dancer but questions how her label as a disabled dancer may re-contextualise her 
within or outside of the disability arts sector, and O’Brien similarly questions whether her skill as a dancer resides 
in her disability; “Am I still valid if I am not making my disability explicit? How am I perceived then?” (quoted in 
Marsh and Burrows, 2017: 20). As O’Brien and Hanauer’s letters attest, having a central part of your identity 
overlooked can be an uneasy experience, and call into question your own identification. While the body has 
traditionally been the site through which identity is conceived and presented, this can lead towards the conflating 
of body as identity, which is the basis for judgements based on sex, race and so on (Jones, 1998). This is not to say 
that my disability is who I am - ME is not me (although I have deliberately used the alternative name CFS in the 
past to avoid that lexical similarity) - but my embodied experiences do inform my subjectivity. My condition 
fluctuates up and down the spectrum of bodily experience; I am sometimes disabled and unable to walk more than 
a few paces, but even at these times I pass as ‘able bodied’ with no physical disfigurement. Like Hanauer, I identify 
as a dancer but I feel a sense of illegitimacy when even inclusive dance companies promote the concept of physical 
elitism through material that frames dancers’ strength and endurance, supported by ‘intensive’ training 
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programmes, which remain the “imperative pathway” to success in a career as a physical performance artist 
(Hargreaves and Vertinski, 2007). Crossing the border into performance art has afforded me the “temporary 
emancipation” that Gómez-Peña describes, allowing for a focus on my physicality and embodied experience as the 
groundwork of my research, but without the insistence on metaphorically (or literally) jumping through hoops 
(2004: 78).  
Other performances have explored fluctuating or invisible health conditions, such as Ecclesia Theatre and Maeve 
O’Neill’s play Hidden: A Love Story About Invisible Disability, which imagined the effects of an undiagnosed invisible 
condition on a romantic relationship (2017). Solo autobiographical performances include Peggy Shaw’s 
performance Ruff (2016), which reflected on her changing needs since having a stroke, or Helen Duff’s Vanity Bites 
Back (2016), exploring her experiences with anorexia and mental health issues through comedy and clowning. 
Coventry University’s InVisible Difference conference in November 2015 also provided a platform for academics 
and performers to examine embodied difference, including Charlotte CHW whose durational performance Pushing 
It tested the limits of her chronic health condition in a durational installation, and Alessandro Schiatterella and 
Annalisa Piccirillo’s performance presentation What a Body Can(not) Do?, exploring questions of bodily 
accomplishment through Piccirillo’s spoken words and Schiatterella’s invisibly disabled performing body. While 
fluctuating health conditions such as ME “contest[s] the possibility of predictable performance” this can offer new 
insight in itself (Price and Shildrick, 1999: 436). In her contribution to Marsh and Burrows’ publication (2017), Tanja 
Erhart shares her experiences as a performance practitioner, noting that while bad bouts of health impact on the 
work she creates because it affects how she views life day-to-day, art can thrive on learning curves like this. Erhart 
questions the perception that a sick body is unable to do or achieve things, arguing that our bodies should not be 
fixed into categories of what they are, but would better be viewed by what they can do at particular times. Will 
Bride corroborates, arguing that performance stemming from personal ability is both valid and valuable as artistic 
practice, and “doesn’t at all mean complacency or concession” (quoted in Marsh and Burrows, 2017: 19). This 
consciousness informs my performance practice, as I create material through rhythms that emerge from my body’s 
needs, and gestures and behaviour that reveal my embodied experiences.  
Publications and performances by the scholars and artists I have discussed have paved the way for a view of 
disabilities that reconsiders the production of aesthetic merit by including more diverse representations of bodily 
difference (Jones, 2012).  Tobin Siebers addresses (2015) this new concept of aesthetic value: 
Disability presents increasingly as the key figure in the production and appreciation of modern 
art, one that is synonymous with aesthetic value in itself. Not only is this evolution crucial 
because it embeds the perception of disability in some of the most creative and valued practices 
in human history but also because it throws open the door to the work of disabled artists, whose 
images of disabled people and themselves must now take their place alongside other treasured 
visions of beauty. (Siebers, 2015: 243) 
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Siebers’ publication Disability Aesthetics (2010) is an explicit search for this new aesthetic value, although flawed 
by a preoccupation with visible forms of embodied difference. While he does not explicitly qualify what he includes 
or excludes in his use of the term ‘disability’, he focuses on visibility as a central theme, through descriptive 
phrases including “the shapes of the individual bodies accepted or rejected by the body politic” (60, my emphasis) 
and his examples of facial disfigurements, limb deformities and even Tourette’s syndrome, conditions which 
present in visible ways. This recognises only a limited spectrum of embodied experience and excludes many 
subjectivities from the attribution of aesthetic value he pursues: I question whether my body is “objectionable” 
(61) enough for his new standard of aesthetic value or whether the invisibility of my condition would prevent my 
body from earning his attention. As Siebers goes on to elucidate, “disability aesthetics embraces beauty that seems 
by traditional standards to be broken, and yet it is not less beautiful, but more so, as a result” (2010: 3). If my 
‘brokenness’ is not visible, I am once again in a liminal state, between the able-bodied, beautiful in their wholeness 
and perfection, and the disabled, beautiful because of their brokenness and difference. Invisible disabilities could 
therefore be described as existing at a vanishing point in this binary, a position of unseen presence, a theme I will 
return to in the second and third case studies (Fischer-Lichte, 2008; Phelan, 1993; Schneider, 1997).  
 
Figure 1. Judith Scott's Construction (Scott, date unknown) 
Work such as mine begins to shed light on an unseen or invisible aesthetic merit wherein the value lies in the 
alterity of experience concealed beneath the visceral layers of the body much like the cocoon-like artworks of 
Outsider artist Judith Scott (figure 1). Her sculptures are created by wrapping objects in multiple layers of twine, 
rendering the original object invisible to anyone but herself, reflecting the interiority of the experience of disability. 
Scott’s work, which has attracted attention from disability theorists (Sedgwick, 2003; Siebers, 2015), provides an 
example of the relationship of the subjective experience of the soma and the objective perception that others hold 
of the visceral body, a duality which is reconciled in each yarn-covered object. While efforts have been made to 
more fully understand Scott’s intentions behind her artworks, with X-rays allowing a view through the layers and 
revealing the collections of items beneath, her process of selecting the items and transforming them into uniquely 
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layered and colourful objects is still not clear. My own artistic practice follows a similar vein as the audience sees 
my visible body in performance, which conceals the invisible experience of disability that is only clear from within 
and therefore to me as artist. The new invisibility aesthetic that I suggest asks the viewer to consider the 
experience of the artist as the fundamental message of the artwork, a rhetoric that engages the viewer in a 
complex interchange of acknowledging and understanding another’s subjectivity. 
 
1.5 Researching the production and reception of meaning  
To perform my subjective experience of chronic illness I take an embodied and somatic approach, drawing on 
Fraleigh’s contention (1987) that although other mediums communicate the body, body-based performing arts 
express the body’s experience best through the essential liveness of its real, living, breathing presence, a 
fundamental point to live art practice (Heathfield, 2004; Johnson, 2013; Jones, 1998). I will examine somatic 
practice in greater detail in the methodology chapter but will now address how an embodied perspective assists in 
research into the production and reception of meaning in performance by reconciling subjective visceral 
knowledge with visual forms of knowing (Fraleigh, 2015; Garland Thomson, 2009; Welton, 2012). 
Embodied practice is a broad methodological field including theories of perception, presence and engagement 
with the world (Low, 2003). While it encompasses varying techniques and practices, a psychosomatic perspective, 
assuming a symbiosis of mental and physical perceptions is common to all and is a prevailing methodological 
approach to both the generation of performance material and as a method of analysis (Brodie and Lobel, 2012; 
Fraleigh, 2015, 2018; Fraleigh and Hanstein, 1999; Grosz, 1994; Leder, 1990; Ravn, 2009, 2010; Sheets-Johnstone, 
1966; Zarrilli, Daboo and Loukes, 2013; Zinder, 2009). My research applies this unified perspective of 
consciousness through physicality to examine how my embodied experiences may impact perception of my 
gestural body, and therefore influence how meaning and physicality are interpreted. To approach this research 
into the production and reception of meaning through the body, I set out some key critical questions: 
How does the gestural body function as an effective site for communication through space and 
time? 
How does the displacement of the embodied space influence perception of what is performed? 
To what extent do changes in space and time influence perception of stylised gestures in 
performance? 
In my research, I use the term gestural body to encompass the body as a physical and mental entity, taking gesture 
as an action performed to express or convey an idea, meaning, or intention, (Soanes and Stevenson, 2006). I use 
gesture as a dimension of language that reveals thought, going beyond its often unconscious use in everyday 
communication to the conscious, whole-body movement of performance (McNeill, 2005). As an expressive act, 
gesture predicates a relationship between the gestural body (the performer) and another subject (the audience), 
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to which it offers this gesture, so I address both my intention of expression as performer, and my perception of 
doing so, as well as the perception of this gesture by the audience. A gesture is an example of a semiotic act, a 
concept communicated through a symbolic action whether meaning is intentional or interpreted (Elam, 1980). 
David McNeill argues however, “It is profoundly an error to think of gesture as a code or ‘body language’ separate 
from spoken language” (2005: 4), but is in fact one aspect of a single, integrated mind-body system. Bruce 
McConachie (2008) agrees that while performances may carry semiotically loaded scenes or gestures, the 
spectator does not consciously decode this framework to make links between signifier and signified in order to 
understand the action. He points to the mirror neurons that enable the spectator to interpret emotion and 
empathise on an immediate and inscrutable level, leaving them with a feeling or understanding of the situation 
through their experience, rather than a network of significance from which to analyse and extrapolate meaning. 
Martin Welton describes this interpretation as an “energetic charge” (2012: 99), which occurs in the spectator as a 
sensuous understanding of what the movement might feel like, arguing that this embodied interpretation connects 
the performer and spectator so that seeing becomes a matter of feeling.  
Erika Fischer-Lichte (2008) identifies that when performers concentrate their efforts on aspects such as 
embodiment, sensuality and materiality, the spectator becomes “the creator of new meaning” (2008: 139). In her 
theory of meaning-making, Fischer-Lichte uses the term autopoiesis, a term originally used in biology denoting the 
self-producing systems of living organisms, to describe the ongoing feedback loop between audience and 
performer in the performance event. Although as embodied individuals we are constantly interpreting and 
contributing to the autopoietic system of everyday interaction, performance creates scenarios which heighten 
awareness of this process. This feedback loop in performance is similar to a reflexive methodology:  
As a self-organizing system, as opposed to an autonomously created work of art, it continually 
receives and integrates into that system newly emerging, unplanned, and unpredictable 
elements from both sides of the loop. (Carlson, quoted in Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 8) 
Fischer-Lichte goes on to argue that while contemporary performance scholars agree that meaning is created 
between performers and spectators rather than sitting solely in the quarter of one or the other, the focus has 
become examining the ways this production of meaning occurs and how it consequently changes the feedback 
loop, impacting the creation of performance (Fischer-Lichte, 2008). I take this approach in my research, using the 
case studies to gather data from myself and the audience about the factors that impact how perception of the 
body, which contributes to my ongoing reflexive research.  
Scholars in the fields of spectatorship including Susan Bennett (1997), Maaike Bleeker (2008) and Gareth White 
(2013) identify that visual performance carries meaning through spectators’ perceptions. It is also understood that 
an individual carries their personal history of meanings, associations and significations from experience in their 
particular social, cultural and historical setting, into their interpretation of performance; what Bennett describes as 
a ‘horizon of expectations’ (1997). Fischer-Lichte however, acknowledges that certain performances create 
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conditions which assist in producing a ‘blank canvas’ of association, disconnecting meanings from wider contexts 
and “liberating the emotional potential that any theatrical element might carry for a given perceiver” (2008: 152). 
In my performance practice I consider how the framing of my body through elements such as staging, lighting, 
sound, clothing and the speech acts that signify the parameters of the performance may contribute to associations 
beyond my body’s gestures and physicality. As Bleeker contends, postdramatic theatre can effectively deconstruct 
ways of seeing from within an awareness of how the performance situation is presented. It is contrived, 
orchestrated and engineered to hold particular signs and significance for the spectator and it is by examining these 
aspects of theatricality that we can better understand the process of meaning-making (2008). Bennett (1997) 
contends that it is through the spectator’s understanding of his/her own relation to both the inner frame of the 
performance, containing the particular performance event with its ideological coding and production strategies, 
and the outer frame, comprised of the concept of theatre as cultural construct and the audience’s definitions and 
expectations of performance, that meaning-making occurs. Through these two frames and at their points of 
intersection, the spectator finds awareness of their own position in relation to both sets of action, and therefore 
able to interpret the performance as an individual. As Bennett articulates,  
It is the interactive relations between audience and stage, spectator and spectator which constitute 
production and reception, and which cause the inner and outer frames to converge for the creation of a 
particular experience. (Bennett, 1997: 139)  
Fundamental to the framing of my body for performance is awareness of how movement contributes to the 
interpretation of meaning. Gesture is a transitory and malleable symbol, occurring through time and space, 
meaning that changes to elements of time such as speed and repetition, and elements of space such as size and 
proximity are influential in how gestures are perceived (Govan, Nicholson and Normington, 2007). Performance 
practitioners have used different approaches to manipulate the performance of gesture to explore how meaning is 
created and interpreted, such as dancer Pina Bausch who used repeated actions to create impact through time 
(Hurstfield, 2014) or performance artist Marina Abramović for whom repetition is a central theme to analyse 
artistic endurance (AAA AAA, 1977; Breathing in Breathing Out, 1978; Rhythm 10, 1973).  
Repetition of an action may also impact how the performer’s movements displace the space that she occupies. 
Rudolf Laban’s kinesphere (figure 2) demonstrates this concept through imagery of the space encompassed by the 
outstretched limbs of the body in all directions, a model of particular interest to my perception of embodied space 
owing to the unusual neurological and muscular sensations symptomatic of ME. A distinguishing feature of this 
chronic illness is intense fatigue, which I perceive as a retreat of the flow of energy that follows the path of the 
central nervous system in my body. I describe this process in more detail in Untitled, using the kinesphere to 
develop a model to analyse my phenomenological perception of ME. At times when I feel fatigued, my ability to 
hold my body upright, move my limbs and walk normally is compromised, meaning that I am no longer capable of 
occupying my normal kinesphere. The new image of the kinesphere would show a much smaller space that I would 
have the potential to inhabit, governed by the extent that my current state of fatigue would allow my arms or legs 
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to move in and reflecting a concept of bodily dys-appearance as expressed by Leder (1990), which I explore in 
greater depth in the methodology and case study chapters. This fluctuating sense of potential movement space 
would undoubtedly influence the way I perform a gesture, and there would be visible changes to the space 
encompassed by the motion of the gesture, the time taken to perform it and the duration I could perform it for. 
These changes are dependent on my perception of a physical condition that is invisible to the audience, but the 
effects of which may become perceptible through gesture.  
 
Figure 2. Rudolf Laban's kinesphere (The kinesphere) 
Exploring elements of space, speed and repetition introduces concepts of duration and endurance into the 
research, which in the case of chronic illness is complicated by the body’s experience of being regulated through 
time, with symptoms of illness something which is already endured (Charmaz, 1991; Garland-Thomson, 2014; 
Morris, 2008; O’Brien, 2014). While connotatively similar, duration designates a period of time during which 
something continues, whereas endurance carries the additional meaning of suffering through something prolonged 
or painful with patience (O’Brien, 2014; Soanes and Stevenson, 2006). As I have articulated, the invisible labour 
suggested by Cosenza (2010, 2014b) that people with disabilities carry out goes unnoticed by those party to the 
hidden rhythms of privilege. My research investigates how this may impact the understanding of durational 
performance for those whose perception of time and ability to endure conventional time frames is governed, not 
by their own will, but by the regulations of their condition (Morris, 2008). Duration or endurance may take on new 
meaning, existing in new parameters, affected by the somatic work of experiencing and enduring illness which is 
subsequently framed for performance (O’Brien, 2014; Vannini, Waskul and Gottschalk, 2012). As Lobel identifies, 
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for people experiencing illness “the lens through which they view the world (and through which the world often 
views them) changes irreparably” (2010: 158). The performance may request a view of time that disrupts 
normative assumptions of temporality to reflect the performer’s experience of chronicity, or open up new views of 
temporality through which the witnesses to the event find their own understandings and resonances within the 
duration of the performance (Heathfield, 2004). 
Framing alternative modes of endurance in performance art may draw spectators’ attention to their habitual ways 
of seeing, imaging and imagining disability, a disruption to social or theatrical norms “intervening in the cultural 
construction of disability” (Hadley, 2014: 15). However, communicating subjective, sense-led experience through a 
visual medium to those with alternative experiences has inherent challenges as neither inner perception nor 
cultural understanding of perception follows linguistic conventions. As Howes attests 
The senses are constructed and lived differently in different periods and societies, and this fact 
has profound implications for how cultural subjects apprehend their environment, as well as 
other persons and things in their environment. (Howes, 2005: 399) 
Leder (1990) contends that the difficulty in describing inner sensations could be attributed to the limited 
dimensional range of our interoception, which has a qualitative simplicity and a correlative lack of descriptive 
vocabulary to communicate its experience. The current cultural era of occularcentrism (Classen, 1993, 2005; 
Garland-Thomson, 2009; Howes, 2005) and my own history in visually-based performing arts has perhaps biased 
me toward a visual medium in the communication of a subjective and visceral experience, a central challenge of 
my research which has led me toward embodied, sensorial practice, offering the possibility of intersubjective 
understanding (Fraleigh, 1987; Grosz, 1994; Jones, 2004; Ravn, 2010).  
Performing as a disabled artist addresses prevailing discourses around the gaze as I create scenarios in which I 
offer my body for view. Forms of looking, gazing and staring have prompted enquiry from many perspectives, 
often seen as a form of domination across boundaries of race, gender and physical difference (Diamond, 1997; 
Garland-Thomson, 2009; Grosz, 1994; Millett-Gallant, 2010; Schneider, 1997; Welton, 2012). Welton asserts that 
the widely accepted view of the gaze, which he argues “has been held responsible for a host of critical and cultural 
crimes – from male hegemony to the very tenets of Western thought itself” (2012: 162), has somehow situated 
seeing as outside the body, creating an unhelpful disconnection from its embodiment. Elizabeth Grosz however, 
argues that the spectator is implicated in the act of looking through a phenomenological perspective: “Seeing 
entails having a body that is itself capable of being seen, that is visible” (1994: 101). Garland-Thomson, who 
examines staring as a form of knowing, similarly contends that looking can “promote[s] attentive identification 
between viewer and viewed” (2006: 189), arguing that staring is far from one-sided but an embodied and 
relational exchange (Garland-Thomson, 2005b). In my performance practice, I present my lived experience as an 
object of spectacle to engender greater reflection from the spectator. As Garland-Thomson contends,  
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staring marks the body of the staree and enacts a dynamic visual exchange between a spectator 
and a spectacle. A certain symmetry inheres in the staring encounter in that it grants a 
preemptive agency to the starer but it also endows the staree with the ability to seize the 
attention and to hold in thrall the starer. (Garland-Thomson 2006: 175) 
This sense of agency also allows me to examine my self-perception because as Garland-Thomson suggests, being 
viewed in this way reveals who we imagine ourselves to be (2000). If the visibly disabled performer’s body brings 
about staring from the viewer through ‘arrested attentiveness’ (Garland-Thomson, 2000), I would argue that the 
invisibly disabled performer’s body requests a different kind of attentiveness, persistent attentiveness, where the 
viewer must search beyond what is immediately seeable to what might be perceived through the performer’s 
gesture and physicality:  
Staring is a conduit to knowledge. Stares are urgent efforts to make the unknown known, to 
render legible something that at first glance seems incomprehensible. In this way, staring 
becomes a starer’s quest to know and a staree’s opportunity to be known. (Garland-Thomson, 
2009: 15) 
As I have previously discussed, presenting my invisibly disabled body as a spectacle in performance requires that I 
out myself as disabled, a conscious othering which carries political implications about the marginalised position 
that invisibly disabled people occupy in society. Helena Grehan, drawing on Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy of the 
responsibility of the self to the other, believes that performance offers “an alternative space of resistance, of calm, 
or even of radical unsettlement within which spectators may hear the call of the other”, prompting an active 
engagement and an ethical response (Grehan, 2009: 20). Grehan suggests that if a performance has successfully 
engaged them, spectators will be left in a state of ongoing reflection and ‘ambivalence’, a term which she 
describes as “about acknowledging the complex, often contradictory and multilayered questions and responses 
political performances can trigger for spectators” (Grehan, (2009: 25). Solo performance can provide a platform for 
an individual to claim territory that may have been unexplored (Heddon, 2008) and for those with disabilities, 
public identification as disabled to the non-disabled majority is a subtle part of the social navigation as a disabled 
person (Lobel, 2013). Lobel posits,  
There seems to be something about ‘awareness’ – its porous nature, its indeterminateness – 
which seems well suited to performance, as an exploration of bodies in space in front of an 
audience... performance work which reflects upon certain lived experience... demonstrates an 
openness for both the performer and the many audiences that the work produces. (Lobel, 2013: 
128). 
Comedienne and presenter Francesca Martinez draws on her experiences with cerebral palsy and reflects on her 
choices of self-representation and others’ perception of her in her performance What the **** is Normal? (2018), 
also a book. In this one-woman performance, Martinez’s unique brand of ironic humour and fearless honesty 
questioned concepts of physical normality and perceptions of disability, proving Mat Fraser’s argument that 
disabled artists are increasingly “intervening in society’s preconceptions of disability” (quoted in Hadley, 2014; 
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182). He argues that when a disability is visible there are prevailing strategies about how to deal with the situation 
of recognition through pre-existing ‘scripts’ for interaction. Although Martinez’s disability manifests in a visible 
way, her acceptance of her disability offered the audience a new script of interaction in which she encouraged 
recognition of her physical difference as part of her lived experience, rather than something to be deliberately 
overlooked. From my own and my friends’ experience of the performance, it is clear that Martinez’s performance 
generated the ethical ambivalence that Grehan proposes, keeping spectators “engaged with the other, with the 
work, and with responsibility and therefore in an ethical process, long after they have left the performance” 
(Grehan, 2009: 22). 
With invisibility as an issue, perceptions of disability are additionally complex as there is often no script to follow 
because the situation is not recognised as one of disability interaction. While Peggy Phelan contends that in our 
current age of post-modernism and technology we have “a more general sense of connection to one another” 
(Phelan, quoted in Grehan, 2008: 172), my task with this research is to make clear the additional challenges to this 
connection when invisibly disabled individuals’ otherness is occluded by the invisibility of their condition. This 
entails an exploration of the ways in which I might make transparent my experience of otherness in performance 
through the gestural body, including the experience of outing myself as other, with the emotional and 
psychological challenges of voluntarily marking myself as different to the norm and belonging to a community to 
which I may not appear to belong (Cosenza, 2010, 2014b; Fassett and Morella, 2008; Lindeman, 2010; Quinlan and 
Bates, 2010). For the spectators of my performance, the scripts of interaction will be challenged as I investigate 
perceptions of my invisible disability to explore how the binary identity categories of disabled and able bodied are 
attributed. As Jones (2012) identifies 
we must continue to acknowledge the ways in which bodies are identified and positioned in the 
world (including our own), while refusing to allow our assumptions about identity to congeal into 
fixed binaries. In order to promote this politics, it is - I will insist - essential first and foremost to 
keep the durational aspects of how we identify in the foreground. (Jones, 2012: 6) 
Jones’s move away from binary models of identification toward “multiple, intersectional, and relational processes” 
(6) is paramount to this research as I explore the liminalities that influence perceptions of the invisibly disabled 
body in performance. However, as Jones points out, we have to be considerate of resistance to concepts which 
nevertheless endure in the language we use to describe them - in critiquing binaries, we are forced to rely on 
words that perpetuate the binary concept, themes which emerge in my own research through concepts of able-
bodied/disabled and visible/invisible. By using my invisibly disabled body to investigate factors that influence 
perceptions of physicality and meaning in performance, I suggest that embodied experience exists on a spectrum 
rather than a binary. Through an exploration of the fluctuating influence of chronic illness on my body/self, and 
how repeated acts of self advocacy and outing construct my body/self through time, I present identity as an 




Chapter 2: Methodological Approaches 
 
2.1 Methodological overview  
The research into perceptions of physicality and meaning through the invisibly disabled body has been practice-
based, predicated on my subjective position as researcher-practitioner, which has provided an immediate and 
authentic way of gathering data (Barrett and Bolt, 2007). In this chapter, I describe how the flexibility of qualitative 
research has allowed me to draw on interdisciplinary methods including autobiography and autoethnography 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Heddon, 2008), and point to the links between subjective research methods and 
phenomenology (Kozel, 2007; Fraleigh, 1987, 2018; Fraleigh and Hanstein, 1999; Ravn, 2009; Roche, 2015). I 
provide an account of how an embodied approach has offered a way to explore sensory and somatic forms of 
knowing and to bring this into the visual realm as a way to communicate the subjective experience of the invisibly 
disabled body (Banes and Lepecki, 2005; Fischer-Lichte, 2008; Howes, 2005; Siebers, 2015; Vannini, Waskul and 
Gottschalk, 2012). I explain how my personal experience with chronic illness has influenced this embodied 
approach, including how the dys-appearing body (Leder, 1990) and the experience of chronic time precipitate 
somatic awareness (Morris, 2008; Charmaz, 1991). Working from the needs and fluctuations of a chronically ill 
body impacts the methods of creating movement material (Fraleigh and Hanstein, 1999; Marsh and Burrows, 
2017) and I describe how I have brought unconscious motions into intentionality and used psychophysical 
techniques to generate impact through repeated actions for both performer and audience (Fraleigh, 2015; Welton, 
2012; Zarrilli, Daboo and Loukes, 2013; Zinder, 2009).  
In my subjective research, I have developed reflexive strategies through which I analyse and inform the ongoing 
enquiry (Brownlie, 2014; Burkitt, 2012; Schön, 1983), and I detail how using a journal has assisted in this reflexivity, 
building my confidence in my voice as a researcher and providing a view of my research journey (Cunningham and 
Carmichael, 2018; Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011; Roche, 2015). I discuss how  the various methods of 
documentation, including through journaling, digital recordings and taking photographs of myself has drawn my 
awareness to how I embody my research (Bochner and Ellis, 2016), allowing me to reflect on my identity as 
researcher emerging through time  (Freeman, 2010; Kozel, 2013; Jones, 2012).  
Finally, I provide an account of the research design, with three case studies providing opportunities for data 
collection, merging theory with practice (Hann, 2015). I consider how my chronic illness has influenced the 
research design, such as the research setting  (Bennett, 1997; McConachie, 2008), but suggest that as gatekeeper, 
my invisibly disabled body has the potential to open new avenues of knowledge (Marsh and Burrows, 2017; 
Siebers, 2015). I go on to describe how I have gathered data from personal experiences through somatic 
engagement (Grosz, 1994; Leder, 1990; Ravn, 2010), and from the audiences of the workshop performances 
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through questionnaires, group discussions and recordings, and lastly, give an account of my methods of data 
analysis.  
 
2.2 Practice-based research, phenomenology, and autobiographical and 
autoethnographic approaches  
The research that I undertake has been practice-based, which as a qualitative research method can be described as 
“multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach” that “crosscuts disciplines, fields, and 
subject matter” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 1-2).  Practice-based research has allowed me to draw on 
interdisciplinary approaches that are relevant to the research through my own position of subjectivity (Heddon, 
2008), which has incorporated autobiographical and autoethnographic approaches through the focus on personal 
experience as influenced by a wider social and cultural context. Since its inception in the late 1980s, practice-based 
research has been the preferred method of enquiry for theatre and performance studies owing to the 
interweaving of conceptual dualisms, including artistic and theoretical, creative and cognitive, and practical and 
written, elements that my approach incorporates (Barrett and Bolt, 2007; Freeman, 2010; Nelson, 2013). Baz 
Kershaw and Helen Nicholson identify that the relationship between the researcher and the research subject in 
this creative field is similarly intermingled: 
intuitive messiness and aesthetic ambiguity are integral to researching theatre and performance, 
where relationships between the researcher and the researched are often fluid, improvised and 
responsive. (Kershaw and Nicholson, 2011: 2) 
 
My central position in the research means that I have been affected by my discoveries as researcher as much as 
the inquiry has been influenced by my position as creator (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; Kershaw and 
Nicholson, 2011). Heddon (2008) argues that as the self is the starting point from which to view the world and of 
all creative or theoretical production, such subjectivity is widely in accepted in research. Furthermore, Estelle 
Barrett and Barbara Bolt argue that this position of immersion generates a deeper epistemological understanding 
through the combination of practical exploration and reflective theory than could be gained through traditional, 
academically driven research alone (2007). The cycle of practice and enquiry has the capacity to build the 
practitioner-researcher’s skills and experience in a heuristic process of discovery, gathering data across a broader 
spectrum than single-mode research (Nelson, 2013). Through immersion in the field, I have equipped myself for 
the journey of enquiry, learning from each stage of practice to reveal the next portion of the map to new 
knowledge.  
The researcher’s position of influence and subjectivity in practice-based performance research means that there is 
necessarily a focus on individual and subjective perspectives, leading many performance practitioners and 
researchers to explore its links with phenomenology (Banes and Lepecki, 2007; Kozel, 2007; Fraleigh, 1987, 2018; 
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Fraleigh and Hanstein, 1999; Ravn, 2009; Roche, 2015). Fraleigh (2018) argues that phenomenology’s sense of 
feeling lends it to the performing arts as a method of ‘doing’ research, because phenomenology is essentially 
performed - it cannot be fully explained through language. For performance practitioner and phenomenologist 
Susan Kozel, phenomenology links unhelpful divides including theory/practice, subject/object, mind/body, and 
solitary/shared experiences, contending that phenomenology offers a way to reconcile the experiences of the 
individual with others, so that one person’s experience may open out meaning or resonances for others (2007, 
2013). Her statements support the phenomenological perspective in my autobiographical research, offering a way 
to bridge the gap between my experience as performer and the audience’s as witnesses. For Jones also, 
“Phenomenology interprets and produces the self as embodied, performative and intersubjective”, meaning that 
the body/self is both subject and object, in the same way that a work of art is produced through both the artist’s 
production and the spectator’s reception of the work in ongoing reciprocity (1998: 39). Although methodologically 
my research is not purely phenomenological, the focus on my personal experiences and perceptions in 
autobiographical practice, and my use of theories of the body as a site of intersubjectivity has necessitated a 
phenomenological perspective. Phenomenology is present in both the enquiry into perceptions of the invisibly 
disabled body and the process of research, as my self-perception and the self-awareness involved in the invisible 
labour of managing and maintaining my chronic health needs has been a necessary influence on the evolving 
research journey.  
As a qualitative project, my research includes themes of data-centred emergent theory and an understanding of 
the researcher’s flexible and heuristic position, which have allowed me to draw on varied relevant methods and 
pursue avenues based on intuition; strategies which are consistent with grounded theory (Charmaz, 2014). The 
work does not follow this methodology however, but merely holds similarities of approach. My position as 
researcher-as-subject means that less data was gathered through interaction with other research subjects than 
through personal experience, and as Kathy Charmaz identifies, grounded theories are “products of emergent 
processes that occur through interaction” (2014: 320). Her statement argues for objectivity from the research 
matter or research participants, and it is my subjectivity that offers new knowledge into the perception of invisible 
disabilities. Furthermore, Denzin and Lincoln (1994) note the need for constant questioning of the basis of key 
topics, which, together with the early episodes of analytic categorisation, data analysis and theory construction 
that grounded theory necessitates, would have been incompatible with the intuitive and fluid personal journey I 
had embarked upon, and distracted from the emerging thread of experience-based data. 
It could be argued that autobiography, autoethnography and grounded theory each explore the interaction 
between self and community through their respective research approaches. Although most obviously centred on 
the subjective perspective, Ann Cooper Albright contends that autobiographical performance engenders 
community through the body’s position in “the complex negotiations between somatic experience and cultural 
representation – between the body and identity” (1997: xiv). Like practice-based and other qualitative research 
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methods, autobiography has sometimes been considered too experiential and personal to hold value, but it is this 
literal self-centredness that offers potential for engagement between the performer and the audience. As Albright 
asserts, “Although it is self-referential, autobiography nonetheless assumes an audience, engaging in a reciprocal 
dialogue in which a story about my life helps you to think about your life” (1997: 119). Deirdre Heddon (2008) also 
draws attention to the centrality of the self in autobiography, warning that the connections between “self and 
identity, identity and representation and representation and politics need to be carefully navigated” (4). She notes 
that this method often attracts marginalised subjects, growing out of second wave feminist studies and other 
discourses of marginalised identities in the 1960s-1970s and although it allows for the possibility of failures - to fail 
to communicate effectively, or to present essentialist notions of the self that continue to constrain the subjects it 
seeks to represent - it also holds great potentiality for change through the connections between micro and macro 
politics. For many it has been a means of telling stories of “otherwise invisible lives” (Heddon, 2008: 3) and while 
taking centre stage does not automatically mean visibility for the issues broached, the theatre’s unique 
temporality engages with the present moment to connect personal stories to contemporary issues of equality and 
human rights. Performer Saša Asentić describes how performance work driven from personal experience creates a 
wider political discourse: 
The social choreography we imagine and realise in our artistic work, rehearses a society that 
abolishes marginalization processes or reduces them to a minimum - a society that doesn’t use 
just one parameter to measure everything, and that doesn’t apply the same norms to all people 
but rather starts instead from the specificities of concrete people, opening the possibility of a 
social community. (Asentić, quoted in Marsh and Burrows, 2017: 23-24) 
Garland-Thomson contends that because disability is an identity status constructed through time and in relation to 
the social experience, autobiographical performance work necessarily carries a wider implication of an 
autoethnographic study due to its social context. She states, 
disability performance art is a genre of autobiography particularly appropriate to representing 
the social experience of disability precisely because it allows for creating both visual and 
narrative self-representations simultaneously and because it traffics in the two realms of 
representation fundamental to the social construction of disability identity. (Garland-Thomson, 
2000: 335) 
Autoethnography seeks to describe personal experience as a method of understanding cultural experience and 
treats research as “a political, socially-just and socially-conscious act” (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011: 1). 
Emerging through a need to move away from the supposedly ‘value-free’ research of the sciences that overlooked 
the significance of personal narrative and experience, autoethnography takes a “self-consciously value-centered” 
approach allowing for accounts to be heard from people and subjects that may have previously fallen outside the 
realms of conventional research matter (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011: 2). Arthur Bochner and Carolyn Ellis 
(2016) describe autoethnography as serving the needs of a culture at a particular time, making it appropriate for 
my research at a time when understanding and representation of disabilities is increasing, but invisible disabilities 
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continue to evade awareness. They describe the researcher’s inward gaze that exposes the vulnerable self, 
encourages creative and performative ways of documenting and expressing personal experience, and develops 
reflexive methodologies. My work demonstrates autoethnographic processes in the examination of how my lived 
experience and identity has been constituted through the cultures I am part of, including how dance and 
performance culture has influenced my understanding and expectations of physicality, while my identity as a 
disabled performer has been affected by the invisibility of my condition. It is also seen in my intention to situate 
my personal experience within a wider political frame of awareness and representation of invisible disabilities, and 
in my approach to embodied practice that stems from subjective experience but assumes an intersubjective 
perspective in performance.  
For performance ethnographer Joni Jones (2002), the embodied subjectivity of autoethnography offers a unique 
form of authentic knowledge: 
Performance offers a new authenticity, based on body knowledge, on what audiences and 
performers share together, on what they mutually construct. As a form of cultural exchange, 
performance ethnography encourages everyone present to feel themselves as both familiar and 
strange, to see the truths and the gaps in their cross cultural embodiments. In this exchange, we 
find an authenticity that is intuitive, body-centered, and richly ambivalent. (Jones, 2002: 14) 
Embodied practice is a vital thread throughout my research, and one which scholars are increasingly turning to for 
its potential to produce research that resonates between individuals and communities. For scholarship such as 
mine into the experience and perception of physicality, embodied and sensory practice can enrich research, 
crossing disciplinary borders and moving beyond the limitations that language and discourse-based epistemologies 
and ontologies can set up (Vannini, Waskul and Gottschalk, 2012). Phillip Vannini, Dennis Waskul and Simon 
Gottschalk argue that sense-led research in ethnography engenders greater reflexivity and brings about a 
“multitude of perceptions” (2012: 14), a theme also explored by Bochner and Ellis who describe the “multiple 
layers of consciousness” that autoethnographic research produces (2016: 65). This multiplicity of consciousness is 
similarly displayed in autobiographical performance through the self-reference that layers past and present selves 
in the current moment of performance. While drawn from real-life experiences, autobiographical material blurs 
the lines between the performer’s real life and the fiction of the performance through a process of editing and 
revision that is an inevitable part of narratives of the self (Renza, 1977). Louis Renza defines autobiography as 
“neither fictive nor nonfictive, not even a mixture of the two. We might view it instead as a unique, self-defining 
mode of self-referential expression” (1977: 22). This notion of self-reference is fundamental to my research, as I 
have negotiated the performance of changing versions of myself brought about by a fluctuating disability, reflected 
in both my autobiographical practice and the reflexive strategies that I have engaged in to document my research. 
As I will discuss in the following section on reflexivity, documenting my practical research in a journal and through 
digital recordings has enabled me to view and reflect on historicised versions of myself, with each journal entry or 
recording capturing an iteration of myself from the past. In autobiographical performance, this retrospective view 
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of the historical self engenders identity as an ongoing reflexive process, “a backward glance that enacts a future 
vision”, which Jones draws upon in her queer feminist durationality (Esteban Muñoz, quoted in Jones, 2012: 6). In 
this way, the layering of multiple versions of the self creates a palimpsestic performance which demonstrates that 
the body or self, as Grosz asserts is “not an organic totality which is capable of the wholesale expression of 
subjectivity”, but exists instead through its connections, links and overlapping areas of influence (1994: 120).  
Albright (1997) addresses how autobiographical practice necessitates performing the history of one’s body, and 
that in this act the body “splits itself to enact its own representation and yet simultaneously heals its own fissure in 
that enactment” (125). The concept of representation inevitably raises issues of authenticity, a complicated area 
for the performance of self in autobiography. Phrases like performance persona, often used to reflect the 
heightened or dramatic characteristics of an individual presenting themselves rather than a character in a 
performance event challenges the notion of the ‘real’ self. Jones (2012) considers issues of representation and 
authenticity in her queer feminist durationality, which demonstrates that identity is formed through an ongoing 
process of identifying, that is, through the repeated acts in which the individual engages in the performance of self. 
She states 
Representation does not secure the meaning of the subject. Nor is it secondary to the ‘authentic’ 
identity of the body... Rather, representation is the very way through which we take on our 
various identifications – both here and now... and in every moment in the future... The body 
always already carries with it every past encounter. (Jones, 2012: 211) 
In Jones’ theory, the idea of an authentic self gives way to an ongoing process of authenticity in which 
representation is a method of identification. Fellow feminist scholar Elaine Diamond (1997) also analyses 
representation and imitation in her theory of mimesis, which she takes to define “both the activity of representing 
and the result of it – both a doing and a thing done” (v). It is perhaps not so surprising that Diamond’s lexical 
choices in her description of mimesis as unravelling through “improvisations, embodied rhythm, powerful 
instantiations of subjectivity” reflects the very passage to performance that has characterised my own embodied 
practice-research (ibid). In representing the previous iterations of myself in performance I have captured some of 
the indeterminateness of mimesis that Diamond describes by calling up the psychophysical experiences of my 
previous self, which means that I experienced them once again - I re-membered them, taking the past experience 
as part of my present self. This self-representation at once enforces the representative quality of my performance, 
while highlighting that there is no true or authentic self at any point, either past or present, reflecting Diamond’s 
description of mimesis that “by its own operations, [it] loses its conceptual footing” (ibid). For Fischer-Lichte (2008) 
similarly to Grosz, bodily acts are “non-referential” because the body or self is not a pre-existing condition; the 
body “engender[s] identity through these very acts” (27). As Jones articulates, any iteration of self is part of one 
enduring self. It is in the ongoing becoming of self, of cycling through many iterations of self that lead from one to 
the next in an enduring palimpsest of meaning-making and self-production that any sense of a true or authentic 
self might be arrived at. The autobiographical thread of my practice-based research explores this concept through 
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an examination of how the fluctuations of a chronic condition inevitably influence the body’s physicality and 
therefore produce the identity of the invisibly disabled body in different ways through time. 
 
2.3 Embodied Practice 
2.3.1 The visual and the sensory 
In the West, visuality is often privileged above other forms of sensory perception (Classen, 1993), but scholars are 
increasingly turning away from the pervasive influence of visual signifiers such as semiotics in what has been 
termed a “sensual revolution” (Howes, 2005: 1). Constance Classen argues that visual privilege can cause academic 
writing to seem “disembodied” (2012; xi), preventing academics from establishing a personal grasp on their 
research projects (2005). With these points in mind, I have immersed myself in researching the perception of my 
invisibly disabled body, which, affected by a chronic condition that manifests in visceral sensations, must first be 
perceived somatically before it may be communicated visually. As Vannini, Waskul and Gottschalk argue, research 
such as this  
depends on the researcher’s embodied presence in the field, and thus his/her ability to 
experiment with modes of representation that evoke sensuality, rather than just treat the senses 
as objects of analytical scrutiny. (Vannini, Waskul and Gottschalk, 2012: 14) 
Their view is corroborated by Stephen Di Benedetto who contends that this approach can “broaden our 
understanding of the capabilities and possibilities of nonverbal expression in the performing arts” (in Banes and 
Lepecki, 2007: 125). Cultural contexts which place vision above tactility in a hierarchy of senses (Classen, 2012; 
Howes, 2005) have led to the association of vision with understanding (Leder, 1990), an over-dependence on visual 
cues which influences beliefs about bodies and produces dominating discourses such as the male gaze, the 
pathologising gaze, or the colonising gaze through a search for visual difference (Jones, 2012). In this social model, 
staring ‘materialises’ the other; “The male gaze produces female subjects; the normative stare constructs the 
disabled” (Sandahl and Auslander, 2005: 32). So it follows that in a culture in which disabilities are presented as 
‘stareable’ physical differences (Garland-Thomson, 2009), chronic conditions go unrecognised as disabilities due to 
their lack of visibility - if vision is associated with understanding, then when vision offers no evidence of physical 
disability, there is a correlative lack of understanding of embodied difference. A turn toward sensory forms of 
knowing offers a path to communicating the unique knowledge “secreted by the disabled body” through forms of 
“complex embodiment” (Siebers, 2015: 244). This embodied sense memory can offer a useful go-between when 
we are confined by language to internal and external phenomena as it merges our inner selves with the sense-
making work of the outer world (Howes, 2005). It may therefore be seen as “a site of unsuspected critical and 
performative power” that can reveal individual histories through the performer’s intimate and profound 
knowledge of her body’s history, which she constructs in transitory and metamorphosing psychophysical detail 
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(Banes and Lepecki, 2007: 2). By shifting the hierarchy of the senses in performance, we can begin to address the 
politics of awareness around certain bodies that have previously been imperceptible (Banes and Lepecki, 2007). In 
my research, sense led work merges the supposed opposition of inner and outer perception through embodied 
approaches that translate somatic perceptions of the invisibly disabled body to the visuality of gesture in 
performance (Fischer-Lichte, 2008).  
In the classical and commercialised genres of performing arts that I previously trained in, interior sensory 
perception was shunned in favour of the visual, repressing the performer’s personal insight, perception and feeling 
in favour of the visual pleasure of the spectator (Gordon, 1983; Gray and Kunkell, 2001). The move towards 
somatic practice has been a challenging one for me as the physical culture I was part of carried bodily and 
psychological values and ideals that I subscribed to as I engaged in the social construction of the ideal dancing 
body through patterns of behaviour and reward (Hargreaves and Vertinski, 2007). Among these values was an 
objective view of the body, what Roanna Mitchells terms ‘body as servant’ (2014) in which performers view their 
body as a property to be used and improved for their art (Gray and Kunkell, 2001; Mazo, 1974; Mitchells, 2014; 
Pickard, 2015). This creates a bodily aesthetic in which fitness is equated with goodness in an “imperative 
pathway” leading to success (Hargreaves and Vertinski, 2007: 6). Although these ideas of dualism and objectivity 
are in vast contrast to the unified, psychosomatic perspective that I have adopted in this research, the influence of 
the didactic classical pedagogy that dominated my performance training can be seen in my early resistance to 
generating movement material not driven by a particular stylistic technique, and in my attempt to reconcile my 
value of movement that held visually aesthetic qualities familiar to me, with performance practice that grew from 
authentic experience. As somatic practitioner Dymphna Callery argues, the disassociation of performers’ physical 
and mental faculties can hinder creative abilities (2001), but more importantly overlooks the value of movement 
derived from inner forms of knowing that reflect personal experience, the core intention of somatic practice 
(Fraleigh, 2015; Ravn, 2010).  
 
2.3.2 Somatic awareness and the dys-appearing body 
Sharing theoretical values with phenomenology, somatic practice offers a way of reflecting more deeply on the 
experience of physicality by focusing on the subjective experience of the body, or soma, from within (Hanna, 
1986). Fraleigh uses the word soma to incorporate the entire physical, mental and spiritual beings that we are, 
merging the consciousness of one’s body, the consciousness of that self as other to others, and the body as human 
nature in our lived experience (Fraleigh, 2015). In my research, somatic awareness has offered a way to access the 
invisible body in performance practice, and is actively brought about through the experience of chronic illness, as I 
will explain. Leder (1990) theorises that the body recedes and appears in our attention depending on its state of 
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ability or dysfunction, persuasively arguing that the disappearance of the healthy or “taken-for-granted” body is a 
normal part of embodied experience that allows us to perceive phenomena outside of the self (131). He explains,  
the body tends to disappear when functioning unproblematically, it often seizes our attention 
most strongly at times of dysfunction; we then experience the body as the very absence of a 
desired or ordinary state, and as a force that stands opposed to the self. (Leder, 1990: 4, my 
emphasis) 
He terms these times of dysfunction ‘dys-appearance’ denoting the awareness of the body through a dysfunctional 
state, such as pain or illness, calling attention to the fact that while the sensation is clearly one’s own, its cause 
seems to come from without. Leder acknowledges that his theories support dualist notions, although he makes 
clear that he does not personally subscribe to them, a tenuous track that I also tread. While I do not agree that the 
mind and body are separate with either privileged or dominant over the other, my research and personal 
experience evidences situations in which thinking in dualistic terms is not just natural, but a path toward greater 
somatic awareness, as I will demonstrate.  
 
Leder describes disability coming about through physical inability; “One’s visceral functions continually and 
necessarily elude direct control. One is simply un-able. In disease, one is actively dis-abled” (1990: 81). David 
Morris (2008) similarly examines chronic illness as producing disability through the body being out of control, 
developing the concept of chronic time; the constraints and needs exerted by the chronically ill body to maintain a 
basic level of health. Kathy Charmaz, who also examines the time constraints that chronic illness exerts and how 
this influences the sense of self, argues that this new experience can seem like an “altered reality” (1991: 5) in 
which intrusive illness  “demands continued attention, allotted time, and forced accommodation” (42). The sense 
of being constrained or controlled by one’s bodily experience as expressed by Leder, Morris and Charmaz brings 
about a notion of duality, which performer and cystic fibrosis sufferer, Jahinger Saleh, expresses:  
I am my body, which means that I am inextricably bound to something that has a life of its own. 
Yet these processes are lived-through by me. They are felt in the midst of my worldly 
engagements. (Saleh, 2010: 15) 
Saleh’s statement exemplifies how dualism occurs through the experience of the body dys-appearing, encroaching 
on the individual’s awareness through its dysfunction. In chronic illness, this dys-appearance can be a constant, 
near-constant or fluctuating presence, in which the individual’s perception is repeatedly pulled inward to 
embodied, visceral experience. Leder argues that the dys-appearing body that intrudes on an individual’s desires 
and daily life can seem like a foreign will, yet it is through the experience of the intrusiveness of chronic illness, the 
duality brought about by the body’s frequent re-presencing to perception, that those with chronic illnesses have a 
heightened somatic awareness. He describes how the dysfunction to the body’s previous spatiotemporality 
“correlates with a heightened thematization of the body” creating “meticulous attention” and “self-
preoccupation”, which is brought into increased awareness through the body’s “episodic temporality of rally and 
relapse” (1990: 81). Charmaz too, contends that in this way, illness “forces self-consciousness” (Charmaz, 1990: 
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43). My own experience of chronic illness and bodily dys-appearance lead me to argue that embodied experience 
in chronic illness moves through phases of dualism and unity. The chronically ill performer experiences her physical 
symptoms, which are outside her control, creating a feeling of subjugation by the body, but by submitting to the 
needs of chronic illness, the individual unifies the self and the dys-appearing body through somatic experience. As 
endurance performer Jill Hocking explains: “I am taking control of my body by learning to live inside it” (quoted in 
O’Brien, 2014: 61). 
For me, this has meant some changes in my expectations of performance from my previous classical ideals to 
accommodate my fluctuating needs. Although I engage somatically in the somatic work of monitoring and 
managing my health (Vannini, Waskul and Gottschalk, 2012), the challenge for me has been linking that somatic 
awareness with my performance practice in the studio, a place where I am drawn back to my previous 
assumptions that generating movement material should come from an objective view of the body. Performer Will 
Bride’s reminder of the value of somatically driven practice is appropriate in overcoming this challenge.  
Dance practice as both a job and an art form feels best when you work from the energy level, 
needs, technical capacity, training, personal and cultural history, aesthetic preference, points of 
reference, etc., that are wholly, faithfully your own. This doesn’t at all mean complacency or 
concession. It means that good work can be done when it emerges from a conscious 
understanding of and engagement with where you are as a human making dance. (Bride, quoted 
in Marsh and Burrows, 2017: 19) 
Somatic practice offers a method of creating material that stems from personal experience in a different form of 
aesthetic value than my previous ideals held. Banes and Lepecki (2007) note that “all aesthetics are bound to 
distinct cultural mappings that define an energetics and a potential for the performing body” (5).  While I may have 
long considered aesthetic value as arising from physical qualities of strength, stamina, and Western notions of 
beauty, Fraleigh asserts “Aesthetics is founded in our senses, realized through our living body in its wholeness, 
actualized in our words, our works, and daily life” (quoted in Fraleigh and Hanstein, 1999: 190). She considers the 
purpose of dance to rediscover the nature of our human bodies, and reflects on Mary Wigman’s suggestion that 
good dance is “satisfied in being what it is, not overtaxing itself for effect and risking falsity” (quoted in Fraleigh 
and Hanstein, 1999: 200). Beginning practice with improvisation, I followed my intuition, exploring movements and 
gestures based in my somatic awareness, choosing to follow or reject instincts in a heuristic process that generates 
expertise, recognition and self-sympathy (Melrose, 2015). The tendency to follow set patterns of movement that 
are inscribed in the body as learned behaviour is a habit that can be difficult to undo, and I have had to learn to 
reject familiar movement styles and act on impulse (Callery, 2001). Fraleigh draws links between these early 
improvisations and phenomenology, advocating this as a method to clear previously held understanding about 
movement to see what emerges without assumptions of what should emerge, contending that this will “yield 
another level of knowledge” (1987: xvii). She describes this form of movement practice as “intrinsic dance” 
(quoted in Fraleigh and Hanstein, 1999: 14); dance which arises from and for the self and which I describe in more 
detail in the first case study chapter.  
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Similar to Leder’s disappearing body, where the healthy body recedes from attention, Fraleigh (2015) notes that 
automatic or taken-for-granted movements become unconscious and habitual, yet in the chronically ill body, even 
these ordinary motions such as standing, walking or dressing can require attention moment-to-moment. My 
research examines what might emerge from practice that recognises the intentionality of movements ordinarily 
considered automatic or habitual, brought into consciousness through the dys-appearing body. Psychophysical 
acting techniques that draw the performer’s consciousness to the process of perception assist in the development 
of gesture generated through authentic experience (Zarrilli, 1997; Zarrilli, 2004; Zarrilli, Daboo and Loukes, 2013). I 
have applied David Zinder’s (2009) psychophysical plastiques (‘exercises’) to explore a gesture as fully as possible, 
repeating the motion to explore phrasing and movement quality in a manner similar to the performances by Pina 
Bausch in which cyclical gestures generate a physical and emotional effect for the performer (Zarrilli, Daboo and 
Loukes, 2013). This response is attributed to the James-Lange theory of psychology, which proposes that rather 
than an emotional response being followed by a particular action, an action can elicit an emotional response (ibid). 
Phillip Zarrilli, Jerri Daboo and Rebecca Loukes describe how witnessing the act affords a different sense of impact 
as the spectator uses their own physical perspective to imagine the experience of the performer:  
Its power comes not from the psychological development of characters... but through what has 
been described as a ‘theatre of experience’ – emotional involvement not with the characters but 
with problems presented. (Zarrilli, Daboo and Loukes, 2013: 211) 
Welton also refers to Bausch’s work as an example of repetition evoking a “feeling tone” for the spectator, 
describing a performance by Ruth Amarante in Rite of Spring (2008) in which her character is overcome by 
exhaustion, her struggling body contrasting with the previously inexhaustible capacity it seemed to have and now 
tries to sustain (2012: 19). In such acts, the spectator is gripped by the potentiality of the experience of suffering, 
drawing their attention to their own physical presence and participation in the act of the performance as witness. 
The ‘theatre of experience’ that Zarrilli, Daboo and Loukes refer to and Welton’s ‘feeling tone’ of performance hold 
particular significance for my performance practice as a method of communicating my somatic perception to the 
audience. Employing a process of repetition, I performed a gesture which deteriorated through time reflecting the 
oncoming fatigue that prevents me from using my body to its fullest extent, as I have previously decribed in the 
diminishing capacity of my kinesphere. This process examines both the emotional response of the James-Lange 
theory, with my performance bringing about a psychophysical response, and references the concepts surrounding 
representation and authenticity in autobiographical practice (Diamond, 1997; Fischer-Lichte, 2008; Grosz, 1994; 
Jones, 2012). Performing a repeated gesture through time becomes an act of self-production, in which there is no 
one true self in either my represention or the present self that performs it, but my identity is produced through 
the ongoing palimpsestic process of identifying in this act of endurance.  
 
2.4 Reflexivity in the research process 
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Autobiographical practice demands a critical view of that which is taken for granted or assumed (Heddon, 2008), 
so reflexivity has been a vital factor to drive the enquiry forwards through ongoing self-analysis that reflects on 
and informs my practice (Brownlie, 2014; Burkitt, 2012; Schön, 1983). I have used “a working interpretive 
document” as part of this reflexive process, which Denzin and Lincoln argue assists the researcher to make sense 
of her learning, not just by recording findings but constructing them through revisions in light of new discoveries 
(1994: 15). In this way, the methods of practice research improve with practise. This need to respond and make 
decisions moment-to-moment is a valuable source of professional knowledge that generates expertise through 
“heuristically-derived responses” (Cameron, 2009: 125). As a practitioner-researcher, following my intuition and 
responding to unplanned scenarios has informed my methodological approach, as making and reflecting on 
creative decisions brings about discoveries that leads to new approaches (Melrose, 2015).  
When I began this PhD, I was aware that the journey of performance practice that I embarked on carried a parallel 
strand of documentation, which would merge with and influence my ongoing practice (Jones and Heathfield, 
2012). The rehearsed technique of journaling from other times in my life offered one method of documenting and 
reflecting on the research, giving me a sense of continuity and providing an anchoring point from which to explore 
new methods of practice (appendix 1). I find that writing by hand moderates and slows my thought, and the 
indelible flow of handwriting necessitates ordered and linear thought; a “free-writing” approach which generates 
meta-thinking (Cunningham and Carmichael, 2018: 57). Ellis, Adams and Bochner (2011) recommend writing as a 
therapeutic process that can make sense of personal experience, engender agency and strengthen the researcher’s 
voice, an argument shared by Nathalie Cunningham and Teresa Carmichael (2018). Cunningham and Carmichael 
additionally suggest that keeping a personal log of insights helps the researcher to engage reflexively, and trust 
their intuition, strategies which in turn, draw the researcher’s awareness to her world view and developing identity 
(58). My journal has been a companion to my solitary research journey, as I have written plans for my research and 
recorded my experiences of my practice, gaining awareness of my emerging voice as a researcher. I have also used 
my journal to record my thoughts about the digital recordings of my practical sessions, which allow me to identify 
my shifting perceptions of my practice, from the intentions and expectations I have in the studio to the 
technologised gaze the digital camera offers after the event (Heathfield, 2004). The journal and the digital 
recordings form an ongoing and reflexive phenomenological document, which has informed my research, being 
fed back into my practice, building a picture of self-knowledge in the research journey (Kozel, 2007).  
An example of this is seen in a journal entry in which I felt disappointed that my experience of exploring space in 
the studio did not translate to what I saw in the digital recording (appendix 1, journal pages 5-9). I had described 
circles and arcs with my arms and legs in repeated patterns, enjoying the feeling of breadth, power and energy the 
movement wrought in my body but when watching the recording, I commented “just make everything more. 
Bigger, straighter, further, wider” (appendix 1, journal page 7). I felt that I was failing as a performer and that I 
should work harder and increase my strength to achieve a movement that was more astonishing to watch, hoping 
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that as I progressed I would be less impeded by physical limitations. Even as I wrote, I could see that I was cleaving 
to the values instilled in me from previous dance training: 
I’ve set up this idea of how the body could move, perhaps in an ideal way, thinking of the body as 
an abstract concept as Collette Conroy suggests (2010), which will always leave the real, specific 
body, my body, falling short of my expectations. So how should I continue, right now, in this 
session? Change my expectations to meet my body’s current capabilities, or work until I achieve 
a body closer to this abstract ideal body? The latter is not an option (as far as I’d like) and doesn’t 
provide much in the way of research or documentation about my condition. (20/10/15) 
These notes reveal how the reflective process of journaling, digitally recording my practice, and journaling my 
subsequent impressions of the recording, have shaped and informed my ongoing research enquiry. As Kozel 
argues, developing reflective practices offers new material as you progress, providing insights and new questions 
in a growing process of devising (2013). In the journal excerpt above, articulating my ideas as I experienced them in 
the moment and then watching the recording brought my awareness to the fact that if I wanted to allow the 
wisdom of my body to be heard, it was doing just that, but not in the way I expected. This moment of discovery 
closed the gap between my past and present selves and drew my attention to the enduring self that moves 
through these shifting perceptions in a process of ongoing emergence (Jones, 2012). Jones offers an example of 
how a performance document, such as a painting, photographic portrait or recording bears a trace of the 
experience or memory of the artist, which opens up the possibility of affect as the viewer identifies similarly 
through embodied experience when viewing it. Although she assumes the artist and viewer are different 
individuals, her explanation of how the viewer becomes an active participant through queer feminist durationality 
resonates with the reflexive process that I am describing. She argues that in the work of art 
we see the trace, we remember our own experiences of bodily movement, and the signs of 
creative action having taken place thus evoke new thoughts, memories, interpretations. Our 
bodies, our memories, attach to those we perceive, imagine, interpret as implicit in (as expressed 
by) the forms and appearance of the work. (Jones, 2012: 194, original emphasis) 
In this description it is apparent that the recordings I make of my work carry traces of memory and feeling that 
endure through time to when I reflect on them. In viewing the recordings, the past experiences become one with 
the present, so I am engaged in an enduring, abiding subjectivity.  
Personal reflexive documents can inform ongoing performance practice in a number of ways. In Sally Doughty’s 
performance Hourglass: The Archive as Muse (2015), she unrolled a scroll of drawings, written reflections and 
annotations on the process of her performance practice from underneath her skirt, in an homage to Carolee 
Schneeman’s performance Interior Scroll (1975), presenting it as an artefact to depict how her performance had 
evolved. Jennifer Roche (2015) uses practice journals in her research into the creative process of choreography, 
incorporating excerpts into her published text to reveal her personal, emotional experience through a voice that is 
free from academic conventions. I take a similar approach, including journal entries in my case study chapters, the 
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voice of my past self in the process of research evidencing my ongoing reflexivity and learning journey. These 
entries reflect my thinking at the time of writing, so earlier examples show the values instilled in me from previous 
performance training, but as the journal progresses, my focus or word choice reflects my evolving thinking. John 
Freeman (2010) compares the ongoing process of practice-research to the Italian term for the layering of different 
paintings on one canvas – pentimento. He posits that performance based research shows earlier versions within 
the viewed product, much as older paintings begin to show through the newer layers of paint as they become 
transparent with age. In my research, this layering of past selves is seen in the journal entries, providing snapshots 
of my thinking at various times in the research journey, and the digital recordings, showing my focus of practical 
research at a given time. My body however, acts as an embodied site for this information, an archive displaying the 
palimpsestic self in which the lived experience of past selves is layered (Krische, 2015; Kendall, 2015).  
It would be impossible to separate the written and recorded documentation of my research from the embodied 
knowledge that practice as research has afforded me, as each has informed and evolved with the other. Writing is 
in itself an embodied aspect of the research process which Bochner and Ellis argue is most valuable as an integral 
part of the inquiry (2016). John Freeman acknowledges a growing trend in practice-based research submissions in 
which practical and written components are not discrete but operate as mutually explanatory partners, a trend 
which my own PhD submission reflects through its live performances, their digital documentation, the thesis itself 
and the research journal. Freeman argues that this change in submissions points to the epistemological power of 
praxis and contends that practice research “is as concerned with the processes of discovery and articulation as it is 
with what is being discovered and articulated” (Freeman, 2010: 6).  Performer Monica Mayer also comments on 
the imbrication of documentation with performance practice: 
I have always thought it paradoxical that half the time I produce ephemeral art, and the rest of 
the time I document it in as many ways as possible. For me, as for most performance artists I 
know, keeping a record of our work... has always been important because apart from registering 
our process, we realize it is raw material for history and theory. (Mayer, 2012: 105)  
In consideration of the points made by Freeman and Mayer, I began to digitally record and reflect on my time 
engaged in literature research and writing at my desk, in the same way I did my practical sessions. I took photos of 
myself on my Smartphone when I was researching through reading or writing, which occupies a significant 
proportion of my time and energy, particularly considering the effort that this intense mental work takes with ME 
(appendix 2). Documenting this written work through self-portraiture took on a sense of performativity, prompting 
me to view the series of photos less as an adjunct to the performance practice but as a form of performance in its 
own right (Cheng, 2012). By documenting the same journey as the recordings of my practical sessions, these 
working selfies further interweave the theoretical and practical elements of my research, and focus on my 
physicality while I engage in what I had not previously considered a practical pursuit, but is another embodied 
aspect of the research process. Covering a period of more than four years, the series offers glimpses of my lived 




2.5 Research design 
2.5.1 Case studies 
I separated data collection into a series of practical case studies based around workshop performances that 
provided opportunities for me to gather data from my experience of performing as well as the audience’s 
responses. Each case study formed part of the ongoing exploration of, and response to, concepts such as the body, 
embodiment, gesture, space and time. Immersion in the case studies ensured that my learning was through 
practical experience, but I used writing, such as through journaling, to direct those explorations, and strengthen 
my praxis (Hann, 2015). The subsequent data collection and analysis after a workshop performance was a vital 
process in my understanding and consolidation of knowledge, informing the subsequent cycle of practical research 
and ensuring that the outcomes of my practice continue beyond the live event (Auslander, 2008; Phelan, 1993). 
The workshop performances were not intended as definitive products, so should be viewed in the context of a 
wider framework of research, each taking a position in my ongoing and cyclical learning journey.  
I approached each case study through a process of provisional theory-building, following instincts based on the 
emerging wisdom of my body and response to previous data gathered (Barrett and Bolt, 2007; Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995; Hartley, 1995; Heddon, 2008; Kershaw and Nicholson, 2011; Melrose, 2015). Grotowski (1968) 
argues that the performance practitioner’s search for self-knowledge structures her creative approach and forms 
an unending cycle, in which the artist explores personal ideas and continually works to find new ways of presenting 
them. The ongoing dialogic process with my own understanding of the concepts and theories I explored means 
that there was overlap in the critical research questions addressed by each case study. Continued reflexivity, 
however, enabled me to draw on experience and follow leads set by findings from previous case studies to enrich 
the themes of the specific and wider research areas, informing and influencing my design and approach to the next 
case study (Cameron, 2009; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Kozel, 2013). The case study chapters provide a detailed 
account of the focus of each workshop performance and describe my practical approach to explorations of the 
research themes. They also present and analyse data gathered, from which I drew conclusions to inform my 
ongoing research. Taken as a group, the three case study chapters illustrate the links between the workshop 
performances, building a picture of my ongoing reflexive learning.  
 
2.5.2 The body as gatekeeper  
While in ethnographic or sociological research ‘gatekeepers’ to knowledge may control literal access to sites where 
research is to take place, in the context of my research, chronic illness assumes a constant presence as gatekeeper 
to both the methods of research and the data collection itself. Living with an invisible disability has necessarily had 
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an impact on my world view, influencing decision-making by dictating the level of physical, mental or emotional 
activity my body can achieve and considering possible after-effects of related stimuli. My invisibly disabled body 
requires careful monitoring and management, so learning to work around my needs or adjust expectations, both 
my own and those held by others, is a necessary step in pursuing goals with this ongoing influence. Despite my 
history with ME, there are still times when I have to purposely re-adjust my approach to allow for factors I have 
overlooked by making assumptions about an ‘accepted’ way of doing things, or what constitutes achieving a goal. 
Marsh and Burrows (2017) re-evaluate the model of gatekeeping from the traditional view of admittance to a core 
way of thinking, suggesting that leaving the doors open to see what might come in has the potential to broaden 
research and engagement, particularly in relation to disabilities. They refer to the positive and inclusive practice of 
Portuguese company Dançando com a Diferença, which prioritises the artists’ needs and accommodations in its 
integrated performances. Although there have been times that my body has dictated my approach to research, it 
has been important for me to consider it less as a gatekeeper but a passport to the discovery of new knowledge 
about work that stems from my needs and embodied experience as an invisibly disabled performer. Siebers (2015) 
encapsulates the value of knowledge generated through different forms of embodiment. 
The power of disability generates new forms of embodied and imaginary difference, supporting 
complex embodiment as a critical methodology, one that defeats the aesthetics of human 
disqualification and formulates a knowledge base to which disabled people may contribute and 
from which they may draw, as they go about the difficult task of determining how they might 
identify each other and themselves. (Siebers, 2015: 245) 
The perceived fixity of disability as part of the binary of able or disabled bodies (Kuppers, 2001, 2004) can lead to 
the ‘disqualification’ that Siebers describes, creating entrenched beliefs about what a disabled body can do 
(Hadley, 2014; Marsh and Burrows, 2017; Schiatterella and Piccirillo, 2015). Erhart describes how she challenges 
this view, working with choreographers to explore the movement potentialities that the varying levels of 
embodied difference of her disability brings, being honest and unapologetic about her choices of when and how 
she engages with her different aids, decisions based on her physical and emotional levels that day and in relation 
to the specific task. She explains,  
Embodied differences are not only an extension of my physicality, but an addition to my 
possibilities of expression. They each bring different qualities into the space, becoming 
movement resources and skill gaining opportunities. (Erhart, quoted in Marsh and Burrows, 
2017: 22).  
The challenge then, is in perceiving the unique abilities of the disabled performer and the needs, effort or physical 
ability associated with their condition on a spectrum of embodied ability, rather than a binary, and remembering 
that each of these differences offers new possibilities for practice.  
At the outset of the research, I assumed that I would be able to engage in classes and training programmes to 
learn from specialist practitioners, but the implications of this type of learning were greater than I had allowed for. 
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These intentions (and subsequent cancellations) included a residential course in psychophysical acting, studying 
under Zarrilli in Wales; a residential course in habitual movement patterns with Sandra Reeve in Dorset; a clowning 
workshop in Plymouth, and improvisation sessions at Siobhan Davies Studios, London. Travelling some miles to 
reach relevant classes, after which my mental and physical levels would be compromised affecting my engagement 
in the class, together with recovery time, which could be some days, to deal with the inevitable after-effects of the 
entire activity, made these ventures unrealistic. Much of the accommodation my disability requires is alteration to 
the anticipated time frame of my work or goals, and while in my schooling this has been more easily quantifiable 
through extended deadlines or rest breaks, in a professional context and especially in the performance industry, it 
is much harder to describe and request the changes to time scales needed. Charmaz (1991) identifies that illness 
intrusiveness creates an important criterion for evaluating success, including the amount of time taken to 
complete a task. The experience of chronicity comes with lessons that the yardsticks previously used to measure 
and judge ability no longer apply to the new chronically ill body but pose “arduous or impossible standards” 
(Charmaz, 1991: 21). These yardsticks are also set out through the hidden rhythms of privilege noted by Cosenza 
(2014a) in which expectations of the time taken to complete a given task are measured by the majority who do not 
have the additional labour of managing illness to contend with. Decision-making was sometimes complex as I 
considered whether I was able to work through periods of ill health, adjusting my expectations and methods of 
research accordingly, and when I should allow myself time without the research as a mental presence. While there 
were occasions when I recognised that continuing to work would put me at risk of entering a downward trajectory 
into symptoms of ME and associated mental ill-health, I did not want to completely avoid periods of less-than-ideal 
health because these experiences are central to the investigation. Conscious decision-making to incorporate my 
wellbeing influenced the research setting and the timescale of performance workshops, choices which became 
part of my wider reflexive strategy, ensuring that work progressed while incorporating real-life factors of invisible 
disability.  
 
2.5.3 Research setting  
The choice of setting for data collection was influenced by my personal circumstances (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 
2011), partly made through my assumption that practical explorations should take place in a studio based on my 
previous experience of movement practice in dedicated performance spaces such as studios and theatres. Places 
of performance hold personal, historical and embodied memories that are influential in our knowledge of the 
space, so these past experiences meant that I could feel a sense of ownership and investment in the space, an 
important consideration in making me, as research subject, feel comfortable to explore personal and emotional 
experiences through methods of practice that were outside of my habitual patterns of working and in the presence 
of an audience (McConachie, 2008). It was also an accessible location for me in terms of travel and access and, 
because I could book the studio for my private use, I could mitigate factors that could have a negative impact on 
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my health, such as light and noise levels and the presence of other people. Additionally, the choice of the studio as 
a rehearsal or training room within an educational establishment carried an implication of a work in progress, 
which fitted with my view of the workshop performances as part of the ongoing research, rather than as finished 
performance products (Bennett, 1997). 
The localisation of the research setting influenced data gathered from the audiences, which were comprised of 
undergraduate students and staff from the university, fellow researchers and family members. The emotional 
impact of sharing personal experience of disability and using my body as a method of analysis meant that 
advertising my performance beyond the confines of this demographic carried too much of an emotional risk for 
me. As Carolee Schneeman articulates (in Johnson, 2013), the conceptual planning and production of live art often 
entails a need for isolation that is contrasted with the social exposure of the performance itself, an issue that was 
reflected in the private management of my condition, which was then made public in the workshop performances. 
I had come to view the university setting and composition of the audience by people with an academic interest as 
a ‘safe’ group to share my experiences with because of my shared background with them, and their understanding 
of research as a process of exploration. Hadley similarly acknowledges the advantages of working within university 
or other institutional settings for disabled artists, which provide an environment to work on politically driven work 
that could go overlooked in other performance venues, which, together with the concentration of academics, 
contributes to a “less hostile” working environment (Hadley, 2014: 20). Although the data gathered from audience 
responses was minimal, the driving force of the research was my own perceptions and experience of the workshop 
performances. 
 
2.5.4 Gathering data from personal reflection and audience responses 
Data collection was an ongoing process that occurred not just through the workshop performances of the case 
studies, but through the practice research that went into each one, and the wider focus on my perception of my 
invisibly disabled body. The fluctuations of my condition, whether directly related to the research methods or in 
the daily somatic awareness through which I monitor and manage my condition, contributed to data gathering. 
This was necessarily personal and subjective, because as Grosz argues, the knowledge of the body is understood 
only through its embodiment: “I am not able to stand back from the body and its experiences to reflect on them; 
this withdrawal is unable to grasp my body-as-it-is-lived-by-me. I have access to knowledge of my body only by 
living in it” (1994: 86). This subjective method of research offers my embodied experience as a specific example of 
disabled identity beyond the faceless concept of disability that a focus on bodies, rather than embodied 
experiences, creates and which “prevent[s] us understanding the material realities of human beings who have 
disabilities” (Hadley, 2014: 7). For Hargreaves and Vertinski, embodied experiences such as mine, shared through 
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autobiographical narratives offer “One of the most graphic ways of understanding about bodily identities” and 
therefore act as empirical data (2007: 8).  
The chronic time of my illness meant that I lived and experienced my evolving understanding of physicality and 
embodiment each and every day through the research period, whether it was purposely intended as data 
gathering or not. Symptoms of ME could interrupt a period of practical exploration or literature-based research, 
but by adjusting my expectations of the methods of gathering personal data, my experiences during these times 
continued to provide insight to the perceptions of physicality and meaning through the invisibly disabled body. I 
used somatic approaches to focus on sensory perceptions and Leder’s conception of the dys-appearance of the 
body as an ongoing source of enquiry, allowing dysfunction to call my attention to previously unaccounted for 
aspects of embodied experience. Taking a sensory view of these periods of diminished capacity allowed me to 
gather a picture of how the symptoms of ME affect the way I use my body in space through smaller motions and 
gestures, and in time through slower movements that take longer to complete. These outward signs of my somatic 
experience affect the way other people gather meaning from my physicality, so experiences gained through a 
symptomatic period provided further data to be drawn upon when I returned to practical research, used as 
preliminary theories to test in the workshop performances. As I have identified, I used my journal to record data 
gathered through personal experience, and at these time of low health it provided an alternative mode of ‘doing’ 
practice (Stancliffe, 2015), and a method to explore ways of articulating sensory experiences (Vannini, Waskul, and 
Gottschalk, 2012).  
Ravn (2010) argues that phenomenological or somatic approaches like mine, which follow an understanding of the 
body as the anchoring point for embodied experience, means that sensation is always understood within and 
through a wider understanding of the term ‘world’; subjective sensation, therefore, forms part of a shared process. 
Jones (1994) also argues that subjective perception opens into intersubjectivity, as the individual’s perception of 
self is brought about through an understanding of their ability to be taken as other, which “entails a reciprocity 
and contingency for the subject(s) in the world” (41). She discusses how a focus on the self, “inexorably leads to an 
exploration of and implication in the other: the self turns itself inside out, as it were, projecting its internal 
structures of identification and desire outward.” (46) It has been important in this thesis to make my personal 
experiences a focus, in order to have some authentic knowledge of invisible disability on which to build because, as 
Hadley articulates, ‘For those with a real, material stake in the matter... the disabled body is a personal, political 
and ethical issue, not just for themselves, but for their spectators and society at large’ (Hadley, 2014: 7). Heddon 
(2008) contributes to the notion of intersubjectivity expressed by Ravn and Jones, arguing that autobiographical 
performances that involve collaborative elements through audience feedback, constitute the self as plural as the 
collective of performer and audience work together to impact how the autobiographical, single ‘self’ is 
represented (9). In each workshop performance, I have used the presence of an audience to gather data about 
their perceptions of my physicality and the way they formulate meaning to build a picture of how the gestural 
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body functions as a site for communication. To record this data, I used questionnaires to direct audience members’ 
attention to particular aspects I was investigating, and informal group discussions which can promote confidence 
and allow participants to be more expansive through conversation (Morgan, 1996). Heddon notes that the post-
show discussion was taken as an integral part of performance by many feminist autobiographical performers 
during the 1970s, in an effort to close the gap between life and art. These discussions were intended as 
consciousness-raising activities for the audience by demonstrating the links between the performers’ real 
identities and the representations of themselves in performance, but also between the performers and audience 
members as a collective. I intended my post-show discussions to operate as ‘productively live spaces’, taking art 
out of the fictional world of performance and into social settings, placing emphasis on spectators’ reactions to 
intervene in the representation and construction of disability (Hadley, 2014). I took an informal approach to these 
discussions to set participants at ease, beginning with generalised, open questions such as, “What were your 
experiences?” or “Is it what you were expecting?” This prompted discussion without being leading and suggested 
to the participants that I was not looking for certain answers. As the discussion progressed, I had to be responsive 
to the group’s changing dynamics, recognising when participants were comfortable enough to share experiences 
without my input or when I needed to move the conversation towards an aspect that I was addressing (Morgan, 
1996). 
Grehan (2009) acknowledges that making a study of spectatorship can be difficult due to the subtle, complex and 
transitory reactions of audience members, meaning that only broad assumptions can be made about their 
reactions. I filmed each workshop to record the performance, the audience responses and the subsequent group 
discussion, a useful strategy to analyse aspects such as audience movement and choices in proximity that I had not 
focused on while I was performing. Having a recording of the group discussions meant that I could accurately 
record participants’ more in-depth responses from the informality of the group discussion, sometimes matching 
filmed, verbal responses to an anonymous questionnaire. Hadley identifies however, that while documentation 
may capture themes of response such as embarrassment, it cannot account for how individual reactions are 
arrived at (Hadley, 2014). “Textured responses” such as these increase the detail of the data gathered but are 
difficult to evaluate as they require interpretation from the researcher (Grehan, 2009: 5). Hadley argues that open 
enquiries such as those I posed in my case studies can frame the audience as potential sources of understanding 
and respect for the performer, meaning that my interpretation of their responses may have been influenced by my 
desire for recognition and acceptance (2014). The researcher’s influential position in qualitative research can mean 
that the research enquiry becomes “partially self-validating” as the researcher takes part in interpreting and 
constructing data in an ongoing process of learning and sense-making (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 13). However, 
self-led research such as mine does not necessarily need to achieve an objective standpoint outside of the 
researcher’s influence as it is this autobiographical process of research and discovery that is both the subject and 




2.5.5 Data analysis  
As I have previously indicated, I gathered data from my own perceptions of the physicality of my invisibly disabled 
body, both day-to-day and in performance. Albright suggests that in autobiographical research in which personal 
experience contributes to knowledge production, “The dialectic between who one is, what one lived through, and 
how one makes sense of all that, creates a particularly complex interweaving of identity, experience, and 
representation” (1997: 10). This sense-making process formed part of the cycle of reflexive analysis that informed 
my identity as researcher and researcher-subject, and shaped the ongoing research design.  For data gathered 
from the audience I took a qualitative approach using the questionnaire responses and transcripts of the group 
discussions to analyse audience members’ perceptions and see whether any themes emerged, in an approach that 
can be compared with grounded theory (Charmaz, 2014; Gray and Kunkel, 2001). While I was guided by the 
audience responses, I recognise that my beliefs and intentions will have influenced data analysis to some degree 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994), but qualitative research is interpretive and “accommodates subjectivity, emotionality, 
and the researcher’s influence on the research, rather than hiding from these matters or assuming they don’t 
exist” (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011: 2). I engaged in analysis in what Denzin and Lincoln describe as a flexible, 
emergent and ongoing process that is “done through the process of writing, itself an interpretive, personal and 
political act” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 479). This was simplest when addressing yes/no responses from the 
audience to assess general opinions, but for more complex questions that invited personal response, I used the 
written records to note words and phrases that carried meaning in relation to the research questions I was 
addressing. I then looked for similarities between these words and phrases to group them into topics (appendices 
6 and 9). In this way, I found that responses to a performance often focused on broad themes that the majority of 
audience members reflected upon, similar to Gray and Kunkel’s method of fitting participant responses into pre-
determined meaning units (2001), but allowed for patterns and similarities to emerge from the data.  The audience 
responses were intended as a way of setting my personal perceptions of the invisibly disabled body in a social 
context, and creating scenarios that would frame my body as the object of a staring encounter to include theories 
of looking and spectatorship in my research (Garland-Thomson, 2009). Audience size varied between the three 
case studies, from just three people in the initial workshop performance, to over 20 respondents for the second 
case study. Although I acknowledge that small audience sizes mean a subsequent limitation of responses, 
qualitative research is an arena in which personal responses and perceptions bring richness and viability even in 
smaller quantities of data (Hargreaves and Vertinski, 2007; Sparkes and Smith, 2007). Bochner and Ellis point to 
the value of autoethnography lying in the interpretation of findings, and how these are incorporated into the 
research, contending, “an autoethnographic text directs attention to meanings rather than facts, readings rather 
than observations, and interpretations rather than findings” (Bochner and Ellis, 2016: 239). Furthermore, the data 
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gathered from the audience was not intended as the focus of research, but only part of the investigation in which 







Chapter 3: Case Study 1 - Untitled 
 
3.1 Introduction 
My performance training has primarily been in codified dance techniques such as ballet, jazz and tap, which are 
characterised by set steps, movements, and embodied ideals reproduced within their physical cultures according 
to the accepted parameters of the style (Hargreaves and Vertinski, 2007; Pickard, 2015). This training exerts a 
continued influence on my understanding of what constitutes performance, how I identify as a performer and how 
I approach performance making. Because of this, the somatic approach in this research presented a number of 
challenges through its value of the internal phenomenological experience of performance practice rather than the 
subjective aesthetic merit of established modes of pedagogical practice (Fraleigh, 2015; Green, 2002; Ravn, 2009). 
While I wanted to take a view of the body as both internally sensed soma and externally perceived body, adjusting 
my perspective to engage subjectively was difficult as I had been taught that my value as a performer was as an 
adaptable and passive object used by others in the creation of their vision (Gray and Kunkel, 2001). I was 
fascinated by the lack of value I held for the performer’s perspective, particularly as my invisibly disabled body 
requires a somatic approach to monitor and maintain my health. I had developed methods of engaging in this 
invisible labour that included assigning numerical values to my energy levels, using descriptive words to draw my 
attention to particular physical symptoms and visualising the energy flow I perceived along neurological pathways 
in my body. However, I had suppressed and segregated this awareness, attempting to uphold ‘ideal’ 
representations of the body (Marsh and Burrows, 2017), believing that consciousness of my chronic health needs 
would jeopardise the mystique of the dancer - a performer set apart from others through her physical resilience 
and ability to push through her own discomfort, placing the audience’s visual pleasure first and foremost (Gordon, 
1983; Mazo, 1974; Pickard, 2015). When my previous notion of success in the performance industry was 
predicated on being strong, beautiful and with endless stamina, ideals of social perfection that emerge from the 
aesthetic of the able body (Siebers, 2010), I questioned how I might reconcile this conflicting perspective with the 
current needs and requirements of my chronically ill body. I wondered what might emerge from the somatic 
practice of an invisibly disabled performer if she no longer had to conceal her embodied difference but drew upon 
it as method of generating movement material. As dancers O’Brien and Hanauer similarly question (Marsh and 
Burrows, 2017), how would       the audience’s and my own perceptions shift as I concealed or revealed my 
disability? By bringing aspects of my lived experience with chronic illness into visibility, I wanted to question my 
assumptions about what it meant to be a performer, and explore the “phenomenological value” of my disability as 
a performance artist (Snyder and Mitchell 2006: 6). To examine these concepts, I created a workshop performance 
that would explore how my invisibly disabled body might be perceived, both by me as performer and the audience 
through spectatorship. I followed three core strands of enquiry: 
 How does the gestural body function as an effective site for communication through space and time? 
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 How does the displacement of the embodied space influence perceptions of what is performed?  
 To what extent do changes in space and time influence our perceptions of stylised gestures in 
performance?  
 
3.2 Beginning practice research 
Working without the idea of a final performance product in mind and without a prescribed form of movement was 
a new experience for me, and I felt adrift. To give myself direction in this new practice methodology, I focused on 
the body’s fundamental link to space and time (Grosz, 1994), concepts that would begin to address some of the 
themes of the research questions. In an early plan in my practical journal (appendix 1, journal pages 3-4), I 
commented on my experiences, saying, “It doesn’t feel like movement or performance that I’m used to”. I 
reminded myself to view this as a liberating experience that would generate new knowledge for me: “Learn 
something new by going somewhere you haven’t been before. Continue in this vein, see what you discover” (ibid). 
I saw inherent contradictions in my role – I had been taught that performers were strong and my condition was a 
weakness that must be concealed. As McConachie contends (2008), cultural institutions build up ideals or myths 
through social practice and affective rituals, and the ideals of the dancing body were inscribed in me through 
language and physical habits, a difficult cycle to break.   
    





My studio practice began with improvisation to work through habitual movement patterns such as turn-out from 
the hips and the quality of weightlessness in classical ballet that were so entrenched in me (Pickard, 2015; Tuffnell 
and Crickmay, 1993). In these early movement explorations, what Fraleigh has called “intrinsic dance” (quoted in 
Fraleigh and Hanstein, 1999: 14), my focus was on my experience of movement and “the play of sensation with 
intention” (15), marking a shift away from an objective view in which dance is performed for another, toward an 
inner dialogue in which personally-led dance holds inherent value. Through this process, I developed my ideas 
about how I embodied my body-space, how my movement displaced space and how I could use my body to 
describe space in different ways. I considered Laban’s conception of potential space set out with the kinesphere, 
and artists’ work also helped me to view space as an expression of movement, such as Da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man 
(figure 3), photographer Shinichi Maruyama’s Nude series (figure 5) and Heather Hansen’s Emptied Gestures 
(figure 6). 
Space is created and described through the body differently across dance genres, and my ballet training was 
evident in my portrayal of space through the axes of my body (Ravn, 1987). I experimented with the way my limbs 
could define space with lines, angles and curves, using repetitive motions such as swinging and circling (figure 11), 
noticing that a fully stretched limb created large circles with a feeling of freedom, but that smaller body parts 
created tighter, more restrained circles that induced faster repetition. I realised that while larger circles and longer 
lines described a bigger space, both somatically and visually, they were harder for me to execute, and I felt 
restrained by what I saw as the limitations of my illness. 
My early journal entries and digital recordings show the struggle I had in reconciling my deep-rooted value of 
movement that I considered aesthetically pleasing by adhering to a pedagogical framework, with movement 
derived from somatic practice. One passage portrays my disappointment after comparing the recording of my 
practice with my experience of the movement:  
As I noted before, I don’t always use the facility my body has, and my body doesn’t always make 
use of the space it could. Whether this is a question of me wanting to improve my movement 
technique for aesthetic reasons, or so that I better communicate my sense of space (and later, 
the gestures within it), I’m not yet clear. Maybe I’m becoming too caught up in the idea of 
separating technical proficiency and aesthetics from whatever it is I consider I should be doing. 
Perhaps embracing and accepting what my previous training has taught me will be a vital part of 
how I work. 
I hope that as I become more accustomed to a) dance in general in terms of fitness, b) somatic 
engagement, c) improvising on my body, d) my own notion of space, I become better able to use 
that space and move my body within it in a way that I find pleasing to watch as well as to move. 

















Figure 5. Shinichi 
Maruyama's Nude series 
(Maruyama, 2012) 
Figure 6. Heather Hansen's 




Looking back, I can see that I had not yet come to understand aesthetic value as something which is “actualized 
(valued) in the subjective life (the experience) of a perceiver” (Fraleigh and Hanstein, 1999: 189). My time in dance 
training had inscribed a set of aesthetic ideals in my thinking and my embodied practice, which I was now seeing 
anew as I tried to work beyond the cultural construction contained in my “historied body” (Fraleigh and Hanstein, 
1999: 196). While Fraleigh acknowledges that work born through somatic work may be beautiful or ugly, its 
aesthetic value derives from movement developed through care for the individual involved rather than a specific 
visual target (2015), a direct contrast to how I had previously worked my body beyond its natural limits, to develop 
a performance that went past everyday movement to something extraordinary. I was clear that working 
somatically would generate material that held authenticity, stemming from my embodied experience, so I had to 
become more conscious of perceptual phenomena as I worked, which would actively inform my ongoing somatic 
movement (Fraleigh, 2015). 
The move toward somatic practice was revealing the conflicting intentions of the respective movement practices I 
engaged in. Dance was providing, as Albright suggests, a rich site to examine cultural constructions of ability, 
subjectivity and visibility, and offered me the possibility of challenging my previous understanding of professional 
dance that “equates physical ability with aesthetic quality” (Albright, 1997: 57). In the classical and commercial 
genres that I had experience in, I was presented in ways that accentuated my physical ability and sexual appeal, 
ideas that I now wanted to face by foregrounding my disability. As an invisibly disabled performer however, I was 
confronted by the additional challenge of presenting a seemingly able and conventionally attractive body that did 
not make a radical visual statement. If the disabled body is deviant from the norm, the invisibly disabled body 
deviates from disability’s deviance, requiring an approach that moves away from occularcentrism to sense led 
practice to communicate its difference.  
An entry from my journal at this time shows my growing awareness of the conflicting ideals that were revealed in 
my practice and how my previous thinking was incompatible with somatic work, and my fluctuating health with 
ME:  
So I’ve set up this idea of how the body could move, perhaps in an ideal way, thinking of the 
body as an abstract concept as Collette Conroy [2010] suggests, which will always leave the real, 
specific body, my body, falling short of my expectations.  
So how should I continue, right now, in this session? Change my expectations to meet my body’s 
current capabilities, or work until I achieve a body closer to this abstract ideal body? The latter is 
not an option (as far as I’d like) and doesn’t provide much in the way of research or 
documentation about my condition.  
Moving forwards – fewer expectations – this is a little reminder to move like you, not the ideal 
you, but the you that exists right now. And sometimes that will be full of energy, on top physical 
form, with a good range of movement, and others, like today, you’ll be fatigued, with a sore 
throat, won’t be able to get your legs as high as you’d like, and won’t last as long as you’d want. 
But that’s ok too. It’s all my body, moving in my own way. (Appendix 1, journal pages 8-9)   
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This stage of research marked a turning point as I began to accept that the movement I created needed to reflect 
my lived experiences and not focus purely on visual form, a transition which Jones articulates as “negotiate[ing] 
the terrain between self-as-image (representation, visibility) and self-as-being (embodied, weighty, sensual, 
volumetric)” (2004: 135). As I continued to shift my focus from an objective perspective to a subjective somatic 
one, I began to incorporate somatic engagement in my practice through yoga classes, which, as a studio-based 
class with a timetable, tutor, and even discipline-specific clothing, was a format familiar to me from performance 
culture.  Realising this, I reflected on the far-reaching influences of the physical culture that I had been part of, as 
without these prescribed features, I had found decision-making in my research practice difficult, unsure of my 
identity as a performance practitioner. I found credence in somatic practitioners’ recommendation of Eastern 
practices such as yoga to promote somatic reflection, which helped me to see my new avenue of practice research 
in terms of its own culture and begin to focus on its concepts of embodiment (Zarrilli, 1997, 2002; Zinder, 2007). 
For Zarrilli, drawing attention inward by focusing on the breath is the first step in somatic training, which he 
articulates as training the consciousness of the bodymind (1997). The breath’s rhythmic pattern draws the 
performer’s attentiveness to her presence in the moment and she becomes increasingly aware of the process 
through which thoughts become actions. Zarrilli contends that through this meditative practice, the outer surfaces 
of the body recede in the performer’s awareness allowing increased inner focus (2004). I spent time in the studio 
noticing the flow of my breath in my body and how this created movement, ideas which would come into play in 
the workshop performance.  
An opportunity to explore my somatic engagement further came when my supervisors first viewed my practice, 
which altered the situation for me, making it a performance. This prompted me to take control, setting chairs for 
my supervisors to watch at what I designated as the front of the studio revealing my unconscious view that an 
audience’s role in performance is as privileged, but passive witness. I also wore form-fitting clothing from a dance 
wear brand that highlighted my body as the classical ideal. With so much thought about my supervisors’ 
perception of my practice, my sense of self was submerged in the effort toward the imagery of the ideal dancer 
(Fraleigh, 1987). On this occasion, I lost focus of my own intentions for movement exploration, and spent the 
twenty minutes of my practice acutely aware of what they might be thinking. This was a valuable learning 
experience, and in discussion with them afterwards, I realised how deeply embedded some of my notions of 
performance and my identity as a performer were, and began to consider my performance choices more 
consciously. 
I began to experiment with controlling the audience’s gaze through mirrors in my practice, positioning the 
audience and myself side by side in front of a mirror, divided by a solid screen so that we could not view one 
another except through our reflections, and with a screen preventing me from seeing myself (appendix 1, journal 
pages 35-37). I considered how mirrors were central to the development of self-as-dancer in classical dance 
training (Whiteside and Kelly, 2016), how they contributed to the development of a sense of self but were opposed 
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to the sensory body and therefore contributed to visual privilege (Bleeker, 2008; Grosz, 2008), and how they could 
be used to create mediatised images that controlled the way the audience viewed my body (Alloula, 1986; 
Auslander, 2008; Garelick, 1995). I would return to these ideas in the final case study, Screening My(Self): 
Reflections. After this, I shifted my focus away from objective judgement of myself, to see what would emerge if I 
let go of the rules I had followed in previous training. I set myself some reminders: 
It doesn’t have to look nice. Very tricky for me, since I want to look nice in so many ways: as a 
dancer to show my ability and training, clean lines, strength and flexibility; as a woman to look 
attractive, not fat, sweaty, short, but to look long, lean, full of energy and pretty; as someone 
living with CFS – for some reason, I still don’t want it to show! 
This is a safe place to bare all. In this arena, to myself and the people interested in my work, I can 
show them everything. I can look ill (maybe go without make-up!) (yes, on camera!), I can dance 
ill, I can ‘underperform’ – not having strength, stamina or flexibility is ok here, and it may well 
not matter if you can’t see the lines of my body seeing as it’s meant to be about the soma, right? 
(ditch the leggings and try baggy) 
The bits I don’t mean to do, may be where it’s at! So show all of it, the thought processes acted 
out physically, the little gestures that weren’t meant for anything, the bits where I give up and 
stop doing what I’m trying. Look at these bits. 
Don’t limit yourself. It’s all relevant and part of the bigger picture. Don’t plan that ‘this bit’ is 
what I’m doing, is what should be focused on and the rest isn’t it. It’s all it. (Appendix 1, journal 
page 16) 
Some of the changes to my practice included not wearing make-up and working without mirrors, which radically 
altered my experience of practice by giving me the permission to be, move and feel in ways that I had not 
previously allowed myself. I seemed to instinctively use my weight and play with my centre of gravity, shifting my 
weight by bending, rocking and swaying, movements that represented a deviation from the elevation of classical 
dance training and therefore a step away from my old ideals. Much of this movement seemed to derive from the 
physicality of my sex, with wide hips creating a low centre of gravity in the pelvis. I noticed how the sexuality of my 
body contributed to my movement and I became interested in the way undressed dolls display highly feminised 
yet specifically sexless bodies, comparing this portrayal of femininity to the seemingly naked bodies of ballet 
dancers in flesh-toned leotards. I used these elements of sex along with the reflections on the rules and 
expectations I had of being a performer to develop a gesture for performance.  
 
3.3 The workshop 
3.3.1 The gestural body in space and time 
To address the gestural body as a site for communication, I wanted a gesture that would express both femininity 
and the concepts of strength and weakness that I was considering, and began to work with a gesture taken from 
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Pina Bausch’s Danzon (figure 8). Looking reflexively, I can see that it expresses ideals of strength and beauty 
through the female body in a way that is closely related to my classical training, perhaps why I identified with it. I 
experimented with performing this gesture in repetition, changing my use of space and time to communicate 
concepts of strength and weakness as a performer with an invisible disability (figure 13). I explored the emotional 
reaction that psychophysical practice creates, and found that performing the gesture slowly and deliberately 
brought about a feeling of being determined and in control, whereas fast repetitions that occurred suddenly and 
more frequently made me feel harried, as though I were trying desperately to achieve the strength the gesture 
expressed. I intended to challenge how meaning is ascribed through Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt, the alienation 
technique that allows the gesture to be seen anew (Worthen, 2004), generating impact through repetition as 
performers Bausch, Abramović and Ulay have done (Abramović, 2010; Abramović and Ulay, 1977, 1978; Loukes, 
2013). Preparing for Untitled, I was interested in using the concept of disintegration through time to reveal 
something of my experience to the audience (Diamond, 1988), but I realised that I lacked a connection to this 
gesture, and that no matter how relevant another practitioner’s work seemed to my own experiences, it could not 
have the same depth of meaning as movement stemming from personal experience. I dropped it from my 
explorations, retaining the themes of strength and the revelation of weakness through deterioration that 
resonated with my personal experience. 
 
 
    
 
Figure 8. Gesture from Pina Bausch's Danzon 
(Danzon) 
Figure 9. Experimenting with the Danzon gesture 
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I next experimented with a pose that displayed the dominant ideology of the female body that had, for many 
years, been my conception of what a performer was.  
I’m displaying my body in its feminine perfection, bevelled leg, tight bottom, pulled-in stomach, 
long neck, straight shoulders, face bright, smiling and ready. I’m considering the requirement of 
my body to look female – boobs, bottom, long legs, pretty face, long hair – but not to show any 
female behaviour like boobs that jiggle, hair that gets in your eyes, unwanted body hair, to say 
nothing of pregnancy, periods and the like. (Appendix 1, journal page 18) 
From this image of simulated perfection, I wanted to contrast my lived experience of being a performer with an 
invisible disability. 
I’m trying to get across, make visible the hidden side of being me as a dancer. What does it mean 
to be a dancer? What does it feel like? Like all the Pinterest posts, I’m trying to communicate the 
thoughts of perfection and inadequacy, of don’t show them that you’re tired, that it hurts, that 
you can’t go on because they paid to see you look perfect. 
I’m trying to show my weaknesses, the leg that won’t stand straight, the posture that wants to 
drop, my face when it wants to fall. I’m trying to make visible how it feels to experience the 
coming-on of fatigue and the other symptoms of CFS – I’m dropping my posture slowly, like it’s 
creeping over me, checking my glands, allowing the big, bright smile to fade away to worry and 
gormlessness. (Appendix 1, journal page 18) 
By revealing my reality, I intended to question both mine and the audience’s conception of being a performer, and 
the categorisation of disability as visible (Albright, 1997). I also wanted to question the ownership of the 
performer’s body, as in my previous training it had become ingrained in me to find pleasure and worth in ‘giving 
myself’ to the audience, gaining value from their enjoyment of what my body could do (Pickard, 2015; Gray and 
Kunkel, 2001). I began to work at times that I would usually avoid due to the onset of symptoms of my ME, which, 
thinking reflexively, may have been a reflection of my ongoing value of suffering for my art, trying to think of the 
negative sensations of illness like the ‘productive’ pain of stretching in dance training (Pickard, 2015). Performance 
artist Charlotte CHW (2015) uses her invisible disability in her performance installation work, pushing her physical 
limits to unleash new lines of enquiry. Similarly, I decided to continue my improvisational sessions once symptoms 
of fatigue, muscular tingling and lack of control had begun. From these explorations, a gesture emerged that I had 
discovered early on in my practice without considering consciously, what Ravn calls the ‘pre-reflective realm’ 
(2010). Despite my intention to move away from codified patterns of movement and create movement that 
stemmed from somatic experience, I was wary of using this gesture, considering that it may lack validity, but I 
began to see that it was precisely the authenticity of its creation that made this gesture a stronger starting point to 
address the efficacy of the gestural body as a site for communication. I now took this gesture, stemming from my 
embodied experience of the disabling fatigue characteristic of ME, developing it reflexively as a phenomenological 

















   
   




Figure 10. Detail of the nervous system (The nervous system) 
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When fatigue comes on, I experience a disruption to the normal neural functioning of my body, which I perceive as 
energy flow that follows the neural pathways from the brain, into the body and to the limbs. Two images were 
helpful to envision this process – the human nervous system (figure 10), which helped me to imagine the neural 
pathways that were affected by ME, and an image from Disney’s Beauty and the Beast (figure 11), showing rays of 
light moving down the Beast’s limbs and extending from his fingers and toes as he is re-embodied as human. When 
fatigue comes on, I perceive energy flow retreating from my fingers and toes, following the neural pathways up my 
arms and legs, into my spinal cord and back to my brain. My use of biological imagery and phenomenological 
experience strikes a chord with neurophenomenology, a method which takes into account both a scientific and 
experiential perspective to generate imagery of the body in performance (Fraleigh, 2018). For Fraleigh, body 
images are constructed in thoughts and ideas but are formed through bodily sensations, kinaesthetic patterns and 
forms of somatic knowing. While the language used to describe these phenomenologies may come across as 
unscientific or un-academic due to the limited vocabulary associated with describing inner sensation (Leder, 1990), 
finding ways to communicate perception is crucial to studies in performance (Welton, 2012).  
These body images have been vital to my conception of embodiment, particularly as my phenomenological 
perception of the retreat of energy from my limbs applies the concept of embodiment in a new way. While I 
continue to perceive my body somatically and to identify my sense of self as my body, I consider areas of my body 
unembodied due to a lack of energy and limited neurological control, sometimes meaning I am unable to move at 
all, what I call a ‘zero phase’ using a scale of energy from 1 to 10. I have come to use the phrase ‘body-space’ to 
describe the physical parameters of my body, within which my sense of embodiment may recede depending on 
the retreat of energy. In this way, I contend that I only have the potential to embody my body-space; parts of my 
body, such as my hands and feet, or everything from my neck down, may be unembodied. Although my body is 
physically present, and it is me and my sense of self, I no longer have control over it and parts of my body are 
remote to my will and desires. To frame my experience of unembodied body-space in a way that others may have 
experienced, it could be compared to the uncomfortable experience of ‘dead leg’, when a leg has become numb 
from inactivity and does not respond to neurological commands to a fully functional degree. The leg becomes 
floppy and difficult to walk on until the ‘pins and needles’ sensation subsides. During these episodes, the concept 
of the limb as potential space to be embodied becomes tangible, as that part of your body feels somehow remote 
to your control, and you must wait to embody it once again. This conception of embodiment relies on an 
understanding that the parameters of the body are determined by imagery rather than being fixed attributes 
(Grosz, 1994). As Grosz asserts, “The body image is extremely fluid and dynamic; its borders, edges, and contours 
are “osmotic” - they have the remarkable power of incorporating and expelling outside and inside in an ongoing 
interchange” (Grosz, 1994: 79). She goes on to state that psychological or neurological disturbances can “entail[s] 
major and in many cases unpredictable psychical effects which may dramatically alter the subject’s body image, 
changing psychological processes as well as motor and sensory actions and reactions” (115). Her argument 
supports my conception of shifting embodiment within my body-space and holds similarities to Leder’s (1990) 
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theory of the dys-appearance of the body to consciousness. To apply Leder’s concept of bodily dys-appearance to 
my own situation, when I have a zero phase my body dys-appears; it is uncomfortably present to me through its 
inability to function as normal. Leder contends that when the body’s normal spatio-functionality is disrupted, the 
body can seem to be away or apart from itself, and at these times while I can see my body, its dysfunction and the 
proprioceptional changes that disrupt normal sensation make my body seem out of my control and therefore 
absent. Leder asserts that the dys-appeared body or body-part can bring about an alien quality creating a feeling of 
being controlled by the body: “The experienced self is rent in two as one’s own corporeality exhibits a foreign will” 
(1990: 87). Although this suggests a dualist reading, practice stemming from phenomenology offers ways of 
reflecting on previously overlooked embodied experiences, which can “help us to be more attentive to experience, 
uncover phenomena that were concealed, explain what Cartesian framework renders inexplicable” (Leder, 1990: 
155). Fraleigh similarly acknowledges that dualism arises at times of physical difficulty, fatigue or illness, when the 
performer finds her body is unable to do what she intends, but that “a fundamental unity” is still apparent (1987: 
12). She holds that dance provides a way to embody the unified concept and that it is in movement that we make 
real our embodiment. If movement is the manifestation of embodiment – “Embodiment is not passive... I live my 
body as a body-of-motion” (Fraleigh, 1987: 13) - her argument supports my own theory that when I am overcome 
by fatigue and unable to move my limbs or body, these areas as unembodied. I do not mean to use this argument 
for a wholly dualist understanding, but merely to recognise the lived body’s experience of dualism in situations of 
dysfunction (Fraleigh, 1987). 
Grosz (1994) addresses the dualism that arises when body-parts are absent to perception, such as in phantom limb 
syndrome, when a body part within a body image is no longer present, and agnosia, the non-recognition of a 
present body part that should form part of the body image. She describes a phantom limb not as a memory or 
image from the past but as “quasi-present”: “It is the refusal of an experience to enter into the past; it illustrates 
the tenacity of a present that remains immutable” (89). To apply this same theory to my experience of 
unembodied body parts with ME, my subjectivity does accept the possession of my arms and legs, I recognise that 
they are mine and they are me (unifying object and subject), and I accept that there are many possible actions they 
could or would perform if they felt embodied, if I could re-member them in the present moment. My own case 
makes a strong argument for Grosz’s quasi-presence – but it is a refusal of the past experience of my limbs to enter 
into the present, and it is the present’s very changeable nature through the fluctuations of chronic time, rather 
than immutability, which means that a past experience cannot be present now. These points illustrate what Grosz 
describes as a ““fictional” or fantasmatic construction of the body outside of or beyond its neurological structure” 
(89), a structure which she goes on to assert constrains the body through its biological limits, “limits, incidentally, 
whose framework or “stretchability” we cannot yet know, we cannot presume, even if we must presume some 
limits” (187). Maaike Bleeker (2008) similarly reflects on how work by disabled artists such as me, who draw on 
phenomenological modes of enquiry, is important in recognising “particular variations of embodiment and ways of 
perceiving the world” (1). She argues that these phenomenologies are “subjectively profound and symbolically 
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significant” (ibid) rather than merely medically measurable, and agrees with Grosz that they have the potential to 
“contradict the conception of the physical boundaries of the body-organism as the natural and necessary 
boundaries of the embodied subject” (6). 
The lack of embodiment in the limits of my body-space when I am totally fatigued means that I am no longer able 
to use my arms and legs to their fullest extent, affecting my kinesphere. My new kinesphere is dependent on my 
ability to stretch or lift my arms and legs, meaning that it may be significantly smaller, perhaps not extending 
above my head, or limited to movements below the waist, depending on the retreat of my energy flow. This 
diminished capacity reflects the intrinsic link between subjective experience, our experience of the world through 
our body and the understanding of place as existing within space (McConachie, 2008). In the workshop 
performance, I wanted to explore whether I could exhibit the experiences of the internal body, what Leder terms 
the “visceral” body, through the outer, or “ecstatic” surface body (1990). The gesture I performed would translate 
the retreat of embodiment within my body-space to the resultant diminished capacity of my kinesphere, which the 
audience may then perceive. This action would take space not as a static entity but a “dynamic phenomenon” that 
is lived in, formed and informed by the moving body, to address how the displacement of the embodied space 
might influence the audience’s perception of the performed gesture (Østern, 2014: 104). Howes (2005) argues that 
displacement implies a disconnection between embodiment and environment, seen in my performance of the 
changing embodiment of my body-space, just one example of how individual interpretations and creation of space 
can vary. This also supports Heddon’s contention that while space is not something solid or fixed it is no less a 
tangible experience, “Though space is ‘performed’, it is nevertheless also material, existing simultaneously then as 
both ‘real’ and ‘representational’” (Heddon, 2008: 111). 
The gesture I created represented energy flow extending through my body and retreating again.  I began standing, 
slumped over from the shoulders with knees loosened, and then straightened my knees, brought my pelvis into 
alignment with my spine, pulled my shoulders back and raised my head and arms, until I was standing on tiptoe, 
arms stretched above me and eye line raised. As I performed this gesture, I envisioned the flow of energy travelling 
from my torso into my legs and feet, and into my arms, hands and head, so that when I reached the pinnacle of the 
gesture, the flow of energy would extend through my toes into the ground, from my pelvis and out through my 
tailbone, and from my fingers and the top of my head into the air. Working with this gesture in repetition meant 
that I also reversed the gesture from the fully extended position back to the slouched posture at the beginning, 
describing the retreat of energy from my extremities in my body-space. The repetition of the gesture in rehearsal 
affected the rhythm of my breath, speeding or slowing it depending on the size of the movement, until I found 
myself immersed in the motion and experiencing a psychophysical response that called up sensations and 
memories of ME that I had not experienced since some particularly bad periods of ill health some years before 
(Zarrilli, 2004). The repetition also suggested the cycle of fatigue and energy, ill-health and recovery that is a 
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feature of ME, and I reflected this through the deterioration of the gesture as I performed it multiple times, in a 
smaller and smaller approximation of my kinesphere.   
The form this movement took was in vast contrast to my previous dancing ideals, and reflected the new forms of 
‘minimal’ dance in Europe that Andre Lepecki suggests challenge assumptions regarding dance’s existing ontology 
based on unrealistic ambitions and expectations of the body and its “very narrow understanding of time and 
temporality” (2004: 127). Heathfield (2004) comments on this view of time as a commodity, noting that to 
examine the cultural structuring of time, performances are increasingly taking an approach that focuses on gesture 
and meaning production with a “slow-time aesthetic” (ibid). He contends that these approaches “provide an 
opportunity to de-habitualise and de-naturalise perceptions of time”, an effort that my performance worked 
towards by drawing attention to the chronic time of invisible disabilities through its slow and repetitious 
movement. Work such as mine then “gives attention to other temporalities: to time as it is felt in the body, time 
not just as progression and accumulation, but also as something faltering, non-linear, multi-dimensional and multi-
faceted” (Heathfield, 2004: 10).  
 
3.3.2 Framing my body for performance 
For the performance, I chose to occupy only a small space in the studio that would reflect my kinesphere and 
demarcate a specific performance area, separating me from the audience but marking me as the object for their 
gaze (Garland-Thomson, 2009). I considered building a rotating stage block that would display me like a life-size 
ballerina figurine on a music box, making a deliberate reference to the idolisation of the dancer (Gordon, 1983; 
Mazo, 1974; Pickard, 2015), but rejected this idea to avoid simplistic imagery that might pull focus from the 
communication of my invisible disability, and because it would allow the audience to remain passive as they 
watched me, which I was keen to challenge. Instead, I positioned myself in the centre of the room and encouraged 
the audience to move freely around me, in what Gareth White terms an invitation to participate, a  turning point in 
which the audience enact their level of response or involvement (2013). In the “moment of invitation” the audience 
were invited to become active, choosing how to witness the performance and becoming part of its artistic material, 
moving from being the spectator to being watched themselves (White, 2013: 28). Abramović and Ulay made a 
similar choice to promote the audience’s conscious decision making in their performance Imponderabilia (1977), in 
which they stood inside a narrow doorway, naked, forcing audience members to choose which person to face as 
they passed through the narrow gap. I used a similar procedure to draw awareness to spectatorship in my 
performance as whether the audience chose to move or remain stationary, their action would become integral to 
the unfolding action.  
To demarcate my performance space, I created a “postural schema” that would portray my experience of space 
through visual means by measuring the distance I could reach with my arms from a static position to determine 
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the size of my kinesphere (Grosz, 1994: 85). I fixed a piece of string to the point at which I stood, and the other end 
to a bottle filled with sand that stretched to the point I could reach, and poured the sand in a circle to portray my 
kinesphere. This depicted the “access to spatiality”, which for me, fluctuates due to the energy levels of ME, 
marked visually through this demarcation with sand as well as through the changes to my kinesphere that I 
described with the deteriorating movements of the repeated gesture (Grosz, 1994: 85). This related the 
experiential, multi-dimensional and malleable conception of intensive space to a measurable form of extensive 
space that is static and external to the body (Østern, 2014: 104). 
Marking the performance space like this held none of the standard visual conventions of theatre (Elam, 1980); 
there were no lights, proscenium arch or stage, and although it is impossible to render a space truly blank, without 
prior memory or signification, I intended to provide fewer semiotic clues that might influence the audience’s 
preconceptions about the performance (McConachie, 2008). This also framed the performance as a live event 
rather than as theatrical, a distinction which Fischer-Lichte (2008) stresses carries additional implications about the 
artist and the spectators’ relationship: a work of art is separate to the artist/creator, exists autonomously, and 
assumes the spectators’ consumption of it in a traditional subject/object relationship; an event however, has a less 
clear boundary between the action by performers and the spectators, existing in state of liminality, where borders 
of action, control and subjectivity are negotiable, an idea that I was beginning to incorporate into my research.  
Framing my minimal, repeated movement with sound was a challenge as finding appropriate music to work with in 
practice had been difficult. My previous training meant I was heavily influenced by lyrics, melodies and rhythms, so 
for a long time I had worked in silence, concentrating on allowing the rhythm of my body movements to develop 
naturally, and listening to the sounds of my breathing, following practices such as the yogic breathing technique 
Ujjayi (Eisler, 2017). The rhythm of my breath and the repeated motion of the gesture reflected the cyclical nature 
of my fluctuating health and the chronicity of invisible disabilities (Morris, 2008; Charmaz, 1991) and I wanted to 
bring this notion of time into the consciousness of both myself and the audience. I used a ticking clock as 
accompaniment for the workshop performance, meaning this to stand semiotically for time and using the rhythmic 
sound to reflect the meditative quality of repeated cycles of breath and movement in my practice. I chose a 
traditional brass alarm clock for the workshop, as its physical presence in the room drew attention to time as a 
feature of the performance. I set myself a 15 minute period to define the deterioration of the gesture from the 
first full execution that saw me use my entire kinesphere, to a final motion that showed only the first moment of 
effort, a slight shift in weight in my pelvis, displaying the minimisation of my kinesphere due to the lack of 
embodiment of my body-space. I could perform the gesture for this period of time within the bounds of my 
physical, mental and emotional capacity, without risking negative after-effects from over-work; I was beginning to 
find aesthetic value in creating performance that reflected my body’s needs. The 15 minute time frame brought 
some of the markers from codified dance training that I was comfortable with - I knew how my movement would 
begin and end - but this made me feel that I needed to match my movement to the soundtrack so that I had 
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portrayed the entire process of deterioration within the time frame, otherwise I would not have performed it 
‘right’. Thinking reflexively, I would have had greater opportunity to focus on my somatic experience of the 
performance if I had put less emphasis on matching my movement to the soundtrack, but at the time this was not 
something I could let go of. I placed the clock within my eye-line so that I could see how much time had passed, 
but tried not to look at the clock too obviously, to avoid destroying the ‘mystique’ of the performance for the 
audience; in this aspect I still clung to old ideals (Mazo, 1974). I wanted there to be an atmosphere of suspense as 
my movement deteriorated, so I set the alarm to go off at the end of the 15 minute period, clearly marking the 
total deterioration of the time and the gesture, and making an abrupt signal for the end of the performance.  
I used my sex as a feature of my performance, addressing some of my thoughts about how, as a performer, I have 
been encouraged to present myself in an overtly feminine way. Grosz (1994) acknowledges that in using the sexed 
body as frame for analysis, sexual difference is inevitably conflated with identity, and in my experience sexual 
difference was a cornerstone of the body’s value. It was by highlighting female sexual characteristics through dress 
and grooming that casting success was most likely to be achieved, and value created. This exemplifies Laura 
Mulvey’s contention that the intrinsic aesthetic value of the female role stems from their status as object to be 
viewed:  
In their traditional exhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked at and displayed, with 
their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so that they can be said to connote 
to-be-looked-at-ness (2005: 3).  
I questioned this traditional female role of to-be-looked-at-ness, asking the audience and myself to look beyond 
conventional interpretations of my sexual difference (Diamond, 1997), to the embodied experience of the viscera, 
which I externalised through the performed gesture. For me, nudity provided an expression of the stripping away 
of layers with which I performed my sense of self, a performance that, during my practice, I had become aware 
was ingrained in my notion of identity as a performer, and which I had begun to address by choices to wear loose 
clothing, no make-up and work without mirrors. Jones argues that live artists using their bodies, ‘fleshworkers’ as 
she terms them, embrace the base matter and materiality of flesh to make explicit the shared humanness that is 
the conduit for our lived experience (2004). In appearing naked, I requested that my sex be viewed invisibly, that 
is, I exposed and then requested erasure of my sex, asking the audience to look past my female attributes and any 
sexual appeal to avoid a wider sense of phallic order (Schneider, 1997). To achieve nudity, while distancing myself 
from specific sexual features, I wore flesh-coloured underwear, as it revealed the female shape of my body and 





In the workshop performance I created a staring encounter (Garland-Thomson, 2006) in which I encouraged the 
audience to look beyond the materiality of my body to the embodied experience of ME that I portrayed through 
gesture. As the ‘procedural author’ of the scenario, I was in control of the framing of the situation and the process 
of invitation to the audience (White, 2013), choices which became subject to scrutiny, as it became apparent that I 
had not clearly marked the beginning and end of the performance event. I pre-set the studio for when the 
audience entered, with the circles of sand and the clock ready, and before I began the performance, told the 
audience that they should feel free to move around the space to look at me. I also included this in the programme I 
handed out (appendix 3), which established a point of contact and provided an early point of entry to the 
performance for the audience as I posed questions for them to consider as they watched me (Bennett, 1997).  
I began the performance by stepping into the sand circle, marking the taking-up of my kinesphere, but as I needed 
to be undressed when I performed the gesture, I took my clothes off within the circle. This was awkward as I had 
not wanted to make the act of undressing part of the performance as it held connotations of stripping and 
therefore potential themes of fetishisation, and I was attempting to distance myself from sexual specificity 
(Diamond, 1997; Heath, 2008). I was unsure whether or not I wanted the audience to watch me undress and as I 
had not clearly defined the beginning of the performance, the audience was unsure whether they were meant to. 
The ambiguity of this moment meant that both my and the audience’s roles were unclear as I had not defined the 
performance frame and therefore when the act of ‘looking’ should begin (Bennett, 1997; Garland-Thomson, 2006). 
This ambiguity also occurred at the end of the performance, as I had to step out of my sand circle to stop the alarm 
clock, a move that should end the performance by my previous theory, after which I dressed. A more explicit sign 
than stepping over the boundary of sand would have defined the performance event more clearly, for the 
audience and me, a point I intended to address in the next case study. 
I expected that the audience would understand my intention of displaying my body as though naked by wearing a 
flesh-coloured bra and knickers, perhaps because of my own familiarity with denoting nudity in this way in dance, 
but my choice of underwear became a subject for interrogation. I was questioned in detail as to the 1950s style of 
the knickers, as audience members wondered if I had meant to echo the feminine ideal of this era, whereas I had 
simply been limited by choice in high street shops. Kelleher (2009) describes audiences over-intuiting, conditioned 
to read something into performance, which has an inescapable quality of “aboutness” (63), with every appearance, 
action or gesture, however arbitrary, being assumed to stand for something. This is described as self-referentiality, 
in which an object is perceived as something, and therefore inherently meaningful, with meaning generated 
through the act of perception itself, a process over which “the perceiving subjects have no control” (Fischer-Lichte, 
2008: 150). In my performance, the audience responded to the challenge posed by my appearance rather than 
attempting to understand its meaning (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 156), revealing the need to be more conscious of the 
many possible perceptions of details that I took for granted, but which work semiotically to form the audience’s 
71 
 
overall perception. Despite my intention to decontextualise my body by stripping away clothing and adornments, 
my body was still culturally and socially inscribed, marked in particular by external physical objects (Grosz, 1994).  
There was some movement from the audience but being only three in number influenced their decision making, as 
smaller audience sizes prevent a sense of collective, increasing individual discomfort and inhibiting confidence in 
response - I was aware of the audience taking deliberately slow and quiet steps (Bennett, 1997). Spatiality, created 
through the links between architectural space, performer and audience movement, and the lighting and noise 
levels, impacts perception of performance, and clearly impacted the audience’s choices (Fischer-Lichte, 2008). 
Spatiality is both created by and creates atmosphere, unstable elements which are fluctuating and liable to change 
from the action of the witnesses to the event, particularly in the relative bareness of the studio I used for my 
workshop. In discussion afterwards, we agreed that a larger number of people would make the audience less 
conscious of their movement as a possible distraction, necessarily creating more noise, and drawing attention 
away from individuals. The audience members remained at some distance to me when they did move, which they 
noted was to avoid what they deduced as the performance space marked by the sand; as Bennett argues, the area 
occupied by the spectators is a crucial factor in their reception of the performance and their understanding of their 
relationship to the action (1997). One person asked how I would have felt or reacted if someone had breached the 
sand boundary, a point that I had not given much consideration to as I was sure that no-one would break this 
rhetorical boundary, although this question provoked an interest in experimenting with proximity as my research 
progressed into the subsequent case studies.  
I had used sand for the practicality of marking the floor in a way I could easily remove, but audience members took 
interest in this material, noting the similarity of the colour to my skin tone and underwear. One person’s impression 
was of my body rising from the earth, and she saw themes of the female reproductive cycle, childbirth, and nature 
represented by the circular pattern of the sand and my repetitive motion that uncurled and reached upwards. 
Another person drew similar links between the body and earth, with themes of female rituals and religion in the 
sand circle and my movement. These responses, and my own idea that encircling myself with a natural material 
echoed a ‘natural’ human state, demonstrate the influence of pervading theories of the body, particularly 
essentialist notions of the female body, seen as closer to nature through its reproductive cycles (Grosz, 1994; 
Hargreaves and Vertinski, 2007). The process of creating the sand circle as a physical manifestation of my 
kinesphere meant that I had a sense of ownership over the space, and made me view it as a performance space 
uniquely my own. The notion of a stage on which I would be performing, and that stepping into it began that 
performance, brought familiar conventions of performance into this setting.  
I had predicted that the clock’s presence both visually and aurally would be a clear indication of the passage of 
time, which linked with my repeated and deteriorating gesture, but this was not something the audience inferred; 
as Jerzy Limon suggests, time does not have its own substance or universal symbol (2010). The audience saw the 
clock as a partner in the performance with me from the way I had marked it within its own sand circle. They 
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wondered whether the alarm would go off and what I might do when it did, but did not take the connection 
further, showing that the physical presence of the clock had not offered the simple denotation of the passage of 
time I had expected. While the audience’s understanding of performance is “subject to their perception of an 
extensive code system”, I realised that abstract concepts that are subjective and experiential needed to be 
managed with greater simplicity to make connections for them (Bennett, 1997: 142). Although I had attempted to 
maintain focus on my body through minimal use of set, props and clothing, associations were inevitably made as 
all performance elements are considered of equal significance by spectators, until they have become accustomed 
to looking beyond them to the performance action (Bennett, 1997). Again, my methods of framing had been 
unclear - demarcating the clock within a sand circle had drawn attention to its physical significance rather than 
denoting time as a concept. As McConachie explains (2008), framing draws attention to the specificity of the thing 
which is within the frame, requesting that it be viewed differently from what is outside the frame; the audience 
had accepted that the sand circle denoted my performance space, continuing this strategy to view the clock 
likewise as a performer. Once I had explained how my sand circle reflected my kinesphere, the lack of foundation 
for giving the clock a sand circle was additionally evident. The audience members’ questions indicated that I 
needed to go through a process of more intense reflexivity when making framing choices, as these details had 
distracted attention away from the concepts of embodied space and time that I was investigating. Beyond the 
impressions of fertility and life cycles, there was little interpretation of the repeated gesture itself, and no mention 
of my embodied experience of invisible disability, despite it being addressed in the programme. 
The clock’s presence also proved a distraction for me, as I had forgotten to release the catch that strikes the bells, 
so the alarm would not ring after the 15 minutes. Unfortunately, I realised this fairly soon after I began, meaning 
that my somatic experience of performing the gesture was hampered by conscious decisions about how to deal 
with the end of the performance. I stopped the gesture as I had planned after 15 minutes, leaving my sand circle 
and going to the clock as I would have done, but without an obvious conclusion to the action of the performance. 
This oversight contributed to the autopoietic feedback loop as, while the audience may have been unaware of my 
internal struggle, my experience had been marred by this additional worry, and I questioned how I attributed 
concepts of success or failure to my performance (Fischer-Lichte, 2008). White (2008) asserts that the feedback 
loop in interactive performance events means that risk is involved for both performers and audience, and while as 
procedural author, the performer is generally considered the active or controlling party, this can be a misleading 
binary (Alston, 2014). In this case, my experience as participant had been threatened by the performance’s 
potential to unfold differently that I intended. This is an inherent paradox in planned live art events, in which 
moment-to-moment liveness and happening carries a sense of risk and potential failure which exists as one of live 
art’s most vital and valuable components (Heathfield, 2004). Contemporary circus performance No Show by Ellie 
Dubois (No Show, 2018) plays with these concepts, as the performers humorously describe the many potential 
risks and failures that could occur in their physical acts as well as playing them out deliberately. Far from detracting 
from the show’s success, making these failures visible builds a picture of the performers as both highly skilled and 
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daring artists in their acceptance of the liminality of their performance, which, as a live act, is always liable to 
change (Fischer-Lichte, 2008). Helen Duff similarly approaches expectations of the performer’s role and the 
possibility of failure, constructing a character through which she uses clowning techniques to play out the 
uncontrolled actions her mental health condition creates in her real life (Vanity Bites Back).  
For me, the need to control the performance event was partly due to dance training, in which physical control was 
exalted and performances followed predictable and repeatable patterns, but also because through my experiences 
of chronic illness, I have learnt to measure personal competence by the careful control of illness intrusiveness 
(Charmaz 1991). Performance artist Rita Marcalo, who has epilepsy, similarly expresses “My body is about control. 
I have spent years training it so that I can gain ‘mastery’ or control of it”, but she explores giving up this control in 
her performance Involuntary Dances by engaging in activities which can bring on seizures (quoted in Johnson, 
2013: 115). At this stage of the research, I was not yet aware of how deeply held my need for control is due to the 
implications of letting go on the regulation of my health, so was not able physically or emotionally to test the 
bounds of my control. However, the workshop had drawn my attention to the risk involved in live performance 
and my desire to maintain control as procedural author, ideas which I would continue to explore in the next case 
study. 
 
3.5 Drawing conclusions 
This initial case study had set me on a path of enquiry into how somatic perception could shape my performance 
practice. I had found value in the movement and gesture I generated from an authentic phenomenological 
experience (Fraleigh and Hanstein, 1999), a process which had allowed me to explore my awareness of 
disembodied body-space through body imagery, challenging prevailing assumptions about the limits of the body 
and body-image (Bleeker, 2008; Fraleigh, 2018; Grosz, 1994). Working with experience from this pre-reflective 
realm in the “performative dimension” of somatic practice had allowed me to take my body as both subject of 
these experiences and object of intentionality (Ravn, 2010: 30), an important step away from a background in 
which the body was viewed objectively as a tool to be used in one’s art (Gray and Kunkell, 2001; Mazo, 1974; 
Mitchells, 2014; Pickard, 2015). My movement practice explored space as a dynamic phenomenon experienced 
and created through the body (Østern, 2014; Ravn, 2010) and recognised my lived experience as one of the 
“particular variations of embodiment and ways of perceiving the world” that work by disabled artists offers 
(Bleeker, 2008: 1).  
Although my intention with this first case study had been to reveal an aspect of my embodied experience of ME, 
the audience’s responses had focused on pervading and essentialist notions of the body (Grosz, 1994; Hargreaves 
and Vertinski, 2007), demonstrating that as Albright asserts, “the embodied experience of dancing can provide a 
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counter (and resistant) discourse to representations of the body even while creating those representations” (1997: 
3, original emphasis). I had hoped to create a resistant discourse to my apparently whole and able body, “de-
naturalizing ablebodiedness” (Cosenza, 2010: 8) by asking the audience to look beyond the materiality of my flesh 
to the embodied experience that my movement described. However, there had been inconsistencies in the way I 
framed my body for performance which drew attention to the method of framing in itself, and with unclear 
framing parameters, there were gaps in the spectators’ cognitions about how and when to view me (McConachie, 
2008). These points were outside the concepts of lived experience and invisible disability I hoped to investigate, 
but contributed to the ongoing reflexivity of the research, by requiring me to be more specific in the ways I posed 
my enquires in performance.  
Moving towards the next case study, I would have to be more explicit in the way I framed my embodied 
experience as one of disability identity, in order to ‘come out’ as an invisibly disabled performer, and make this the 
focus of the audience’s attention (McRuer, 2006). As a disability constituted through the experience of chronicity, 
coming out in performance would require me to more clearly link my movement with the passage of time 
(Charmaz, 1991). I would need to further research and experiment framing time in performance to communicate 
that my slow repetitions of the gesture carried a sense of endurance through the 15 minute performance, which in 
chrononormative terms was a short period of time (Cosenza, 2014a). I also began to wonder if wearing underwear 
to represent nudity had been a way of hiding myself, an effort which had conversely, attracted attention, and 
considered whether part of my outing should include total nudity to be transparent about my embodied 
experience. I wanted the audience to see beyond the cultural inscription of my female body as a sexual object to 
the embodied experience beneath that is human, not explicitly sexed (Jones, 2004). I was also aware however, that 
because of that same cultural influence, revealing my body made my act a feminist one because as Grosz 
maintains, “one’s sex makes a difference to every function, biological, social, cultural, if not in their operations 
then certainly in significance” (Grosz, 1994: 22, original emphasis). I took these enquiries into the next case study 
to address how and why nudity could be a strategy to reveal lived experience, and to more deeply analyse how this 
might influence perceptions of the gestural body. As I moved forward, I would also begin to address my methods 
of controlling the performance transaction, exploring how audience interaction would influence the ongoing 








Chapter 4: Case Study 2 - (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The audience feedback after Untitled had drawn my attention to the discrepancy between my expectations of the 
audience’s perceptions and their responses. The ways that I had framed my body had drawn more attention than 
the gesture I performed, so I felt that I did not have adequate responses from the audience about their 
perceptions of my movement. For (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See, I continued with the gesture I had developed 
in Untitled, re-framing it through spatial and temporal elements to focus attention on my lived experience, 
questioning how the audience constructed meaning from my physicality. This redressed the first two research 
questions: 
 How does the gestural body function as an effective site for communication through space and time? 
 How does the displacement of the embodied space influence perceptions of what is performed?  
I also continued to investigate elements that influenced the subjective experience of the passage of time and how I 
could use these to communicate my lived experience of invisible disability, addressing the final research question: 
 To what extent do changes in space and time influence our perceptions of stylised gestures in 
performance?  
In this second case study I would also explore methods of giving up some of the control of the performance event 
by increasing the level of audience interaction, investigating how this participation influenced perceptions of my 
body for both me and the audience (White, 2013). This would coincide with my use of nudity as a device to reveal 
lived experience, further exploring perceptions and expectations of the female body in performance. I was 
fortunate to have two opportunities to perform (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See, the first being an event I held for 
my research and the second a month later when I was invited to perform at the Performing Risk symposium held 
at Canterbury Christ Church University. This gave me the opportunity to use reflexive strategies between the two 
performances and gain further insight into my own perception of the performance. 
 
4.2 Continuing practice research 
Reflecting on Untitled, I had experienced a sense of risk in displaying my body in a way that deviated from the rules 
of performance I had previously followed, but felt that I could take this further. I was moving away from the notion 
of the body as the performer’s property to be used for her art (Mitchell, 2014) towards the artistic ethic of sharing 
personal experience and aspects of self-discovery through performance that Grotowski describes (1968). I came to 
see my previous decision to wear underwear, despite my intention to appear naked, as a way of hiding my ‘true’ 
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self (a concept which I had not analysed deeply at this stage) and felt compelled to take the concept of risk further 
by revealing myself totally naked. My intention was to remove the final physical barriers to viewing the embodied 
experience of chronic illness, an interpretation of unveiling the true self (Malik, 2008), an act of literal uncovering 
that holds links with the uncovering of queer outing in which an individual no longer intentionally covers or plays 
down characteristics that may otherwise out them (Branfman, 1997). Uncovering myself meant outing myself as 
invisibly disabled, asking the audience to look beyond my flesh to the lived experience of the soma, but also 
revealing the flesh of my body that bears no trace of disability, borrowing from Phelan to question where the 
vanishing point of my disability is (1993). By voluntarily adopting the position of visibility that disability usually 
occupies (Kuppers, 2001), I questioned whether I would be re-contextualised once my disability was made clear 
(Marsh and Burrows, 2017). This question was similarly broached by Kate Marsh and Welly O’Brien in their 
performance Famuli as part of Coventry University’s InVisible Difference conference (2015), in which their 
choreography played with concealing and revealing their respective bodily differences. If the difference in 
contextualisation is the way the audience look, I would attempt to elicit the ‘engaged staring’ that Garland-
Thomson describes as a quest to know and understand something challenging on the staree’s appearance (2006); 
as my disability is not ‘stareable’ with an obvious visual marker, this created the challenge in itself (Garland-
Thomson, 2009). By using my whole and therefore apparently able body as a vehicle to display my invisible 
disability, I would challenge the assumption that disability is visible, or rather the assumption that that which 
cannot be seen does not exist (Cosenza, 2014b). This idea has been produced through the idea of ability and 
disability as a binary of presence or absence, as Fassett and Morella describe, “an ontological light switch that 
indicates possibility or futility, rather than as a meaningful spectrum” of experience (2008: 140). This denies the 
liminality between disability and able-bodiedness, a borderland that invisible disabilities occupy through their 
invisible presence, and which queer and crip theories destabilise (Cosenza, 2010). My outing would be a 
performance (Bunzl, 1999), which asked that my body be read crip or queer, opening up a view to previously 
unseen differences, and questioning disability as a visible identity category (McRuer, 2006).  
At this time, I was also bringing feminist performance strategies into my work, so my nudity provided a vehicle for 
me to question my performance choices as a feminist and my expectations of the audience’s perceptions of me as 
a female performer. However, I was unclear where the overlap between nudity as a device to reveal embodied 
experience and nudity as an act of feminist performance lay. This created a paradox in that as a feminist, I did not 
want to be objectified, reduced to my physicality and assessed on the success of the way I reproduced accepted 
notions of gender (Butler, 1988), yet I was consciously framing myself as object for the audience’s gaze. This 
position could be aligned with Diamond’s use of Brechtian and feminist theories in performance criticism (1988), in 
which she argues that while the female body explores the concept of looking, “the Brechtian-feminist body is 
paradoxically available for both analysis and identification, paradoxically within representation while refusing its 
fixity” (89, original emphasis). In this case study then, the body operated as both analytical strategy and object for 
analysis (Conroy, 2010). My intention was for my sex to be viewed invisibly (Schneider, 1997), opening out an 
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intersubjective view that looked beyond the specificity of my sex to the lived experience of the visceral body 
(Jones, 2004), but it also provided a strategy to question spectatorship, drawing attention to the concept of 
‘looking’ itself, rather than the object being looked at (Mulvey, 2005). In Untitled Feminist Show (UFS) director 
Young Jean Lee explores concepts of humanity and identity through six female performers’ naked bodies, requiring 
the audience to move past their initial reactions and discover meaning in the nakedness (Solga, 2016). Kim Solga 
recounts her own reaction: 
I realized that I was both gawking at them and struggling to look away. I wanted to show their 
bodies respect but did not know how. Finally, I realized that I did not need to stare; instead, I 
could choose to bear witness to the bodies... as she passed me, each performer looked right into 
my eyes. I fought to meet her look, and not to blink. (Solga, 2016: 28-29) 
I hoped to confront the audience’s expectations of their own spectatorship, challenging them to see past their 
initial reaction to nudity to what my gesture and physicality communicated. 
Despite my attempt to achieve a neutral position outside sexual difference, its influences are pervasive and subtle, 
insinuating themselves into every scenario (Grosz, 1994). In the overlapping intentions of this case study, my 
choice to appear naked was inevitably an act of feminism as I followed the conventions of female objectification, 
but by framing myself in this way, I disrupted the usual binary of active (male) gazer and passive (female) object 
(Mulvey, 2005). Anna Furse (2018) illustrates how a woman might stake a claim over the objectification of her 
body with the case of Queen Elizabeth I who re-appropriated the Blason, a cultural trend of describing women’s 
bodies in poetic detail. Elizabeth I famously exposed her upper body, breasts and belly to her courtiers and visitors, 
in “an explicit act of self blasonry... taking control of the body-politic through her own revealed, virgin, 
untouchable flesh” (Furse, 2018). Acts such as these draw attention to and challenge the long-standing gender 
binary that governs Western codes of female objectification by adhering to that same framework (Jones, 1998). 
Jones’ queer feminist durationality (2012) argues that additionally, “certain enactments of the female sex look 
back, establishing the reciprocity of the gaze”, and preventing the woman from being viewed as mere passive 
object of the gaze (172). This reciprocal gaze, brought about through a reversibility of seeing and being seen, 
entails intersubjectivity between self and other, establishing the body/self as therefore both subject and object, as 
the production and reception of the work of art is carried out between the artist and the spectator in ongoing 
reciprocity (Jones, 1998).  
Although I intended to appear naked to out myself as invisibly disabled, as a way of enacting intersubjectivity, and 
as a feminist act to challenge conventions of female objectification, I was aware that the audience may make 
different judgements about my choice (Solga, 2016). My social and cultural background, including the influence of 
performance culture in which undressing communally was commonplace, had been influential in my accepting 
view of nudity and had given me an understanding of bodies as shared, in performance arenas. I was surprised 
therefore, that approaching the performance I felt nervous, wondering how the audience would react, and 
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whether they would judge me on my choice to appear naked, perhaps thinking that I was being exhibitionist or 
narcissistic. Jones argues that narcissism though, through its focus on the self, “inexorably leads to an exploration 
of and implication in the other”, reflecting my intention of using my body to open out an intersubjective 
perspective (46). Making my own body, through which I experience the world, a focus, is vital in order to have 
some knowledge of invisible disability on which to build research. As Jones continues, “The enacted body/self is 
explicitly political and social” (46-47) through its desire to share experience and open out to otherness, a 
contingency of the performing self which precludes the simplistic or regressive label of narcissism (Jones, 1998).  
As I have identified, I also believed that in my performance I would display my ‘true’ self, a reality that I felt I had to 
explicitly share with the audience, and which therefore held a greater sense of exposure and risk for me. I am 
aware that in my learning journey at the time I had not yet fully explored the concept of identity as an enduring 
process of identification, rather than as a fixed status that existed somewhere in one’s interiority (Grosz, 1994; 
Jones, 2012). This meant that uncovering myself, both literally and as a queer act, placed me in a position of 
vulnerability (Fassett and Morella, 2008). Despite being comfortable with using my body in performance in the 
past, I had always been playing a character or a performing an idealised version of myself, a performance persona 
which I felt would now be absent (Govan, Nicholson and Normington, 2007). I was aware that I would be 
performing myself, enacting my own experiences from the past in the present, but I had not considered that in 
autobiographical practice, the self is both subject of the performance and its medium – there is no clear divide 
between the performed self and the ‘real’ self (Heddon, 2008). As Heddon articulates, “the ‘auto’ signals the 
sameness of the subject and object of that story: that is, the ‘author’ and ‘performer’ collapse into each other as 
the performing ‘I’ is also the represented ‘I’” (2008: 8). While autobiographical performance draws attention to the 
self as a performed role, one of its formal strengths, this also complicates notions of truth because a split or 
multiplicity of selves is implied. At this stage, I had not found my own understanding that this multiplicity of selves 
may be what constituted any sense of a true self but was concerned with the notion that Grosz refutes of a true 
self concealed somewhere in the body that may emerge in particular circumstances (1994). To quote Diamond, I 
had not yet found my “conceptual footing” in this area of performance practice (1997: v), a naiveté seen in some 
of my approaches to this case study which endure in this record of the research as a vital part of my reflexive 
learning process.  
 
4.3 The workshop 
4.3.1 Framing my body 
In this performance, I wanted to continue to represent my embodied space through physical markers as I had done 
in Untitled with circles of sand, but to more clearly mark this area as belonging to the transactional convention of 
performance (Elam, 1980). I used a stage block to frame my body as a spectacle for view and as a visual signifier of 
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theatrical performance, and while the space would never be truly blank, I kept it as lacking in other signification as 
possible (McConachie, 2008). These choices reflected the cross-disciplinary nature of my practice, as while I 
designed the space to be un-mediated, this design was in itself a construction, bringing a sense of theatricality to 
the live event, proving Shalson’s point that theatre endures in performance art (2013). I positioned the stage block 
in the middle of the space, allowing the audience to view me from all sides as one might a statue on a plinth in an 
art gallery, and to encourage the audience to consider their choices in movement and proximity, I requested that 
they move around the space to look at me, an invitation to participate that I made both verbally and in the 
programme (appendix 4). Presenting myself on a stage block echoed fetishistic conventions that view women’s 
bodies, especially nude, in an objectifying way, but in this active choice, I took the “quiet authority” and resistance 
that artist’s model Elizabeth Hollander suggests can come by voluntarily offering oneself as object for attention 
(quoted in Albright, 1997). Hannah Wilke similarly offers her body for attention in her art (figure 19, p--), 
highlighting her sex as female, but also suggesting that her role is male in her active authority as artist (Jones, 
1998). While acts such as Wilke’s have attracted criticism as an example of feminine idealism and unfeminist 
narcissism, these arguments overlook the impossibility of taking her body as mere object, since it exists as both 
object of the art and location of the subjecthood of the artist, a unique and complex merger of embodied 
subjectivity (Grosz, 1994).  
Fetishism is also seen in views of the disabled body, which take a medical view of physical difference to create an 
acceptable form of objectification (Millett-Gallant, 2010; Garland-Thomson, 2005a, 2005b). Artists such as Mary 
Duffy, Marc Quinn and Joel Peter Witkin re-examine fetishistic and medicalised views, framing disabled bodies to 
foreground their ‘brokenness’ and solicit stares (Millett-Gallant, 2010). Ann Millett-Gallant (2010) explores how in 
Witkin’s photographic work, “the fetishization of the body is fully sensationalized and made into a theatrical 
spectacle – fetishized bodies are spotlighted, placed on pedestals, and framed in excessive stage sets” (12). I follow 
this convention of medical fetishisation, presenting my body as spectacle by undressing and displaying the entirety 
of my body for the audience’s view on a pedestal, an act which, like Witkin’s photographs, “serves up the disabled 
body on a platter” (ibid). In this encounter “Starers become doctors by visually probing people with disabilities” 
(Garland-Thomson, 2005a: 32), yet this medical view of my body reveals no visual marker of brokenness or 
disability. Siebers calls for a disability aesthetics that “refuses to recognise the representation of the healthy body 
– and its definition of harmony, integrity, and beauty – as the sole determination of the aesthetic” (2010: 3). His 
disability aesthetic is met by work such as Marc Quinn’s sculpture Alison Lapper Pregnant (figure 12) and Mary 
Duffy’s Cutting the Ties That Bind (figure 13), which subvert the bodily aesthetic of neoclassism through Lapper 
and Duffy’s unusual, and therefore deviant, bodies. My body however, subverts this disability aesthetic, by 
conforming to the image of wholeness, health and beauty that Siebers strives to move away from. The literal 
wholeness of my body brings into question both the notion of disability as a physical lack that may be seen, as well 
as the presumption that a body which displays the visual markers of wholeness equates to ability and health, and 
subsequently ‘goodness’ and ‘success’ (Hargreaves and Vertinski, 2007; Marsh and Burrows, 2017). While “full 
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disclothsure” is possible (Levine, quoted in Schweitzer, 2000: 65), this total baring reveals no visual mark of 
disability, drawing attention instead to my lived experience of ME, with this somatic knowledge the only available 














To draw awareness to the rhetorical interaction and relative positions of power between myself and the audience, 
I wanted to break the performance frame, and address them directly (Elam, 1980). This effect is seen in Laurie 
Anderson’s performance Happiness, which she concludes by addressing the audience directly saying, “It is the end 
of the play and the actors come out and look at you” (quoted in Govan, Nicholson and Normington, 2007: 68). 
Engaging in informal proxemics in this way breaks the usual barriers between performer and spectator, reminding 
the audience that the performance occurs only at a certain time and challenging their expectations of their role in 
the event (Bennett, 1997). To begin the performance, I addressed the audience with the words, “I am going to 
start the performance now”, defining my position of power as procedural author and confirming the parameters of 
the performance frame (White, 2013). To move away from this position of power, giving up some of my control of 
the performance transaction, I would need to raise the relative power of the audience by offering them an 
invitation to participate. Live art events which include personal interaction can increase audience engagement in 
Figure 12. Alison Lapper Pregnant (Quinn, 2005) Figure 13. Film still of Mary Duffy 




terms of the experience of the event and the “imperative to make meanings” from it (Heathfield, 2004: 9). One 
such example is interactive performance The Privileged (Haydon, 2015), in which the audience, cast as zoo 
keepers, must follow instructions in caring for a polar bear, played by director and performer Jamal Harwood, 
confronting issues of power and authority through the audience members’ acceptance or refusal to comply with 
the instructions. In my performance, I enlisted the help of audience members as I undressed, asking them to hold 
items of my clothing, a process which increased the intimacy of the performer/spectator relationship through 
contact, and affected a call to aid (Grehan, 2009). It also drew the audience’s awareness to how their choices of 
action formed an integral part of the performance event, and how their perceived risks of interaction, from 
embarrassment to potential physical harm, would influence their choice to engage with the invitation (White, 
2013). Peggy Shaw’s autobiographical work Ruff (2016) also makes the audience complicit in the performance by 
asking them to hold props and assist her with her increased medical needs since having a stroke. This invests the 
audience with a sense of unity and shared purpose as they take part in an act that both performer and audience 
share as witnesses (Solga, 2012). By making the audience complicit in my uncovering, they shared in framing my 
body for performance as a feminist act, and participated in the conscious choice I took to reveal myself as invisibly 
disabled.  
 
4.3.2 Framing time 
In the previous case study, I had found that the clock’s sound increased my somatic awareness by echoing the 
cyclical motion of my gesture, but using visual indicators to link the  passage of time to the deterioration of my 
gesture had been ineffective. I now wanted to experiment with how sound might draw attention to the passage of 
time, influencing perceptions of my body in performance and communicating my lived experience of chronic 
illness. In the previous case study, my perception of time passing as I performed the gesture through its process of 
deterioration was affected by my physical, mental and emotional state (Limon, 2010). David Wiles (2014) notes 
that the understanding of time was traditionally based on the limits of the human body, such as the heart beat, the 
cycle of breath and the pace of walking. For those with chronic illness or disabilities, the experience of time 
through the materiality of the body is highlighted as life is dominated by time and narratives (Sparkes and Smith, 
2007). The chronically ill body is regulated through a relationship to time and duration, with an individual’s desires 
dependent on physical factors that are beyond their control (Morris, 2008).  
The subjective perception of time makes a shared sense of its passage difficult to arrive at, although this has been 
described as “atmosphere” or “mood” in performance (Wiles, 2014: 4). I wanted to experiment with the 
performance atmosphere, destabilising perceptions of time for the audience, creating what Jones and Heathfield 
have called “durational aesthetics”, giving access to “other temporalities, excluded or marginalized within culture’s 
increasingly rigorous temporal organization” (2012: 29). This could be described as an effort to queer time, taking 
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queer as a way of disrupting normalisations of the subject, opening it up to previously unseen perceptions 
(McRuer, 2006; Jones, 2012). I employed a composer to digitally alter a recording of a ticking clock so that the 
sound gradually sped up over 15 minutes, during which time the physicality of my gesture would deteriorate. As 
with the durational works that came to light in the 1970s and 1980s, this took time as a malleable phenomenon, 
drawing attention to time as an alterable construct (Jones and Heathfield, 2012). By altering the rhythm of the 
clock sound I hoped to enforce a warped sense of the passing of time to the audience (Wiles, 2014) and more 
prominently feature duration as a key aspect of the performance. I drew the audience’s attention to the 
connection between my movement and the passage of time in the programme: “Consider your reactions to what I 
do and how they change as time passes” (appendix 4). I intended that the focus on the decreasing physicality of 
my body within the space - both through the small area I occupied within the studio and the pattern of 
deterioration - would contrast with the increased speed of the clock’s rhythm reflecting the lack of control and 
shifting subjective experience of time that living with chronic illness creates. 
 
4.4 Perceptions 
4.4.1 Nudity  
I used nudity as a device to represent the stripping away of layers of what, at the time, I considered my performed 
self to reveal the embodied experience of chronic illness beneath.  I realised that nudity would be a taboo subject 
for some people, and addressed their experiences with the questions, “Did you feel uncomfortable at any point 
during the performance? When was this? What was your experience?” (appendix 5). Some responses described 
feelings of awkwardness or shyness: “I felt I will invade your privacy by looking at your body”, “I did have a mild 
uncomfortable experience in the beginning of the piece – I always feel uncomfortable when many people are 
looking at a naked body” (appendix 6). Embarrassment may be a signal that an ethical process is taking place for 
the spectator as they search for an appropriate response (Hadley, 2014) since participation in the staring 
encounter re-constructs the social self with each new act (Garland-Thomson, 2006). My role as procedural author 
of the performance event was clear, yet these spectators’ concern for my privacy shows their awareness of the 
social and ethical implications of publicly viewing a naked body. The emotional responses generated by taboos 
such as nudity contribute to the autopoiesis of the event, as behavioural changes and other perceptible actions 
affect the performance atmosphere and influence how other spectators perceive the performance, stimulating 
further reactions to the taboo subject (Fischer-Lichte, 1997). My undressing in particular made a number of 
respondents feel uncomfortable as in Western society this act is generally confined to private spaces that prevent 
visual contact, but in a public context carries implications of stripping, in which undressing is a sexual act for the 
voyeuristic pleasure of the viewer. One respondent stated that they felt uncomfortable when I undressed, writing, 
“I had to rise to the challenge of looking at you without feeling self-conscious, dealing with the feeling that my 
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looking was on show too”. Another response suggests an awareness of the voyeurism that the performance 
addressed:  
Nakedness is somewhat of a social taboo – getting naked and getting dressed felt voyeristic [sic]. 
But then I thought perhaps this was the point – we are voyers [sic] of passing time. Only slightly 
uncomfortable when dressing and undressing, this passed quickly. 
The responses referring specifically to the periods of undressing and dressing evidence the social connotations of 
stripping in which clothing plays a vital part in maintaining eroticism by prolonging the anticipation of sexual 
gratification (Schweitzer, 2000). Dahlia Schweitzer draws on Roland Barthes’ contention that “it is only the time 
taken in shedding clothes which makes voyeurs of the public”, going on to argue that the stripper is desexualised 
once she has removed all the layers of clothing and achieved a natural and “perfectly chaste state of the flesh” 
(quoted in Schweitzer, 2000: 68). While nudity drew the audience’s attention to their spectatorship, it was this 
desexualisation that I hoped to achieve, a tactic that performance artist La Ribot similarly employs, arguing that 
although there will always be “intrinsic connotations”, she intends nudity to stand for a lack of meaning in a 
dramatic sense (quoted in Heathfield, 2004: 30). She states, “If I failed to concentrate on this neutralisation or so 
called ‘non-meaning’ of the naked body, there would be no ambiguity, no questions, no irony created” (ibid). The 
ambiguity of how nudity will be perceived contributes to the myriad interpretations of meaning by the witnesses, 
and offers diverse potentialities and risks through the audience’s unpredictable reactions as part of the live event 
(Hadley, 2014; White, 2013). 
For many audience members, my neutralisation was successful and comments taken from the questionnaire and 
the group discussion reveal that they saw my body in a non-sexual way:  
There was a second when I just skipped thinking about you as a female, I saw you as just a 
human being representing male and female.  
It exceeded being you, a female, it became just a human being.  
I didn’t see anything sexual about it, I just saw a body. 
The performance was not about nudity but how the body functions. 
For these respondents, I had succeeded in framing the materiality of my body as a conduit for shared human 
experience, rather than drawing attention to my sexual difference (Jones, 2004). The shared experience of sexual 
specificity was also influential, as one woman explained in the group discussion: “for me it felt like it was a body, 
rather than any kind of gender but maybe because that’s me talking from a woman’s perspective”. While a woman 
might find it easier to see past the shared sex, a number of male audience members speaking in the group 
discussion also said they had not been uncomfortable, with one clarifying that he had expected to. A number of 
responses reveal the audience’s awareness of the implications of the gender divide on their spectatorship, 
demonstrating that the relationship with other audience members is an influential factor in individual experience 
(Bennett, 1997). One response agreed that my nudity had brought feelings of discomfort because “there were men 
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in the room”, going on to suggest, “I think I would feel less uncomfortable if there were only females”, 
demonstrating that social settings construct values and meanings according to sexual difference, especially in 
terms of spectatorship (Grosz, 1994). In discussion, one man admitted being unable to see past my nudity to my 
lived experience, hyper-aware of looking at what he considered an ‘attractive’ woman, and that in his perception 
this fixed him in the role of privileged male onlooker (Mulvey, 2005). He expressed how he was uncomfortable in 
the questionnaire: 
I think with the nudity right at the start. In relation particularly to me looking at you [exclamation 
mark crossed out]. Heteronormative I realise, but I felt pissed off at the idea of the male gaze! 
Always the male gaze. 
This response highlights this man’s awareness of how sexual difference holds significance for every social or 
cultural act (Grosz, 1994), and of the enduring discourse of the active male gaze. It also supports Jones’ argument 
that certain performances in which a woman presents herself in an objectifying way are “reciprocally defining of 
the one who gazes”, casting the (male) viewer as insecure of his power status (2012: 172). This respondent’s 
discomfort in his role in the performance event may have been due to my establishing reciprocity of the gaze 
through direct contact with the audience (Jones, 2012), challenging the status quo of the performer/spectator 
dynamic, and requesting a change in value and attitude on the part of the spectator (McConachie, 2008). As 
McConachie contends, cultural models are resistant to change through time, and some people have more 
flexibility to change and to embody new cultural concepts. My performance challenged patriarchal structures, 
acknowledging the exploitation of women’s bodies in art by mimicking these conventions, but denying the 
reduction of women’s bodies to that image through my autonomy in presenting myself in this way (Diamond, 
1997). The audience responses suggest a latent awareness of how my performance disrupted cultural models of 
interaction between the object of the gaze and the gazer, and I will discuss how the gender divide affected 
audience members’ spectatorship in their active responses in the following sections.  
While for some, my undressing had provoked discomfort, others found that requesting their assistance as I 
undressed helped to frame my body, making them complicit in my nudity and enabling them to see it in a non-
sexual way. One man asserted that it was helpful for the audience to be with me through the process of 
undressing, rather than seeing me standing naked already, which others corroborated. Male and female audience 
members agreed that the act of undressing separated my social self from my performance act, as this response 
explains:  
The ritual of divesting and re-investing yourself with your personal effects before and after the 
performance meant that I could view your ‘performance’ self as distinct from the everyday. 




My own experience of this process was different as my intention in stripping to nudity was in revealing what I 
considered my true self (Heath, 2008), meaning that undressing was an act of self-expression and self-revelation in 
which I consciously displayed my lived experience in an outing that carried emotional weight and therefore 
vulnerability for me (Fassett and Morella, 2008; Malik, 2008). I had chosen clothing for the beginning of the 
performance to convey ‘neutrality’, wearing a loose black T-shirt, blue jeans and flat black shoes, with no make-up 
and left my hair down. For me, this outfit did not carry the same sense of performativity as the colourful outfits 
that I would usually wear; I was purposely trying not to convey my personality in a manner that could be linked to 
Branfman’s conscious ‘covering’ of characteristics that might otherwise out him as homosexual (2014). Now, 
further along my learning journey, I understand that the self/identity is produced and inscribed through our 
embodied experience of social and cultural settings, and therefore cannot be reduced to an association of the real 
self with internal experience and a fictionalised self with the external body, but at the time, my thinking was more 
simplistic. I felt I performed ‘neutrality’ when dressed and the process of divesting myself of my clothing reflected 
a shedding of the layers of assumed neutrality to reveal the somatic experience beneath that I performed through 
gesture. My creation of the workshop with stylistic movement, staging and an audience confirm that I was 
performing myself while I was naked, but unlike the audience, for whom the framing presented an impersonal and 
neutral body (“it wasn’t Mo anymore”), I perceived my true self to be displayed – I felt more Mo than ever. I had 
not come to terms with the complexities of the performativity of self as both a performance act and a social act 
(Goffman, 1990), and that the self that performs in the social realm is “the same body that is the instrument of 
artistic practice” (Garland-Thomson, 2005a: 33). As Grosz argues, while there is no one real body/self because we 
perform the roles and behaviours set out for us by the various social and cultural narratives in which we are 
positioned, our positioning within this framework may be unknown to us (1994). I acknowledge that I was more 
comfortable when clothed, at ease within the social conventions that this marked, a point that one respondent 
noted and which drew my attention to my positioning within the social frame: “the re-assertion of your social self 
with your clothes was a very striking moment. Interesting that this was when you spoke to us too”.  
Stripping to nudity then, revealed divisions between the social self and the performance act which the audience 
and I interpreted in different ways, with our opinions on neutrality contradictory. The audience’s separation of me 
from my body could be attributed to a need to distance themselves from the body as a sexual object in case their 
reactions compromised how they were perceived in this social setting (Hadley, 2014). Solga’s description of 
watching UFS reveals a similar division. Her words focus on the performers’ bodies – “I wanted to show their 
bodies respect”, “I could choose to bear witness to their bodies”, a reaction of acceptance and respect, yet by 
describing them in this way, she dislocates the performer from her body (Solga, 2016: 28-29, my emphasis). It is 
the performers themselves who request the attention and respect of the audience, but Solga’s phrases retain a 
hint of bodily objectification that demonstrate a privileged gaze, often seen as male, but in this case being the fully 
clothed audience compared to the unclothed and therefore vulnerable performers. This same sense of 
objectification is seen in the descriptions of my performance – “it was just the body”. Although I intended to 
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present myself as an object for visual consumption, framing my body in such a way as to allow it to be seen in a 
sexless way, I used this strategy to portray my lived experience of ME, experienced through the soma or bodymind, 
incorporating physical, mental and emotional elements of embodied identity (Fraleigh, 2015; Zarrilli, 2004). The 
responses reveal more about the audience’s need to separate the person from the body to be comfortable to 
discuss it. The audience’s perceptions of the gesture display their interpretation of the cognitive as well as physical 
phenomenon I wanted to express, as I will discuss, but when dealing with the topic of nudity, there is a clear divide 
between me and my body in the audience’s language. As Heathfield notes, “Performance explores the paradoxical 
status of the body as art... simultaneously questioning its objectification by deploying it as a disruption of and 
resistance to stasis and fixity” (Heathfield, 2004: 11).  
 
4.4.2 Audience interaction and a community of care 
My act of undressing was the turning point for audience involvement as I requested their help in holding my 
clothes – a literal invitation to participate in which their response became integral to the unfolding performance as 
they were aware of being spectated upon themselves (White, 2013). I hoped to reduce the perceived risk for the 
audience members to take part by undressing in a perfunctory way to avoid a sexualised view of me, an effort that 
the audience noted in the discussion saying that it was not provocative. I addressed them in direct manner such as, 
“Would you hold my jeans, please?” or “Would you hold my underwear, please?” I chose underwear that did not 
frame my body for erotic appeal, with black short-style knickers and a vest, which one audience member noted 
presented my body in a neutral way: “I think what helped in framing yourself as a body was your choice of 
clothing... you didn’t wear a bra you just wore a t-shirt and shorts”. I was aware that despite my requests, the 
audience’s reaction to what I asked of them was uncertain as their horizon of expectations may be built on the 
general understanding that performance creators take authority for the action, while audience members are not 
directly involved (Bennett, 1997; White, 2013). A change to this status quo poses risk to each party, as both must 
surrender some control of their part of the exchange, and like Harwood’s instructions for the ‘zoo keepers’, my 
requests questioned the levels of authority in the performance transaction, as the audience could accept or refuse 
what I asked of them, considering any risk that they perceived in their participation. All the people I asked 
complied with my requests, however, in the group discussion, one man stated that he would not have held my 
clothes if asked, a reaction that I knew was a possibility because as White suggests, “interactive work must be 
allowed to clash with those that it invites to participate” (2013: 19). I would have simply asked another member of 
the audience if someone chose not to accept my request, but his comments revealed the need for risk 
management in my performance, particularly in handling my clothing. 
I decided not to wear a bra partly to eliminate this specifically female garment from my performance, but also so 
that as I undressed, the final garments I removed would be my knickers and vest, and I could fold my knickers 
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inside the vest, before asking someone to hold them. With this ‘audience friendly’ bundle, I was attempting to 
minimise a perceived risk to social order that Classen argues has come about in the occularcentric West, where 
barriers of touch and proximity in daily life and social interaction have resulted in “heightened awareness of bodily 
boundaries” (2005: 259). In my experience in performance training, boundaries of touch were broken through 
dance, friendly affection and the handling and sharing of clothes and costumes, but it was understood that 
knickers were never removed, remaining the final barrier to nudity and therefore to personal space. Intimate 
items, particularly those associated with the orifices of the body, may retain bodily fluids, which Grosz contends 
retain a sense of subjectivity, and when detached from the subject itself, produce a reaction of disgust (1994). Julia 
Kristeva argues that these items are ‘abject’, that which “falls away from [the body] while remaining irreducible to 
the subject/object and inside/outside oppositions” (quoted in Grosz: 192). These abjections reveal the privileging 
(and therefore fetishisation) of some body parts, while leaving others unrepresented, particularly in relation to the 
female body, what Grosz argues is “the consequence of a culture effectively intervening into the constitution of 
the value of the body” (192). Kristeva also identifies that there is a sense of threat in the bodily fluids of each sex, 
stemming from the unknowability of sexual difference, but which carries additional implications in a post AIDS 
crisis era, where the legacy of contamination and the subsequent risk to health is still in mind (in Grosz, 1994). 
Handing my underwear to a spectator then, was fraught with the social implications of potentially fetishised body 
parts and possibly real health risks in the minds of the spectators, increasing the risk I took in making this request 
of them. 
Asking for the audience’s assistance as I undressed allowed them to view me with less fear of invading my privacy 
and made them feel more connected to me as a performer, as one audience member explained: 
It made it more personal. I think from an audience point of view, it made it feel like it was ok to 
watch you doing that because you were asking for our permission, for our help, so it made it 
more of a connection for me personally to watch you undress yourself, because you were 
engaging with us.  
This response shows awareness of how the essentially collaboratively process of my undressing made the 
performance space a meeting point of public and private domains – private through my action of undressing, and 
public in the audience’s witnessing and participation in that act (Heddon, 2008). Their willingness to assist me may 
have been through recognition of my vulnerable position in a room of clothed and therefore privileged spectators; 
as one response stated, “[I] felt performer was safe and vulnerable at same time”. While in theatre, the audience is 
cast in a role of separation which prevents a sense of community between performer and audience (Blau, 1990), 
live art events such as mine unify performance space and spectators’ space, making performer and spectator joint 
witnesses to the event (Fischer-Lichte, 2008; Heddon, 2008). For me, the sense of community generated through 
the audience’s acceptance of my requests for help contributed to the autopoietic feedback loop, making me feel 
accepted and supported and mitigating the vulnerability of my exposure, both as a physical act of displaying my 
nudity and in outing my disability. As in Shaw’s Ruff (2016), being open about having a disability, both through the 
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programme notes and by portraying my phenomenology through gesture, meant that I considered my requests as 
casting the audience in the role of care-givers, asking for assistance in the act of making my invisible disability 
visible (O’Brien, 2014). The audience’s behaviour portrays their tacit perception of their role as care-givers, and 
their descriptions of personal engagement highlight the connection with me that was forged through interaction. 
These temporary communities, created through the communicative power of proximity, blend the aesthetic and 
the social, transforming its witnesses through the construction of new consciousness (Blau, 1990).  
 
4.4.3 Space, proximity and social conventions 
The framing of the space in (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See explored how perceptions of space influenced the 
audience’s choices in movement and how this affected their perception of my body and gesture. The instruction 
that the audience should move around the space and view me from all angles was greeted with surprise as some 
audience members facial expressions showed. As one person stated in the group discussion, movement is 
“generally not expected of an audience member in ‘traditional performances’”, revealing how their horizon of 
expectations was challenged in this event (Bennett, 1997; McConachie, 2008). In the first performance the 
audience was smaller, less conducive to personal comfort, increasing awareness of the influence of audience 
action and inhibiting their movement choices; a number of responses suggested that movement might have 
disrupted the performance or spoilt the atmosphere, showing a reflexive awareness of the effects of the 
autopoietic loop (Elam, 1980; Bennett, 1997; Fischer-Lichte, 2008). In discussion, one person posited, “If everybody 
had started moving around I would have felt more comfortable to do that”, a point proved by the larger audience 
of the second performance which demonstrated “homogeneity of response” in movement (Elam, 1980: 96). This 
increase in motion contributed an ebb and flow of energy to the atmosphere of the performance, a rhythm which 
the audience acknowledged impacted their individual choices of action (Wiles, 2014). This also affected my 
experience of the performance, as at these times I was aware of the audience’s proximal choices in viewing me, 
which in turn drew my attention to my performance as a spectacle for their view. 
The audience members generally positioned themselves far away from me, close to the walls, choices which 
portray a tacit understanding that in this spatial arrangement, power increased with greater proximity to the 
central point of focus (McConachie, 2008). Space also acts as a metaphor for knowing through vision, so greater 
proximity to me would be associated with familiarity while maintaining a distance would ensure I, as subject, 
remained foreign (Garland-Thomson, 2009), an important social implication considering my nudity (Hall, 2003). As 
one respondent explained, “I kept to the edges as that was what was expected of us/me – or so I felt”. Nudity is 
often considered more taboo in live performance than in cinematic performance, as there is no screen to keep the 
action at a safe distance, making the space shared (Bennett, 1997). One person stated that my nudity “was kind of 
shocking in a small space and I was interested in that” and another linked the naked female body to concerns for 
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“proximity and safety”. Grehan argues that the relationship between performer and spectator in performance art 
generates “an intimate space” in which proximity and touch (although not necessarily physical touch) are the 
means of communication (Grehan, 2009: 28). The audience’s lexical choices such as “confined” and “invade” 
suggest their understanding of this intimacy, and their unwillingness to breach the invisible barriers of touch and 
proximity in normal social interaction, despite this being a scenario which did not prescribe to these conventions 
(Classen, 2005). One respondent stated, “I really wanted to approach you to do something in solidarity. Maybe to 
see what you want to say by interacting. However, I thought this might spoil the performance”, a decision which 
prioritised the aesthetic value of the event over individual intention by allowing it to continue uninterrupted 
(Fischer-Lichte, 2008; Shalson, 2013). In discussion, this woman suggested that this interaction might have been 
simply to stand close to me, which I would have interpreted as companionship through the shared experience of a 
female body, but when asked if my reaction would have changed if a man had done this, I posited that I would feel 
more confrontational and defensive of my right to appear in this manner. Grosz notes that we are we are just as 
quick to perceive and protect the area outside of the body as we are our internal body, and that “The size and 
form of this surrounding space of safety is individually, sexually, racially, and culturally variable” (1994: 79). My 
different reaction across the gender divide may have been because my nudity altered the quality of this space: 
Grosz explains that the area may be thinner in areas that we are more likely to tolerate touch with strangers, such 
as the hands, and thicker in privatised areas, which in the case of my nudity, increased awareness across my whole 
body. The audience were also aware that sexual difference influenced their proximal choices to me, with one man 
explaining that he wanted to move closer to me but did not, fearing judgement from the women in the room, 
saying “My relationship with the other audience members in that piece was complex”. Postdramatic theatre, 
sharing themes with my performance style, questions spectators’ security in their responses and behaviour by 
drawing attention to spectatorship as a contingent part of the performance event (Shalson, 2013). This man 
demonstrated awareness of how his response would be spectated upon, and that as a man, his response was more 
likely to be judged as sexually voyeuristic (White, 2013; Mulvey, 2005). 
In this performance, I explored how the performer takes agency as object of attention and sets the bounds of 
acceptable or invited audience interaction (Shalson, 2013; White, 2013), as in Abramović’s performance Rhythm 0 
(1974), and Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece (1965). Although I had been clear in my invitation for the audience to move 
around the space however they chose, I assumed that the audience would not interact with me verbally or touch 
me during the performance. It is noteworthy however, that no-one chose to breach the invisible barriers of 
proximity or touch, barriers which I did not explicitly enforce, but which were clearly perceived through the 
audience’s proximal choices and verbal responses. This demonstrated the deeply rooted privileging of the visual 
sense and the concurrent debasement of tactility which establishes and maintains boundaries around, and 
controls access to individualised bodies in social settings (Classen, 2005). In discussion the audience questioned 
how I would have reacted if they had tried to interact with me, but I was only able to imagine as far as making eye 
contact if someone approached me and tried to touch or speak to me. For me, performance was a safe medium to 
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share my body in a performed outing of my invisible disability, due to the tacit understanding of the performer’s 
position of power (Elam, 1980). From experience of the transactions of traditional theatre I assumed that the 
audience would accept the level of activity that I prescribed, and not take more authority than I allowed them, yet 
their questions highlighted that our interaction was governed more by the rhetoric of social convention than by 
any explicit parameters that I had put in place.  
 
4.4.4 The gesture through time 
One of my intentions with (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See was to explore the idea that time is “a product of 
structures of thought” and to examine how I might frame the experience of time for the audience to draw 
attention to its construction (Heathfield, 2004: 10). Preparing to perform (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See I 
wanted to time the deterioration of the gesture so that it culminated at the end of the 15 minute soundtrack, 
when the rhythm was at its fastest, reflecting a period of deterioration from a good level of energy to a low one 
due to illness intrusiveness. Because I wanted the audience to view the full process of disintegration, I briefed my 
technical supporter to cut the soundtrack if he saw me reach the point of total gestural deterioration, to save the 
possibility of the soundtrack continuing to play while I had reached the end of the movement. Although this gave 
me a sense of security before I started, I was preoccupied by this possibility in the performance, and less able to 
engage somatically. As with Untitled, I had assumed that the performance must go as planned, demonstrating how 
the conventions of traditional theatre endured in my expectations of performance, as in theatre, the performer 
aims for repeatability, while in performance art, the singular and transformational act is prized (Shalson, 2013). In 
the second performance I let go my need to control this element, realising that while I may have specific intentions 
as procedural author, the construction of meaning was dependent on the uniqueness of the event and its audience 
(Bennett, 1997; Bleeker, 2008; Elam, 1980; White, 2013). I was more somatically engaged and experienced a 
psychophysical connection meaning that I progressed more slowly through the pattern of deterioration and had 
not come to the end of the movement when the soundtrack ended. This link between somatic connection and the 
perception of time would become a focus for my practice in the final case study. 
The audience responses showed that the soundtrack was influential in their perception of the passing of time and 
affected their perception of the gesture. My intention that the increasing rhythm of the soundtrack would be 
linked with my movement was corroborated with the audience’s descriptions of stress, tension and a sense of 
anticipation, proving as McConachie contends that “Spectatorial empathy appears to be strongest when 
combinations of sound and movement entrain our bodies” (2008: 71). The audience also linked the increase in 
tempo with their perception of my gesture: 
I wonder how fast this is going to get, I wonder if it’s going to get frantic, because it was 
dictating, you know, the speed of your movements.  
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It made me focus a lot more on the muscle tension, because the music was getting more frantic 
and your moves were getting more frantic.  
The descriptions of my movement as ‘frantic’ also implies that these respondents interpreted a sense of urgency, 
perhaps due to the neurological response in which watching someone doing an action brings about a similar 
experience as carrying out that action oneself (McConachie, 2008). The deteriorating pattern of my movement and 
the physicality of my body prompted the audience to reflect on growth, life and death, supporting Heathfield’s 
contention that the presence of the body in live art events make it impossible to consider liveness without also 
death as the two are inextricably and connotatively linked (Heathfield, 2004). Conceptually, death may be 
considered as the end of time, marking the end of the natural cycle of birth, growth, life and death in a shared and 
embodied understanding of universal markers of the temporal progression of the human body (Morris, 2008). This 
normal order of meaning-making is likely to have been influential in a collective construction of meaning 
(Heathfield, 2004) as audience responses described an interpretation of this life cycle, with phrases including: “the 
circle of life”, “female aging”, “youth and inspiration, old age and death”, “how time speeds up as you age”, and 
“the body at its best and in its deteriorated form”. Many respondents identified that their feelings changed as time 
went on, inferring a connection between my movement and the passage of time through their reflections on 
struggle, deterioration and loss (appendix 6). Negative words in the semantic fields of tiredness and exhaustion 
expressed a sense of degradation or deterioration to describe the gesture and an understanding that the time of 
the performance was constructed through my embodied subjectivity (Heathfield, 2004). One respondent 
articulated, “The music was very tense, especially at the end, the echoing and the speed, it sort of adds to what 
obviously you’re trying to achieve with the tiredness or the exhausted nature”, again demonstrating the strong link 
between sound and movement in spectatorial empathy (McConachie, 2008). 
(In)Visible: Tell Me What You See requested that time be read queer, by drawing attention to its passage in a way 
that might de-habitualise or destabilise perceptions of time (Jones and Heathfield, 2012). By increasing the speed 
of the soundtrack and decreasing the displacement of my embodied space, I attempted to portray a new 
understanding of time and temporality (Lepecki, 2004) to reflect the subjective experience of chronicity – the body 
controlled through time (Charmaz, 1991; Morris, 2008). I intended that the cyclical but decreasing movement and 
the subtly increasing rhythm would disrupt the normal sense of time, what Henri Bergson calls ‘clock time’ (in 
Jones and Heathfield, 2012). While clock time is sectioned and proportioned through language, the subjective 
experience of time is composed through the thoughts, feelings and sensations of experience, and is therefore in a 
constant state of flux and ongoing creation. The responses describing that the performance seemed to last for 
longer than 15 minutes, that they wondered when the movement would end and what would happen when it did 
point to the audience’s subjective experience of time and could be interpreted as describing a sense of endurance. 
One woman’s response in the group discussion demonstrates how the link between my movement and the 
soundtrack caused a shift in perception: “I thought I’d imagined it speeding up... because I felt that you had slowed 
down so much that to me the music was just the same metronome with some added effects”. Her response may  
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have been due to an embodied and empathetic reaction in which spectators mirror the rhythm of the performer’s 
movement, which in this case altered her perception of the soundtrack’s rhythm (McConachie, 2008).  
My use of the altered soundtrack combined with my deteriorating movement in space presented time as a way of 
being and feeling, as performance artist La Ribot describes her own work (Heathfield, 2004). She uses time as a 
way to draw attention to the corporeal existence of the witnesses of the event, with time not as the central factor 
but a means of inviting individual response. My own approach similarly presented my experience of time as a 
shared event, allowing the spectators and me to find our own resonances and embodied experiences in the 
performance. In the group discussion, it was clear that the performance had prompted the ambivalent 
engagement that Grehan describes, as the position of other that I adopted required the spectators to come to an 
individual response (2009). One person reflected on the embodied perspective the performance encouraged in the 
audience: “I honestly did not expect you to be naked and perform in such a way that could get me engaged, 
thinking and reflecting on my personal experiences”. A number of audience members highlighted their increased 
awareness of their spectatorship, noting how the performance made them interrogate their own beliefs about 
voyeurism, and come to a new perspective. Many people expressed interest in this self-reflection, suggesting that 
a performance of longer duration would offer them the opportunity to further explore their spectatorship. The 
concept of the subjective experience of time and endurance broached by the audience’s responses and my own 
experiences of chronicity prompted me to reflect on the different interpretations of endurance, concepts that I 
explored in the third case study. 
 
4.5 Drawing conclusions 
In (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See I explored methods of outing myself as an invisibly disabled performer to 
address how the gestural body functions as a site for communication through space and time. Because my 
disability does not provoke stares, I orchestrated an unusual event for invisible disability, creating a scenario in 
which I chose to make my disability stare-able, managing my self-presentation and creating an opportunity to 
reciprocate the gaze through interaction, challenging the dynamic of the encounter and questioning normal social 
interaction (Garland-Thomson, 2009). To out myself, I used the concept of uncovering (Branfman, 1997), which I 
interpreted as both a form of queer outing and a literal process of undressing to make an aspect of my subjectivity 
visible to the audience. In this performance, I used nudity in three ways, which had generated a number of 
discoveries around the research questions, some of which overlapped or contradicted one another. The first use of 
nudity was as a way of uncovering the invisibility of my disability, questioning the assumption that disability is 
visible (Cosenza, 2010; Fassett and Morella, 2008; McRuer, 2006). (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See subverted the 
neoclassical references by disabled artists such as Mary Duffy and Marc Quinn through images of visibly disabled 
bodies, questioning Siebers’ disability aesthetics through my whole and apparently healthy body. This new view, I 
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might call it an invisibility aesthetics, opens up a disability aesthetics that, in Siebers’ own argument is “worthy of 
future development” (2010: 3) by recognising that disability is not a binary of visible presence or absence (McRuer, 
2006; Fassett and Morella, 2008). For me, the notion of uncovering held the additional implication that I would be 
revealing my ‘true’ self (Malik, 2008), an idea which I now consider underdeveloped, but at the time carried a 
sense of emotional vulnerability and risk. It had drawn my attention to the division I made between my ‘true’ self, 
which I revealed through nudity, and my social self, which the audience had linked to my being dressed. I was 
beginning to understand the contradiction that Grosz describes of the body: “The body is neither – while also being 
both – the private or the public, self or other, natural or cultural” (1994: 23). Through this case study I developed 
my understanding of the self as multifaceted and in a state of ongoing identification; as Fassett and Morella 
identify, performance is “emergent from and formative to our bodies in ways that are palpable and meaningful” 
(2008: 152). Inviting the audience to participate in my uncovering by asking them to hold my clothes had created a 
community of care, which made me feel more comfortable to expose myself, both literally and metaphorically. 
There was risk associated with interaction both for me and the spectators, but what was an unknown and 
unknowable body for the audience became one they could identify with by my granting them permission to share 
in the performance through interaction, making my body an effective site to communicate my previously invisible 
disability.  
The second way I used nudity was to reveal my body as innately human rather than sexually specific to draw 
attention to the embodied visceral experience that my gesture portrayed (Jones, 2004). As I have identified, 
making the audience complicit in my nudity through interaction was helpful to frame my sexual difference invisibly 
and allow them to focus on my embodied experience (Schneider, 1997). Audience responses interpreting ideas of 
fatigue, deterioration and exhaustion, and the strong connection they saw between my movement and the 
soundtrack show that elements of space and time, such as the displacement of the embodied space and its rhythm 
through time are influential in perceptions of gesture in performance. My intention of presenting time as a 
construction of subjective experience (Jones and Heathfield, 2012) was also effective to queer time, as the 
audience responses revealed their awareness of destabilised perceptions of the passage of time and 
interpretations of my movement as everlasting. 
The third way I used nudity was as a feminist act, using my sex to draw attention to spectatorship and the process 
of looking (Diamond, 1998; Furse, 2018; Jones, 2012; Mulvey, 2005). The effects of my nudity were seen in both 
the audience’s and my awareness of the implications of the gender divide on our roles as participants and in how 
we were viewed by others. The trend in movement choices that did not breach invisible barriers of proximity to 
me, and responses suggesting that I was in a position of vulnerability also demonstrated the pervasive influence of 
sexual difference, which can impede a view of the body as a site for communication by creating rhetorical social 
barriers to interaction (Classen, 2005). I was interested that a number of audience members felt inhibited to move 
closer to me because they were aware that their choices of proximity would be spectated upon as part of the 
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event, and I wanted to experiment further with methods of framing to explore how I might encourage the 
audience to move across the invisible boundaries to proximity with me. 
Moving towards the next case study, I wanted to more deeply interrogate my understanding of the construction 
and performance of self (Goffman, 1990) with particular focus on the construction of self through chronic time 
(Charmaz, 1991; Jones, 2012; Morris, 2008). Continuing to investigate perceptions of the invisibly disabled body 
would be reliant on my willingness to offer myself as an example of lived experience, but this case study, whether 
through workload or the emotional experience of baring myself for the workshop performances had had an 
emotional and physical impact on me. I became ill between the two performances of (In)Visible: Tell Me What You 
See and struggled with symptoms of ME and depression for some months afterwards, meaning that my priority 
had to be maintaining stable physical, mental and emotional levels before I could consider framing my experience 
for research again. Moving forwards, I would have to balance the self-care needed to manage the fluctuations of 





Chapter 5: Case Study 3 – Screening My(Self): Reflections 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The second case study had left me with a number of questions and areas to explore further. By framing my body as 
an object for visual consumption, I had intended to question the visibility status of disabilities and make an aspect 
of my lived experience of ME visible (Cosenza, 2010; Fassett and Morella, 2008; McRuer, 2006). However, 
audience reactions were split between those who found my nudity a stopping point, and those who saw past my 
sex to the human experience of the body. The social and cultural taboo of nudity also influenced the audience’s 
movement in the workshop space, and I now wanted to find a way of overcoming the invisible barriers the 
audience perceived in viewing me, to investigate the movement choices they might make without them.  
I was interested in the process by which the invisibly disabled performer claims agency of her body, submitting to 
the needs of chronic illness but framing this experience for performance (O’Brien, 2014). This enquiry was 
particularly pertinent as I was experiencing a bad period of health which had begun during the last case study and 
continued since. Both my mental and physical strength were very low and had required me to take time away from 
my work, which had shifted my priorities as I now returned to research (Charmaz, 1991). I had been trying to 
accept that my output of work had been greatly reduced, as I had to concentrate on maintaining a basic level of 
health, what Morris describes as “that which must already be provided for” (2008).  I wondered how I might 
approach my practice research within these reduced limits and without a further detrimental effect on my 
wellbeing. While the timing of this particular low period could be seen as inopportune, it forced me to consider 
ways of working that emerged from my needs, and to reconsider my perceptions of the work I should be producing 
(Marsh and Burrows, 2017). (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See had explored concepts of repetition and 
deterioration, and focused on time as a subjective construct of thought (Jones and Heathfield, 2012), ideas which I 
now intended to explore in relation to the construction of embodied identity in illness and disability (Charmaz, 
1991; Leder, 1990; Morris, 2008; O’Brien, 2014; Sparkes and Smith, 2007, 2011). I wanted to include duration in 
my practice research but in doing so, needed to confront expectations and perceptions of duration with particular 
relation to disability. As Gómez-Peña identifies, the “cult of innovation” in performance art demands newer and 
more boundary pushing works from artists (2004: 79), an unhealthy requirement that overlooks the possibilities 
that work produced through different embodied realities can offer (Lepecki, 2004). I have learnt that it is through 
submitting to the needs of my body that I have control; by living within my capabilities, I can be emancipated from 
the struggle of pushing those same boundaries (O’Brien, 2014). What effect would taking control of my body by 
submitting to the limits of chronic illness have on my performance practice and on perceptions of my body? How 




 How does the gestural body function as an effective site for communication through space and time? 
 
5.2 Continuing practice research   
The period of bad health I had been experiencing since the last case study had impacted me emotionally and 
mentally as well as physically, and regaining balance in this phase of psychosomatic cause and effect was difficult. I 
questioned how much of this relapse was due to the physical demands of my work in the previous case study, and 
how much of an impact the notion of baring myself to the audience, both literally and metaphorically, had brought 
about. Considering using nudity once again for the final case study, I realised that this level of exposure had had a 
greater emotional impact than I had anticipated. My challenge now was to use the process of undressing as a 
metaphor for uncovering but to minimise my nudity, both to avoid some of the inhibitions the audience had felt in 
viewing me, and to reduce the sense of exposure I felt in framing myself for the audience’s view. While social and 
cultural taboos such as nudity or touch may make physical intimacy obvious, the act of looking itself can hold great 
intimacy, and many artists and scholars have explored ways of controlling or directing spectators’ gaze (Jonas, 
1970; Krystufek, 1996; Mulvey, 2005; Phelan, 1988; Sprinkle, 1992). Artists Joan Jonas (1970), Elke Krystufek (1996) 
and Annie Sprinkle (1992), each use intimate bodily actions in their performance art, but these become secondary 
subjects to the way the artist frames her experience for view. The artists control the audience’s gaze and direct it 
to where they choose through carefully enacted invitations, which can engender a sense of agency by reframing 
embodied narratives on the performer’s terms (Heddon, 2008). Performance artists Linda Park-Fuller and Tami 
Spry similarly achieve agency through performing their embodied narratives of illness, Park-Fuller describing how 
she presents herself as survivor rather than sufferer of breast cancer, while Spry finds that using her body for 
performance “enables me to speak the personally political in public, which has been liberating and excruciating, 
but always in some way enabling” (quoted in Heddon, 2008: 3). 
I began to look at how I could frame my embodied experience in performance through veiling, as the central 
concept of this garment is the act of concealing and revealing (Heath, 2008), which aligned with my research into 
covering or uncovering as a form of queer outing (Branfman, 2015). Dance pioneer Loie Fuller used enormous 
swathes of fabric in her work at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, distancing the veil from specific geographic, 
cultural or religious connotations to make veiling a theatrical device (Garelick, 1995). Fuller performed at the 
World’s Fair in 1900, an exhibition of the technological advancement and colonial expansion of New Imperialism, 
at which a number of exhibits featured so-called ‘exotic’ or ‘oriental’ women, displayed behind windows living 
their ‘colonial’ lives for the public to view. Rhonda Garelick (1995) argues that Fuller’s work acted in response to 
this method of presenting women as spectacle to the public, evolving from veils to include glass screens and 
mirrors. One performance of Fuller’s featured a two-way mirror at the front of the stage, allowing the audience to 
watch her dancing as she watched her own reflection. Garelick contends, “In placing herself inside a glass case 
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(and one of her own creation), Fuller literalized and played with the scientific voyeurism of the other spectacles” 
(92). This visionary performance confronted the fetishistic convention of the display of colonial women, by creating 
a scenario in which the gaze operated one way only, challenging the accepted notion of the active gaze decades 
before Mulvey’s seminal work, Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema (2005). By using the mirror as a screen that 
both separated her from the audience and functioned as a window through which to view her, Fuller presented 
herself not just as the object to be viewed, as a butterfly might be seen pinned behind glass, but the taxidermist as 
well, actively presenting herself as subject for the audience’s voyeurism (Alloula, 1986). This was a pioneering 
move by Fuller, and one that resonated with my own research through the paradox of the feminist presenting 
herself as spectacle for the audience (Conroy, 2010; Diamond, 1988; Jones, 2012). This concept was also broached 
by performance artist Carolee Schneeman in her body-based work in the 1970s in which she, like Fuller, 
questioned if she could be “both image and image-maker”, using her visual actions to assert her own authority 
over the presentation of her body, confronting previous taboos and destabilising male artists’ configurations of the 
female body (Schneeman, quoted in Johnson, 2013: 1).   
I began to consider ways that I might re-frame this paradox for the final workshop performance. In the previous 
case study I had experimented with feminist theories through fetishistic conventions which objectified the female 
body by placing it on a pedestal; I now carried this notion forward, actively placing myself as object for view behind 
a screen. In my performance, a screen would operate as both a physical veil or boundary between the audience 
and myself, and as a method of mediatising the gaze (Garelick, 1995). This resurrected ideas from my first case 
study when I had considered controlling the gaze through mirrors and screens, drawn to my reliance on the mirror 
from dance training, where self-surveillance was vital to further physical skill but privileged the visual sense, 
placing it above somatic engagement. I wanted to explore the use of mirrors in the construction of the sense of 
self, drawing on research into the development of subjectivity through mirrors (Bleeker, 2008). Hadley asserts, 
“[The infant] becomes a subject, with a social identity, and agency, only when it is able to see itself as an 
integrated individuated whole”, a view which takes its own image as object (through the mirror) but recognises 
that it has a simultaneous experience as subject doing the looking (2014: 39). I intended to use mirrors in my 
practice to bring together the subjective experience of my disability with the objective view a mirror would afford 
me of how I looked in this performance. I approached these ideas to explore how two-way mirrors might be used 
to control both my own and the audience’s gaze of my gestural body, creating a new staring encounter that 
privileged the visual sense to further investigate the visibility of my disability (Garland-Thomson, 2005a). 
 
5.3 The workshop 
5.3.1 Framing  
98 
 
I took Fuller’s use of a two-way mirror, developing it from a one-dimensional screen (appendix 1, journal pages 98 
and 104) to a box that would screen me on all sides and provide me with a 360 degree reflection of myself when 
standing inside it (figure 14). The notion of screening suggested the physical separation or veiling of my body from 
the audience, but also referenced the mediatisation of my body as image to be viewed (Garelick, 1995; Mulvey, 
2005). The concept of screens that simultaneously hid and displayed was encapsulated in the title Screening 
My(Self): Reflections, which played with the word screening as both a method of concealment and display, 
interpreting the concept through the use of parentheses. By including ‘reflections’ in the title, I alluded to the 
mirrors that would create images of my body while also referring to the ongoing process of reflexivity that has 
been key to my practice research. The multiple images of me that the screens reflected resurrected Fuller’s use of 
mirrors in her patented work featuring mirrors angled to form an octagonal room that reflected her image, filling 
the space with identical, synchronised dancers. Alloula (1986) compares this multiplicity to the mass reproduction 
of images of colonial women at the time; my work also played with socially acceptable forms of looking at both 
female and disabled bodies through the multiplied, mediatised images that the mirrors created (Garland-Thomson, 
2005b). I presented myself as object of the gaze in a manner similar to performance artist Skip Arnold in On Display 
(figure 15) or Hannah Wilke’s What Does This Represent/What Do You Represent (figure 16), in which Wilke 
constructs herself as “literally ‘cornered’ by the gaze” (Jones, 1998: 159). In my performance I was boxed in by the 
gaze, with the simple wooden batons of the screens creating frames that suggested the windows of sex workers in 
red light districts or peep shows (figure 17), codifying my appearance as fetish object. The spectators, who could 
move freely, carrying their gaze from any angle, seemed to be in a position of privilege and authority while I was 
static, trapped by the screens that allowed their view. However, by taking this position, and communicating that I 
could not see the audience but only my own reflection (appendix 8), I took an active role, with my own gaze pre-
empting the criticism that the female body inevitably receives (Butler, 1988), and which would traditionally come 
from the active, and often presumed to be male, gaze (Diamond, 1997). Additionally, my movement, as opposed to 
a stationary pose, threatened the interpretation of my body as sexualised object, adjusting the visual codes of 
looking at female bodies for my own purpose (Jones, 1998). 
Schneider argues that the work of female artists has the potential to disrupt normal or appropriate views of the 
body by making their bodies explicit and refusing to vanish, a disruption necessary to effect cultural change 
(Schneider, 1997). Drawing on Schneider’s theory, my research attempted to make the invisibly disabled body 
explicit by being transparent about my experiences, a lexical choice used in performance to convey a quality of 
honesty or revelation. This was reflected in (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See through my use of nudity, in which I 
searched for the vanishing point of my disability, and allowed others to see through my performance of self to my 
lived experience of ME (Phelan, 1993). In Screening My(Self): Reflections, I continued to make the invisibly disabled 
body explicit through transparency, in both my research method of performing my embodied experience, and the 
transparent material that framed me for view. Artist Oleg Kulik uses glass and mirrors as filters to transform reality, 
offering a way to see through and alter what is perceived (Kulik, 2004). In my performance, the unique material of 
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the two-way mirrors, at once a solid screen and a window through which to direct the gaze, echoed the liminality 
of my disability as physical but not visible, present but see-through-able. In this way, the glass acted as a vanishing 
point at which I might interrogate vanishing points of both the female body and the invisibly disabled body. 
Schneider considers the female body as “Prime Signifier of the Vanishing Point” because the excessive 
representation of the female form means that it is fetishised, idolised and debased, but is always evocative, 
assumed to be representative of something while carrying no inherent meaning in itself, representing a lack (1997: 
5). Similarly, my invisibly disabled body was represented in excess through the many reflections of the mirror box, 
seen as a whole and able-looking body, meaning that its lack may go unknown: its disability is un-seeable so the 

























The two-way mirrors also allowed me to explore this vanishing point through the many reflections of myself that 
the mirror box showed me. In my continuing investigation into the performance of self and the revelation of the 
‘true’ self in performance, which of these reflections would show any more ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ a self than the 
others? Would any one of them reveal where the invisibility of my condition resided? The mirrors presented 
multiple images of myself, reflecting my live body. This meant that I could experience a merger of subjective and 
objective perspectives – I could experience myself at once as live subject of the performance and see myself as 
object for view within it through my reflections; as Kulik argues, glass is, “simultaneously material and ephemeral, 
and it is capable of ‘sublimating’ the most diehard oppositions” (Kulik, 2004: 56). Artists have incorporated mirrors 
and reflections into their work in media ranging from oil paints to photography and performance, placing the 
viewer into a position that merges subjective and objective perspectives (Jonas, 1970; Ulman, 2014; Van Eyck, 
1434; Velazquez, 1656). Through my practice research, I had become aware that working with mirrors influenced 
my awareness of my subjective sense of self through my reflected image, and although I had moved away from 
them to let go of the aesthetic rules that my classical training had imposed, working with my reflection now 
allowed me to investigate reflective and reflexive possibilities (Bleeker, 2008; Whiteside and Kelly, 2016). This 
tactic was similarly explored by Joan Jonas in Mirror Check (figure 18), in which Jonas’ used a mirror to construct a 
visual and metaphorical sense of self, narrating what she saw to the audience to control their view of her body, 
deconstructing the positions of power between performer and viewer (Warr, 2012). By using a two-way mirror, I 
also controlled the audience’s view of me, framing my body for their view by showing them how I viewed myself. I 
Figure 16. Print of Hannah Wilke in What Does 
This Represent/What Do You Represent from 
the So Help Me Hannah series (Wilke, 1978-84) 
Figure 17. Red light district workers in Amsterdam  
(Red light district workers) 
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used my reflection to analyse my performance of self, creating different iterations of myself through the clothes I 
wore and in the transitions between them, as I will describe in the next section. In this way, the mirror became a 
tool to deepen my embodied sense of self by reflecting each self that I performed, and revealing my embedded 
habits and values through this process. This presented a multiplicity of selves in both my different performances of 
self through clothing, and the multiple images that the mirrors reflected. In my exploration of which of the 
performances or images of myself was the ‘authentic’ or ‘true’ self, and which of these might display the invisibility 
of my condition, it was this multiplicity that was the answer. I constructed my identity through my performance of 
self through time, including my identification as invisibly disabled in performances of outing, so this multiplicity of 
selves created myself as authentic in an ongoing process of construction (Bunzl, 1997; Butler, 1990; Fassett and 
















5.3.2 The gestural body 
In Screening My(Self): Reflections I used clothes as part of my performance of self, drawing on Goffman’s (1990) 
and Schweitzer’s (2000) arguments that clothes are a vital aspect of the construction and presentation of self in 
social settings. I used different outfits to reflect the outward manifestation of three iterations of myself, and 
Figure 18. Joan Jonas performing Mirror Check (Jonas, 1970) 
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through the gestural process of undressing and redressing in the clothes, I intended to question perceptions of the 
three selves presented. What would the process of becoming these versions of myself reveal about my 
experiences of each? I began in the same clothes that I had used in (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See, intending to 
portray standardised and non-specific garment choices for women in Western society – blue jeans, a black T-shirt 
and flat black shoes. Although I now acknowledge that the body is inscribed by sociocultural experience, “marked 
by the history and specificity of its own existence” meaning that the concept of neutrality can never truly be 
achieved (Grosz, 1994: 142), at the time, I meant this outfit to cover my personality and therefore felt that I 
performed myself as neutral wearing these clothes (Branfman, 2014). The next iteration of self reflected my 
classical dance training: ballet tights, a leotard, a chiffon wrap skirt and pointe shoes, with my hair pinned into a 
French twist, choices that reflected embodied ideals of classical ballet (Pickard, 2015). Dressing in these clothes 
had been an important ritual to embody the ideal dancer for many years of my life, and I questioned whether I 
would attempt to re-embody this sense of self through this habitual process now (Whiteside and Kelly, 2016). 
Structurally, I wanted to suggest the process of deterioration from the previous case studies, so the third iteration 
would bring into visibility my experiences of relapses of ME and strategies I use to manage these symptomatic 
episodes. This is an iteration of myself rarely seen other than by my immediate family, partly because the changes 
the symptoms affect in my body language generally go unnoticed, and also because I manage my condition so that 
these episodes occur in the privacy of my home. By performing this self through the clothes I wore and my body 
language as I dressed in them, I intended to communicate some of the invisible aspects of my illness, in a process 
of conscious outing (Branfman, 2015; Bunzl, 1997; Cosenza, 2014b). These clothes were typical of what I wear as a 
method of self-care in a symptomatic episode – loose fitting trousers and a sweatshirt made of soft fabrics that will 
not put pressure on my limbs, and a number of layers to help control body temperature.  
The process of embodying each of the three iterations of myself was an autobiographical act, in which I performed 
my experiences from the past, drawing attention to the performance of self. Bobby Baker’s autobiographical works 
Kitchen Show (1991) and Drawing on a Mother’s Experience (1988) similarly reference the self as a performed role, 
as Baker develops personal experiences into a series of live actions and gestures that make a performative act of 
her inner life. Heddon argues that in these performances, Baker both is and is not herself through a complex 
relationship of subjectivity and performance of self, a rhetoric that is crucial to autobiographical practice (2008). 
These acts bring about their own objectivity since performance is not reality and therefore necessitate a 
representation of that reality, requiring the performer to reach an understanding of that distance (Heddon, 2008). 
This is always an unstable area of autobiographical performance, with the representation of reality enforcing its 
representative quality, bordering on deconstructionist and postmodernist territories that could go on endlessly 
(Diamond, 1997; Heddon, 2008). As with Baker’s Kitchen Show, I performed gestures that drew attention to my 
performance of self, such as my conscious attempt to perform ‘neutrality’, or the mannerisms of the dancer 
checking her appearance in the mirror. In acts such as these, the ‘I’ that was the subject of the piece and which 
was also the object that performed it, was simultaneously present and absent, the past self represented by the 
103 
 
present self, but in being only represented, the self of the past was missing (Heddon, 2008; Jones, 1998). This 
representation complicates notions of truth because “in the act of representing the self, there is always more than 
one self to contend with; the self is unavoidably split” (Heddon, 2008: 27). This drew attention to the multiplicity of 
selves that I was investigating, questioning which one of these was the ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ self, and to which one 
the unspoken narrative belonged. This already complex performance of self was further complicated as the 
performance produced a real, lived experience of disability for me. I was aware that my low level of health at the 
time of the workshop meant that the duration of the performance would require some endurance from me, as the 
emotional weight of performing a symptomatic iteration of myself for an audience, together with the 
psychophysical reaction that performing this private self produced, meant that I was likely to experience the very 
symptomatic episode that I intended to perform (Zarrilli, 2004). It would therefore be impossible to make a 
division between the performed self and the subjective experience of self that would coincide with the moment of 
performance. Heddon argues that in autobiographical works the binary of performance and reality collapses into 
itself through the same performing and represented self, proven in my performance (2008). It is not necessary 
therefore, to make distinctions between the real and the represented as both are present and absent in the 
performative act. 
The only concept of a true self that could be arrived at is displayed through the “strategically complex and layered” 
multiplicity of selves in autobiographical performance (Heddon, 2008: 8). As Heddon argues, the concept of self is 
one that brings about identity rather than preceding it, meaning that it is through actions such as this 
performance, as well as the many other performative actions in daily life that I bring myself into being. Jones 
asserts,  
Representation does not secure the meaning of the subject. Nor is it secondary to the ‘authentic’ 
identity of the body... Rather, representation is the very way through which we take on our 
various identifications – both here and now... and in every moment in the future... The body 
always already carries with it every past encounter... (Jones, 2012: 211) 
The iterations of myself in Screening My(Self): Reflections then, should be viewed less as a series of discrete 
personae or separate selves but facets of the same self, each reflecting a historical time, place or experience, but 
forming a single entity. To use Merleau-Ponty’s analogy of the body as a prism through which we perceive the 
world, the facets of the prism could be said to represent the many iterations of self through time that make up an 
individual’s identity. The presence of the artist’s body in live events produces the self as a re-enactment, which 
“both exemplifies the iterative nature of all bodily enactment... and the yearning for authenticity and presence 
that continues to encourage us to privilege the ‘live’ over the ‘representational’” (Jones and Heathfield, 2012: 16). 
Heddon agrees that “The ‘real’, even if intellectually understood as contingent, nevertheless retains its pull – and 
so it should, given that its impacts are often painfully tangible” (Heddon, 2008: 10). My performance displayed 
these concepts of reality and representation, layered in my live performing body, questioning whether my re-
enactment of past experiences was any less real than my live experience in the present, and marking the 
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impossibility of separating the two. It investigated whether my experience of embodying each iteration would be 
perceived by the audience, addressing how the gestural body operates as site for communication. 
 
5.3.3 Time 
The timing of Screening My(Self): Reflections emerged from rehearsing the process of dressing and undressing, 
with a focus on the psychophysical connection brought about by my response to each iteration of myself (Zarrilli, 
Daboo and Loukes, 2013). My physical, mental and emotional state caused subtle changes to how I embodied each 
performed self, influencing the real-time of the performance and I wanted to explore this experiential sense of 
engagement in the autopoeitic process (White, 2013). This meant confronting my sense of risk in presenting a 
performance in which I would appear to be doing little beyond dressing and undressing, but simply being present 
in the moment and responding to each iteration of myself, a process of meaning making in which “the transient 
and elusive nature of this presence becomes the subject of the work” (Heathfield, 2004: 9). In my research 
journey, this marked a further move towards minimal performance, offering new ways of viewing embodiment, 
subjectivity and temporality, and contesting the physical demands of the dance industry that I had previously been 
part of, what Lepecki describes as “an exhausting programme for subjectivity, an idiotic energetic economy, an 
impossible body” (2004: 127). I knew that my level of illness intrusiveness would affect my subjective experience of 
time passing, so there was also risk in submitting to the performance’s temporality and allowing myself to 
experience each moment of embodied identity, subject to the physical symptoms of ME, stressors and emotional 
investment in the performance (Fischer-Lichte, 2008). In preparing for the workshop, I questioned whether my 
performance would fail to be durational if I was limited by my illness and what length of time constituted 
durational performance and for whom. As I had previously investigated, time is produced through subjective 
experience (Jones and Heathfield, 2012) and for those with chronic illness the link between the experience of time 
and the body is additionally complex. The experience of chronicity can lead to a “separate reality” in which 
definitions of achievement and success are measured in new ways (Charmaz, 1991) as markers of time belonging 
to the “rhythms of privilege” do not apply (Cosenza, 2014a). In Screening My(Self): Reflections, I again intended to 
queer time, opening up the understanding of duration to include my subjective experience of the time of the 
performance, which, dependent on my level of health on the day of the workshop, may include endurance as a 
feature. O’Brien (2014) distinguishes durational performance from endurance art, noting that while both carry 
implications of continuing through time or persistence, endurance art holds the additional meaning of suffering. 
He discusses a number of performers who take agency of their chronic illness by framing their experiences as 
endurance art. These acts are necessarily diverse and present endurance in different ways, from Jill Hocking lying 
on a bed covered in cabbage leaves that slowly wilted and decayed, reflecting the deterioration of her health, to 
O’Brien’s bouncing on a trampoline to loosen the mucus that is symptomatic of his cystic fibrosis. For people 
experiencing illness “the lens through which they view the world (and through which the world often views them) 
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changes irreparably” (Lobel, 2010: 158) but by presenting these experiences of time in performance, we can open 
up what is often a narrow understanding of time to include more diverse subjectivities (Lepecki, 2004). 
In the previous case study I had investigated time as a construct of structures of thought and the possibility of the 
perception of time being subject to revision and change (Heathfield, 2004). In this performance, I would continue 
to explore the effect of sound on the perception of time, altering the rhythm of the clock to slow down, an 
additional influence on my psychophysical reaction that would coincide with my deterioration into the final 
iteration of myself. I expected that as in (In)visible: Tell Me What You See this shifting tempo may influence the 
audience to draw parallels between my gestures and body language in a process of deterioration, linking the 
decrease in rhythm to my diminishing energy level. As before, the soundtrack lasted for fifteen minutes, but I 
accepted and allowed the possibility of reaching the final iteration of self before that time, wanting to focus on the 
moment-to-moment presence that would make durationality a feature of this performance. Like La Ribot’s 
performance Panoramix, in which she combined many short actions of her previous performances into one 
durational work, I drew attention to time as an ongoing aspect of subjectivity (Heathfield, 2004). By re-enacting 
past iterations of myself in the present moment of the performance, I presented time as both the enduring process 
of becoming which extended beyond the performance, and drew attention to the time of the performance itself. 
La Ribot describes that in her performances, “I am not enforcing an exact length of time, I am simply giving an 
approximation, a possible time” in which each witness can discover their own understanding and experience of 
how time is produced (quoted in Heathfield, 2004: 30). Her performances do not focus on time as theatrical, a 
time which she describes “starts and finishes”, but as “approximate”, in which she provides “a relative period of 
time to use, a period of time that begins to be understood, and is made up by, each of us individually” (ibid). I  also 
used this tactic to interrupt the hierarchies between performer and spectator, allowing each to coexist in the 
performance without pressure of obligation or responsibility and to open up their own understandings of time and 
temporality (Heathfield, 2004; Lepecki, 2004).  
 
5.4 Perceptions 
5.4.1 Embodied identity 
I gathered feedback from the audience by giving out questionnaires immediately before the workshop that 
focused their attention on perceptions of the screen box, their experience of watching me through the two-way 
mirror and how the changes of clothes I wore impacted their impressions of me (appendix 8). I had planned to 
conclude the workshop with a group discussion, but a number of audience members left the studio before I could 
begin this, and the remaining people were tutors and examiners who were unable to provide commentary. This 
was disappointing as the group discussions in the previous case studies had been valuable for data collection, as 
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people are able to be more expansive in conversation than in writing, and the informality of a group can engender 
greater confidence than individualised feedback allows (Morgan, 1996).  
I recorded my experience of the workshop in my journal before coming to the feedback from the audience in order 
to gain insight to my fleeting and transitory phenomenology prior to analysis (Kozel, 2007). From this entry, I can 
see how my somatic awareness came in waves, with my focus shifting between body-as-subject and body-as-
object, an experience that somatic practitioners argue occurs in the pre-reflective realm (Fraleigh, 1987; Ravn, 
2010). My journal entry describes my shifts in focus between the audience’s and my own perception:  
Catching sight of my anxious expression and that moment of objectivity that helped me to 
choose to experience the ‘now’ differently.  
Undressing and feeling that surge of awareness that accompanies nudity, feeling exposed and 
wondering what they thought of me doing this, what they thought of my body. Distracted into 
the moment by a twisted bra strap... 
...feeling the thrill of magic, of otherworldliness that saw me balance on the tiny platform, 
knowing that others would be watching me in that moment with wonderment. The reality of my 
changed body, my lack of musculature that made this process, so habitual years before, 
unfamiliar. (Appendix 1, journal pages 114-115) 
These reflections demonstrate moments when I saw my body-as-object by considering how I appeared to the 
audience; realising that my expression was anxious, wondering what the audience thought of my nudity, or 
considering their reactions to my pointe work. They also show how this awareness called my attention back to my 
body-as-subject; realising that I felt anxious, that I wanted to fix my bra strap or that I could no longer perform as I 
used to. Fraleigh posits that the body can be experienced as either body-subject - recognising the “unity of body 
and self in action” and experiencing the world moment-to-moment, or as body-object - denoting the attention 
given to the body as object for consideration (1987: 13). However, taking the body as object is complicated since 
one’s own body can never be fully objectified; it always retains an element of self-ness (ibid). Ravn similarly agrees 
that in this realm of consciousness, the body cannot be reduced to mere object as when we reflectively examine 
our subjective bodily sensations we take our body as object for experience (2010). My description demonstrates 
this complex merger of body-as-subject and body-as-object, with the mirror precipitating my shifts in awareness 
between the two.  
Mirrors are used in the development of self by affording a distanced view of the body; as Bleeker explains, the 
subject can take up an understanding of itself as a unified body/self “from a point of view outside the body” 
(Bleeker, 2008: 6). This objectivity is vital in the way we choose to present and construct our sense of self, 
demonstrated in my performance as the mirror allowed me to view my attempts to embody each iteration of self, 
contributing to this embodiment (Goffman, 1990). Whiteside and Kelly’s study (2016), which applies Goffman’s 
presentation of self to an adult ballet class, argue that outward appearance is a vital factor in the understanding of 
embodiment, a term they use to describe both the somatic sensations of executing prescribed ballet movements, 
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and the conscious outward portrayal of ballet habits and values that construct the notion of ‘being a ballet dancer’. 
I put this theory into practice as I consciously engaged in movements, dress and styling to attempt to embody 
three iterations of myself. The clothing I chose offered both a view of the self I intended to embody, and a view of 
the attempt of that embodiment through dressing, a process which Goffman contends assists with the movement 
from one performed self to another (1990). By displaying this process, through undressing from one set of clothes 
and redressing in the next, I revealed the oncoming sense of embodiment, or attempt thereof. For example, 
dressed in the leotard and tights, I found a disparity between the embodied self I expected to see based on my 
past experiences of wearing those garments and my current sense of embodiment. 
The familiarity of the garments and the expectation of their fit on me... Looking at myself dressed 
up in my ballet clothes and feeing for a moment that I was playing dress-up, trying to resurrect a 
part that was no longer mine and this making me uncomfortable, unhappy somehow. (Appendix 
1, journal pages 114-115) 
I was aware of the disparity between the past self I performed and the present self that attempted that 
performance, what Fischer-Lichte describes as perceptual multistability (2008), and what McConachie calls 
oscillation (2008), a shifting awareness between personal presence and the representation of a character, in this 
case, my self-representation. This shifting perception occurred because the physicality of the past self was 
different to my present self, brought about by the effects of chronic illness in the intervening years. This drew my 
awareness to my sense of self as belonging to neither, but as emerging through an ongoing process of durationality 
which incorporated both past and present selves (Jones, 2012). As Fischer-Lichte contends, bodily acts 
do not refer to pre-existing conditions, such as inner essence, substance, or being supposedly 
expressed in these acts; no fixed, stable identity exists that they could express.... Bodily, 
performative acts do not express a pre-existing identity but engender identity through these very 
acts. (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 27) 
I included questions to address whether the audience would notice any change in my body language as I 
performed each iteration: “You saw me in three different changes of clothes. How did your impressions of me shift 
as you saw me in each different outfit? Did my behaviour change at all as my clothing changed?” Responses noted 
that in my ballet clothes I behaved as though “on display”, that they “made you assume a certain attitude of 
strength and assurance”, and that “you definitely ‘appeared’ more confident” (appendix 9). This suggests that the 
audience focused on my gestural body language as I attempted to embody this version of myself, but were 
unaware that this attempt fell short of my expectations. As Fischer-Lichte notes, in the self-referentiality of 
autobiographical performance, it is clearer to the performer when these shifts in perception are happening (2008). 
In the final outfit I wore, I had begun to feel the physical strain of the performance, making me feel vulnerable and 
exposed, uncomfortable displaying this experience of my invisible disability publicly. The following passage from 
my journal describes the change after the iteration of myself in ballet clothes: 
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Realising the effort those momentary few steps had cost me and how breathing was suddenly 
harder, the energy to stand seeming more than I had. Feeling the tightness in my thighs and 
knees, the energy dissipating from my limbs. Telling myself that I was allowed to feel like this 
now, and the workshop was to allow me to show that feeling, but how hard it was to be honest, 
to let the internal sensations that came in waves, the symptoms that were almost imperceptible 
in a body that was somehow numb, to show on the outside. If I allowed my arms to shake, my 
hands to tremble, was I somehow hamming it up, performing something that wasn’t there if it 
didn’t normally show on the outside? (Appendix 1, journal pages 115-116) 
This passage shows that I was considering how the tacit experience of my disability complicated the explicit act of 
performing my disability through this final iteration of myself (Henderson and Ostrander, 2010). In this instance, it 
was impossible to draw a line between the real and the represented, since both were imbricated in my live 
performing body (Heddon, 2008). I was unsure whether the inner sensations of my disability would be 
communicated through my gestural body, and I was wary of bringing something into visibility which would not 
ordinarily show in my behaviour – “was I somehow hamming it up, performing something that wasn’t there if it 
didn’t normally show on the outside?” If my experience of disability was not apparent to the audience, would I 
have failed to out myself as invisibly disabled or would this lack of recognition affirm the invisibility of my 
condition? Framing my experience of ME for performance, which had now become an act of endurance, made me 
question having to perform my disability in order for it to be recognised as part of my identity. Butler argues that it 
is in the repeated acts by which we identify ourselves that identity is constituted, and in invisible disabilities, like 
homosexuality, “it is precisely the repetition of that play that establishes as well the instability of the very category 
that it constitutes” (quoted in Albright, 1997: 9, original emphasis). Invisible disability could be viewed as an 
unstable identity category, once again drawing attention to its liminality as present but not visually clear, 
experiential but not easily communicated (Albright, 1997). 
Few audience responses commented on perception of my physical sensations, with more comments on changes in 
my emotional state. My discomfort at revealing this private iteration of myself may have contributed to the broad 
theme of “hiding”, as they described that my confidence seemed lowest at this stage, that I appeared “glad to be 
covered” and it was as though I could “take off the mask” I had previously worn (appendix 9). In empathetic 
reactions such as these, spectators ascribe an emotion or intention to the performer, generating meaning through 
a process which relies on their ability to embody another’s emotional state (McConachie, 2008). The audience 
responses also suggest the difficulty in interpreting the subjective experience of disability through visual means 
(Kuppers, 2001) and as Charmaz identifies, public audiences to chronic illness “only know slices of this person’s 
experience” (1991: 37). 
 
5.4.2 Voyeurism and audience privilege 
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The audience showed awareness of their privileged position through a trend in responses describing a sense of 
voyeurism as they watched me perform the private actions of undressing; one comment articulated, “I wanted to 
watch, yet knew almost shouldn’t”. My performance requested the audience to move beyond their feelings of 
voyeurism, asking them to go from ‘separated staring’, in which the starer wants to look away, in this case through 
a sense of social propriety, to ‘engaged staring’, which Garland-Thomson describes “reaches out rather than 
shrinks back. It meets rather than dismisses. It intrudes, most often benevolently, because it is on an urgent 
mission for knowledge’ (2006: 188). Phrases like “unsettling” and “weirdly invasive” describe the audience’s 
feelings about watching me, and their awareness of the possible intrusion they made into my intimate actions of 
undressing and examining my body in the supposed privacy of the box.  
The solid but transparent material of the two-way mirrors operated as both a window to frame the audience’s 
view of me and as a physical screen between us, creating a division between the spectators’ space and the 
performance space. I expected that this would minimise the perceived risk for the audience to experiment with 
their choices in proximity without the pressure of me as procedural author spectating on their choices, which was 
proved right in their movement (Heathfield, 2004; White, 2013). For the two-way mirrors to work effectively I 
illuminated the inside of the box with spotlights, and kept the studio unlit, contributing to the performance 
connotations of the event (Welton, 2012) and further suggesting the fetishistic imagery of peep shows. The 
relative darkness the audience were cast in increased their sense of personal space allowing them to respond 
instinctively (Bennett, 1997), and from the recording of the performance I could see that there was more audience 
movement than in the previous case study. The majority of the audience moved around the space, looking at me 
from different angles and experimenting with their proximity to the box, and some came particularly close, with 
their faces just inches from the screens, actions which had not occurred in (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See, when 
the physical presence of my naked body carried socially and ethically loaded considerations in relation to proximity 
(Classen, 2005). With the addition of a barrier and the assurance that I would be unable to see them, the staring 
encounter was not relational as I could not return the gaze (Garland-Thomson, 2005b). The audience members 
could allow themselves to stare, secure in the knowledge that I would not see them doing it; as Garland Thomson 
suggests, 
The risk... in visually objectifying another is being caught doing it. Such fascinated looking is 
simultaneous domination and subjection... the excessive, indecorous enthrallment of staring 
subjugates the starer by begetting shame. (Garland-Thomson, 2009: 44) 
The audience movement and particularly their close proximal choices point to the influence of the two-way mirror 
on their spectatorship in the staring encounter. Compared to the previous workshop when audience members 
avoided approaching me assuming it would be inappropriate, disruptive or uncomfortable, the physical barriers 




I also used the two-way mirrors to retain a sense of privacy, minimising the exposure I felt after (In)Visible: Tell Me 
What You See. Although I knew I could be seen in the mirror box, I could not see the audience, which created a 
vanishing point of perspective (Schneider, 1997). The audience’s view was at once distanced and directed by the 
framing of the mirror box, which gave the viewer an omniscience like God (and subsequently, an active, male 
power, as in ‘God the Father’), but also afforded them a disembodied invisibility – the viewer was everywhere, but 
to me, nowhere in particular (Schneider, 1997). I questioned how experiencing this vanishing point would 
influence my perception of my performance, as the body reacts physiologically to being stared at (Garland-
Thomson, 2009). I had undressed in front of the audience in the previous case study, but I was no longer making 
them complicit in this act through interaction. Knowing that they were watching me offered a fresh perspective on 
my habitual actions and the values that were embedded in them for me, as this description shows: 
Seeing the strange opaque pinkness of the tights as if for the first time, and wondering how this 
had come about as the ideal look for ballet dancers’ legs, the absurdity of this simulated natural 
perfection from an outsider’s eye, not accustomed to the habits and values that ballet has set 
out for it followers. (Appendix 1, journal page 115) 
I had designed the lighting to ensure the two-way mirrors worked reliably and that I would see only my reflection 
in the mirror but nothing of the room beyond. Standing in the mirror box, I was aware of the vanishing point in 
which the audience were invisible to me, but the sensation of being watched made me doubt the mirrors for a 
moment: 
Briefly considering whether I could see anyone in the audience, thinking I had better not try in 
case it made me uncomfortable, giving in to curiosity because it was a part of my perception of 
the event if it did make me nervous, following my line of sight and seeing nothing anyway... 
taking comfort in my screens as a barrier and my reflections as company, pinning me to the 
present moment. (Appendix 1, journal page 116) 
In this passage, it is clear that the vanishing point the screens created did afford me a sense of privacy – “taking 
comfort in my screens as a barrier and my reflections as company”. Schneider observes that in classic perspective 
the subject of the gaze is “blinded” (1997: 67), and I had voluntarily taken a position in which I prioritised my own 
gaze through seemingly private self-surveillance, meaning that being unable to reciprocate the gaze protected me 
from the intimacy of contact with the audience (Jones, 2012). 
 
5.4.3 Time, duration and subjective endurance 
In Screening My(Self): Reflections I explored durationality both through the concept of identity emerging through 
time, reflected in my performance of past iterations of myself, and through a focus on my subjective experience of 
the passage of time in the performance, influenced by my chronic illness on the day. The soundtrack of the clock 
was the only indication that I intended time to be a feature, and I had deliberately not addressed the audience’s 
perception of time in the questionnaire to see whether they would link it to my movement independently. 
111 
 
Unfortunately, owing to an oversight by my technical assistant, the track did not slow down as I had planned but 
maintained a steady rhythm. I had anticipated that the gradual deceleration of the soundtrack would influence 
both the audience’s and my perception of the duration of the performance, for me, adding to the psychophysical 
response to my performance, increasing my fatigue. As it happened, the soundtrack did affect my perception of 
time, as the lack of decreasing rhythm that I had expected to occur from five minutes into the edited soundtrack 
made me feel that I must have been so affected by having an audience that I had come to the end of my 
performance in around four minutes – a radical shift in my perception that points to the difficulty in monitoring 
perception of time without an external marker. Having reached the final iteration of myself in what felt like a much 
shorter time than I had intended, I was concerned that I had failed in my exploration of durational performance. 
Despite the physical and emotional effort that the performance had cost me, evidencing that for me, it had been a 
performance of endurance, I was aware that expectations of durational performance from those without 
experience of the chronicity of invisible disabilities may be different, and they may be unaware that my 
performance had been one of outing myself as invisibly disabled. If “we learn who we are from the responses we 
elicit from others” (Garland-Thomson, 2000: 334) this might mean that my performance was viewed in a different 
context to the one I intended, confronting the shifts in visibility that questioned ‘who’ or ‘what’ I am as a 
performer (Marsh and Burrows, 2017).  
Discussing the long durational performances of the 1970s, Abramović expresses that it is only by going through 
these processes that the artist understands the energy that they both require and generate (in Heathfield, 2004). 
The position of subjection that the performer places herself in for performance art can act as a transformational 
event, and while these transformations may leave physical traces, acts of endurance can also leave marks, albeit 
invisibly (Fischer-Lichte, 2008). I was aware of the traces of endurance from both the previous case study and this 
one but as these were visceral sensations they were unlikely to be read by the audience. The “cult of innovation” 
that demands newer and more boundary pushing work (Gomez-Pena, 2004: 79) and sets up an “exhausting 
programme for subjectivity” (Lepecki, 2004: 127) has led audiences to equate acts that make visible marks such as 
cutting and bleeding with the notion of risk and endurance, whereas other forms of endurance, such as 
performances of duration, require more from the artist in terms of “risk to thought, to perception” (Abramović,  
quoted in Heathfield, 2004). In my performance, I had experienced risk in the vulnerability of outing myself as 
invisibly disabled (Fassett and Morella, 2008), and in the subsequent risk that my performance of this disability 
might have failed to effectively communicate with the audience (Heddon, 2008). As Jo Verrant’s ironic and 
imaginary Disability Arts Rulebook suggests, disability should only be performed in ways that reproduce the image 
of disability according to accepted social models, generally as visually clear, and not exhibiting any signs of 
suffering:  ‘thou shalt not produce work that relates to pain or fatigue or anything that speaks of disability in a way 
that could be interpreted as weakness’” (Verrant, quoted in Lobel, 2013: 117). My performance had confronted my 
own awareness that expectations of disability may not be met by someone with a chronic illness, the experiences 
of which are unseen. This was evidenced by the audience feedback, few of which showed perception of my 
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physical exhaustion towards the end of the performance. As Kuppers points out, “Disability is, but isn’t clear. Pain 
and muscular effort is, but isn’t readable, and knowable” (2001: 39), an unreadable and unknowable presence that 
produces invisible disabilities as liminal, existing between physical presence and invisibility.  
In this case study, I demonstrated the endurance of the performance of self by an invisibly disabled performer. 
Shalson argues for a new view of endurance within theatre in which the acts that go into theatre performance, the 
work of representation and repetition, become the acts of endurance (2013).  
Rather than situating endurance as what distinguishes the ‘real’ of performance from the 
pretence of theatre, this reading asks what it might mean to endure the imitated, the rehearsed, 
and the repeated; to take theatre literally, and to remember that such wilful acts of endurance 
are also acts of love. (Shalson, 2013: 161) 
In her reading, my performance can be seen as existing between the reality of performance art and the 
representation of theatre, an act which blurs the lines of the two with a desire to perform and to make one’s own 
experience a pivotal part of the event for both self and other. In this act, I endured the attempts to re-embody past 
iterations of myself, an endurance which came about through the mental and emotional effort of attempting to re-
enact iterations of myself that my present self was no longer able to fulfil, and the physical effort that this 
attempted performance of self cost with a chronic illness. As Shalson goes on to describe 
To write of the endurance of theatre is to resist from the start a sense that real endurance is only 
involved in situations of extreme bodily pain, exhaustion, or discomfort. It is to resist the 
assumption that degrees of bodily difficulty are readily determinable, or that the line between 
genuine suffering and ‘playing for sympathy’ is always easy to draw. (Shalson, 2013: 161)  
By enacting this performance of self, representing past iterations of myself in the present, I acknowledged that the 
time of the performance, and its related concepts of duration and endurance, could not be easily quantified. As in 
La Ribot’s performance Panoramix, the re-enactment of past actions demonstrated that the witnesses were “in the 
grip of an impossible temporality – fleeting and enduring – a time that does not have its own time” (Heathfield, 
2004: 8). Time was at once the duration which my acts had lasted, and the ongoing, enduring time through which 
my identity was constructed, beginning many years before this case study and continuing afterwards. Through my 
representation of iterations of myself, I could feel resonances of the present moment with the memory of the 
actions I had performed in the past, which now collapsed into each other in the present performance. Wiles (2014) 
draws on Aristotelian theory to argue that time is experienced only through the relationship of past, present and 
future – we exist in the ‘now’, but we can have no concept of ‘now’ without simultaneously thinking of ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ as directly related. We form an understanding of the self as existing through these multiple moments in 
time, with these layered selves forming the narrative of our life. For Sparkes and Smith (2007), the disabled 
individual’s experience of time is particularly significant in the formation of their narrative of self, as it is likely to 
include past selves quite different from their current self, as my performance had shown. 
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Through the process of practice research and the methods of documentation I have used in this PhD, my own self-
narrative as constructed through time has been shown in sharp relief, as seen in Screening My(Self): Reflections. 
The performed actions of undressing and dressing into each set of clothes, and the accompanying sense of 
embodiment with each, demonstrated just some of the iterations of myself through time, and of the disparity 
between the past and present selves. The following extract from my journal reveals how the workshop 
performance gave me a view encompassing past and present iterations of myself. 
Catching sight of my buttocks, their soft wobbly texture, feeling the passage of years, the 
deterioration of fitness from what I used to ask of my body but knowing that in this moment it 
did what I asked of it, balancing on one leg as I put on ballet tights. The familiarity of the ballet 
leotard and skirt, with all the memories of hoping and dreaming infused into their fabric, into the 
way I dressed myself in them. The familiarity of the garments and the expectation of the their fit 
on me and again that speeding-up of time as I fast-forwarded through the many occasions of 
wearing them to now, seeing how my body has changed, has failed my expectations, and how I 
am coming to terms with the new version of my body and of myself, adjusting my expectations 
to the levels of an invisibly disabled body... (Appendix 1, journal page 114-115) 
Henri Bergson argues that however brief any perception may be, it exists in a “durational circuit” through which 
we link a “plurality of moments” in our memories (quoted in Jones, 2012: 192). This effort of memory brings the 
notion of ‘reality’ or ‘authenticity’ into dispute, suggesting that it is not in any one moment, but through the 
processing of these moments that we arrive at an understanding of our subjectivity. My performance 
demonstrated an understanding of this subjectivity as becoming through time, through the presentation of 
multiple selves, both in my performance and in the reflections that the mirror box created. The presence of my live 
performing body was the vehicle to present these multiple selves, but the process demonstrated to me that it did 
not hold any more authenticity than the other images of myself I presented. Fischer-Lichte similarly stresses that a 
stable understanding of the body/self cannot be arrived at: 
It constitutes a living organism, constantly engaged in the process of becoming, of permanent 
transformation. The human body knows no state of being; it exists only in a state of becoming. It 
recreates itself with every blink of the eye, every breath and movement embodies a new body. 
For that reason, the body is ultimately elusive. The bodily being-in-the-world, which cannot be 
but becomes, vehemently refutes all notions of the completed work of art. (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 
92) 
Screening My(Self): Reflections brought my past, present and future selves together in a palimpsestic performance 
document. The past iteration of myself was seen in the attempt to embody the ballet dancer I used to be; the 
present iteration of myself performed the actions of the workshop; and the future iteration was referred to in the 
title of the performance with the word ‘reflections’, commenting on the reflective process that would come after 
and in which I am now engaged. The four screens that simultaneously hid and displayed me, and produced a group 
of eight reflections, provided a physical portrayal of the multiplicity of selves layered through time, in a similar way 
to Jindeok Park’s technologised dance choreography in which she layered video recordings of herself through time 
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in a single performance document (2015) or Bill Viola’s multi-media installation The Veiling, which suggests the 
multiplicity of subjective experience through time (figure 19). My performance of self-representation also captured 
some of the indeterminateness of mimesis that Diamond describes as “both the activity of representing and the 
result of it – both a doing and a thing done” (1997: v). This at once enforced the representative quality of my 
performance, while highlighting that there is no true or authentic self at any point, either past or present. Any 
iteration of self is part of one enduring self. It is in the ongoing becoming of self, of cycling through many iterations 
of self that lead from one to the next in an enduring palimpsest of meaning-making of the self or self-production, 
that any sense of a true or universal self might be arrived at (Jones, 2012).  
 












5.5 Drawing conclusions 
In this final case study, I explored the gestural body as a site for communication, taking agency of my chronic 
illness by literally framing my experience in a box of two-way mirrors that at once displayed me for the audience’s 
view and provided a physical screen between us. The two-way mirrors demonstrated that the audience were more 
comfortable in their spectatorship with the screen between us, as both a physical barrier and a method of 
preventing me from viewing their proximal choices, and allowed me to feel less exposed in my performance, by 
placing the audience in a vanishing point of classic perspective (Fischer-Lichte, 2008). This unique material also 
explored my body as existing in a vanishing point, as it allowed a comprehensive view of my body, but did not 
Figure 19. Bill Viola's The Veiling (Viola, 1995) 
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necessarily reveal the invisibility of my condition, either through my performative actions or in the multiple images 
of myself that the mirrors reflected. My condition was still invisible, with no one image of myself offering truth or 
authenticity. The mirrors allowed a merger of subjective and objective perspectives as I could experience myself at 
once as live subject of the performance and see myself as object for view within it through my reflections, 
recognising that how we are perceived by others constitutes our sense of self through an understanding of 
ourselves as both body-subject and body-object (Grosz, 1994).   
As I have argued, I used my performance as a way of taking agency of my chronic illness, framing my 
representation of past iterations of myself as an act of endurance, both in the emotional investment of this act of 
self-advocacy, declaring my identity as invisibly disabled in a form of outing (Cosenza, 2014b), and in the 
psychophysical reaction that this performance prompted, bringing on symptoms of ME (Zarrilli, Daboo and Loukes, 
2013). Using one’s own experience in acts of live performance can be a transformative event offering new insights 
to its witnesses (Heathfield, 2004), but can also impact the performer, leaving them with scars produced through 
the exhaustion of crossing borderlines between reality and representation (Fischer-Lichte, 2008; Kulik, 2004). For 
me, this was proven in the emotional and physical after-effects of (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See and my 
experience of enduring the work of representation and repetition in my performance of self in Screening My(Self): 
Reflections (Shalson, 2013). These acts showed me that while they did impact my wellbeing, they were a necessary 
way to draw attention to the experiences of people with invisible disabilities who may not otherwise be 
represented in performance. As Asentić articulates, 
We wish to endure the cuts although they’re painful and leave many of us exhausted, burned out 
and disappointed... We wish to continue creating new social facts that will be our contribution to 
a society of solidarity and complementarity... We wish to continue to mobilise other precarious 
groups in our society, and to claim responsibility for the public good. (Asentić, quoted in Marsh 
and Burrows, 2017: 24) 
Using my own experience as an invisibly disabled performer, and the influence my condition had on my perception 
of the duration of the performance recognised that the experience of time is subjective, and attempted to open 
out new views of temporality that incorporated the chronicity of chronic illness. This case study demonstrated that 
while subjective experience itself is difficult to communicate (Limon, 2010), the performer’s body language can 
display the way she reacts to that experience and the audience may make their own empathetic inferences based 
on their embodied social and cultural experience (McConachie, 2008; Kelleher, 2009).  
As an autobiographical performance, this case study explored the complex layering of reality and representation, 
arguing that these concepts collapse together through the live artist’s body (Heddon, 2008). I have argued that our 
sense of embodied identity emerges through time, and that we construct a narrative of the self through an 
awareness of a multiplicity of selves through time (Fischer-Lichte, 2008; Jones, 2012; Sparkes and Smith, 2007, 
2011; Wiles, 2014). By presenting some of these iterations of myself in performance, I explored how the habitual 
processes of performing the self can reveal the values we hold about how we choose to be seen. These habits and 
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values may be seen in body language and behaviour, which, in the context of autobiographical practice, influence 
the gestural body as a site for communication. As my performance focused primarily on my own exploration of the 
presentation of self and my subjective experience of the passage of time, it has been difficult to achieve a 
distanced and objective view of my research in this case study. It has nevertheless offered me new insights into my 
understanding of how the self emerges through time, as Fraleigh describes, “self appears in its works” (1987: 31), 
or as Cosenza articulates, 'I used physical performance as a method of processing, communicating, critiquing and 
learning' (Cosenza, 2010: 2). While the invisibility of chronic conditions suggest an intrinsic difficulty in 
communicating subjective experience through the gestural body, as seen in Screening My(Self): Reflections, the 
invisibly disabled body occupies an important space in performance and in our minds, challenging the received 
discourses of both disability and performance, confronting the accepted notions of what disability is and what it 





Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1 In summary  
In this research, I have used a practice-based methodology to investigate perceptions of physicality and meaning 
through the invisibly disabled body. I have explored how the body functions as an effective site for communication 
in performance by examining how elements of space and time influence perceptions. I did this by experimenting 
with factors of space, examining how my embodied experience of the displacement of space within my body-space 
is reflected in the displacement of space through gesture in the performance environment, and how the framing of 
the gestural body in the performance space contributes to its perception. I also analysed the extent to which 
changes in time, such as the speed and repetition of gesture, the manipulation of the codification of time through 
sound, and the differing subjective perceptions of concepts of duration and endurance are influential in the 
perception of physicality and meaning through the invisibly disabled body. 
Through my central position as researcher-practitioner, I have gained a unique perspective into the role of the 
invisibly disabled body in performance practice, how it can offer new insight into performance practice through 
personal reflection, and how this embodied experience can be communicated in performance. The study has 
limitations, which I will address, and is therefore intended as a first step in my ongoing research into perceptions 
of invisible disabilities in performance, but the research presented in this thesis and the accompanying practical 
submission have enabled me come to some conclusions. 
 
6.2 The invisibly disabled body and somatic awareness 
Using my own experience of chronic illness in this research has led me to posit that the invisibly disabled body 
lends itself particularly well to phenomenological reflection and somatic practice owing to its near constant bodily 
self-reflection due to its subjugation by chronic illness. The experience of illness brings greater awareness of the 
body, as suggested by practitioners including Zarrilli (1997, 2004) and Fraleigh (1987), and theorised more deeply 
by Leder through the concept of the dys-appearing body (1990). In my research, my experiences of bodily dys-
appearance have demonstrated the potential for a dualist reading that Leder, Zarrilli and Fraleigh describe the 
body naturally motivates, but I have discovered, as Leder contends, that it is precisely through the fluctuations of 
bodily disappearance and dys-appearance that the underlying unity of body and mind are proven. An embodied 
perspective, which takes the body as source for subjective experience, is attentive to the changes in bodily 
perceptions, promoting greater awareness of the possibilities of embodied experience. I contend that for the 
individual with chronic illness, an embodied perspective begins a cycle of self-awareness that necessarily moves 
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through unity and dualism. Physical symptoms draw attention to the illness as separate to the individual’s 
intentions and desires and she feels subjugated, creating dualism, but by learning to live within the regulations of 
the body and its needs, the individual can achieve unity once again. Using her subjective experience to generate 
performance material through somatic or phenomenological methods, she is able to frame her lived experience for 
performance, and take agency of her body and her illness, claiming it as her own. This process occurs cyclically, 
induced by symptomatic episodes of illness, a regulation of the chronically ill body through time which in itself 
prompts greater somatic awareness. The individual must constantly analyse her illness intrusiveness or bodily dys-
appearance in order to maintain a basic level of health alongside an ongoing research project or career path. This 
subjective experience of chronic time (Morris, 2008) or chronicity (Charmaz, 1991) means that the individual is 
engaged in ongoing somatic reflection, both through the rhythm of symptomatic episodes and through narratives 
of the self constructed through the chronic experience (Charmaz, 1991; Sparkes and Smith, 2007). In my practical 
research, I demonstrated awareness of this somatic reflection through time by exploring my subjective experience 
of temporality and how this might be communicated in performance. In (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See, I 
explored how the audience’s subjective experience of time could be manipulated through the digitally accelerated 
soundtrack of a ticking clock, and together with the decrease in displaced space through the deteriorating pattern 
of my gesture could communicate the experience of chronic time. In Screening My(Self): Reflections I represented 
past iterations of myself, reflecting both my subjective experience of this performance as one of endurance 
(Shalson, 2013), and the durationality of identity as emerging through time (Jones, 2012), in my case including the 
influence of chronic illness on the construction of my self-narrative through time (Sparkes and Smith, 2007, 2011).  
The invisibly disabled performer’s somatic engagement is also influenced by her unusual experience of spatiality. 
Leder’s theory of bodily dys-appearance gives rise to the notion of the body or body parts as absent, which I have 
explored through my own experiences with ME, when low energy levels prevent me from using my body or limbs 
normally and leading me to consider them as unembodied. As Grosz has theorised (1994), internalised images of 
the body are constructed not just through its physical realities, but through embodied understandings that draw 
upon subjective representations of the body as existing in time and space, again pointing to the somatic 
engagement of those with alternative physical experiences. Presenting different forms of embodiment in 
performance is an important step in recognising the diverse possibilities of embodied understanding in those who 
identify as disabled or situate themselves across a spectrum of bodily difference. Tanja Erhart, whose fluctuating 
disability creates different states of embodiment in her practice, argues that it is important to address how 
disabilities impact on making performance in a constructive and playful way, beyond a medical view, to “find out 
what potentiality dis_ability experience brings into dance and aesthetics, and how to rethink the body” (quoted in 
Marsh and Burrows, 2017: 22). In my performance practice, I explored the potentiality of increased somatic 
engagement through my invisible disability, applying my own understanding of embodiment to my performance 
practice in different ways. The gesture that I performed in the first two case studies portrayed how my perception 
of unembodied body-space could be applied to Laban’s kinesphere as a visual signifier of the diminishing potential 
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space that my illness brings about. These performances explored this diminishing space through repetition and 
deterioration, to explore how the change in displaced space, both within my body-space and in the external space 
of my kinesphere could influence the audience’s interpretation of meaning though my physicality. In Screening 
My(Self): Reflections I explored changes to embodiment through my attempts to re-enact past iterations of myself, 
which questioned the understanding of embodiment as a fixed and stable experience, by pointing to the 
fluctuations that illness or disability can bring about in individual interpretations of the self as embodied. 
 
6.3 Perceptions of the invisibly disabled body 
Investigating the gestural body as a site for communication in performance has led me to contend that the invisibly 
disabled body carries essentially queer theories in the following ways. It has an intrinsic otherness, in that it does 
not conform to normalised expectations or predictable patterns of how the apparently able body should function, 
meaning that it additionally exists in a state of liminality, between visible recognition and physical presence 
(Cosenza, 2014b; Lindemann, 2010). This means that like alternative identifications of sexuality or gender, invisible 
disabilities must be performed in order to be recognised (Bunzl, 1997; Cosenza, 2010; Fassett and Morella, 2008; 
Henderson and Ostrander, 2010), requiring repeated identifications that reinforce the instability of its identity 
category (Butler, 1990; Albright, 1997). My embodied practice has also demonstrated the need for the invisibly 
disabled body to be viewed queer, a reading which refutes the possibility of a subject or meaning being fixed 
(Jones, 2012), encompassing a range of subjective experiences of concepts such as embodiment, spatiality and 
temporality, moving away from an unhelpful binary of ability and disability toward the recognition of a spectrum of 
embodied difference (Leder, 1990; Fassett and Morella, 2008; McRuer, 2006; Marsh and Burrows, 2017). 
If the body is the lens through which we perceive the world, it follows that the world perceives each person 
through their body, as Grosz posits that subjectivity includes an awareness of how the outer surfaces of our body 
inform inner self perception (1994). To borrow Merleau-Ponty’s body-as-prism theory and reverse it in this way, 
the array of influences we each derive from sociocultural settings is thrown into relief by working with the body, 
displaying the perceptions, habits and experiences that influence our world view, in the same way that a prism 
refracts white light into the seven colours of visible light. It seems fitting then, that the rainbow of colours 
produced is used by the LGBTQ+ movement to represent a spectrum of experience, in an effort to queer normative 
assumptions about identity, an aim I share in my research into invisible disabilities. Working with my body in 
practice research has revealed some of the influences on my emerging sense of identity through time, and how 
this impacts the gestural body as a site for communication, both at a performative level and in the ways I choose to 
frame myself for performance. In order to communicate my subjective experiences of invisible disability, I have 
had to learn to work from the fluctuating needs and capacity of my body with a chronic illness, consciously 
stripping away habitual movement patterns and embodied ideals that were part of the physical culture of dance 
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that I was previously part of but which set up unrealistic expectations about how my body should now work 
(Hargreaves and Vertinski, 2007; Lepecki, 2004). The difficulty I perceived in moving away from my previous ideals 
reflects that the body/self is not just inscribed by our social and cultural settings but is produced through these 
factors (Grosz, 1994), and is testament to the depth to which physical cultures embed their ideals in the bodies, 
minds and emotions of the people who follow them (Gordon, 1983; Gray and Kunkel, 2001; Mazo, 1974; Pickard, 
2015). Our identity is subject to change in a constantly evolving creation of self however, and maturity affords us 
new values in how we practice our art, as Marsh and Burrows reflect: 
The body changes constantly, we are in an ever-shifting process of ageing and changing, as artists 
we might experience a period in our early career of pushing to ‘fit’ into prescribed or ‘ideal’ 
representations. Time and experience however seem to give us more confidence to act on 
impulse and practice our art form authentically and with a truth that is tied to our individual and 
transitional body. (Marsh and Burrows, 2017: 7) 
In writing this conclusive chapter, acting as the final stage to my research through reflexivity, I can see the journey 
I have made away from the ideals and values that dominated my classical dance training. However, while my 
intention of using my lived experience with a chronic illness in my performance practice is to draw awareness to 
this often overlooked subjectivity, it holds similarities to the ideals of self-sacrifice and the value in suffering for 
one’s art that I previously experienced in classical dance culture (Gordon, 1983; Gray and Kunkel, 2001; Mazo, 
1974; Pickard, 2015). While Grotowski’s contention (1968) of the performer’s moral duty and artistic ethic to gift 
herself to the audience is not specific to any performance specialism, I question whether I have found a new way 
of interpreting an old value, finding worth in enduring the vulnerability of exposure to offer insight to more diverse 
subjectivities. 
Working from my embodied experience of chronic illness has addressed the misconception of ability and disability 
as a visible binary, through my attempts to be transparent in how I presented my experience of invisible disability 
(Cosenza, 2010; Fassett and Morella, 2008; McRuer, 2006). At first thought, invisibility and transparency are 
semantically alike, both implying a quality of being present but unseen, of being see-through-able. Yet the 
invisibility of ME suggests being unable to be recognised, something which can be overlooked or seen past. I have 
explored how this invisibility holds emotional ramifications in both others’ and self-perception; as fellow 
performers Hanauer and O’Brien have suggested, not being recognised for how you identify can be uncomfortable 
(in Marsh and Burrows, 2017). Disability studies and discourses have until recently, focused on people with visibly 
marked disabilities, an understanding perpetuated by publications such as Siebers’ (2010) which focuses on a 
disability aesthetics that recognises the visual difference of disability over the traditional aesthetic of the whole 
(and therefore healthy) body. These views also point to the ongoing privileging of the visual sense, which has 
power but also primacy (Garland-Thomson, 2009), and has led to a perceived lack of legitimacy of invisible 
disabilities, based on the assumption that that which cannot be seen does not exist (Cosenza, 2014b). These issues 
contribute to the difficulty in communicating invisible disability in performance, a difficulty which I attempted to 
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overcome by making my embodied experiences transparent through my practice methods and materials, 
borrowing from McRuer’s use of crip theory to suggest a displacement of the barrier of invisibility, and enacting an 
openness to new views of disability (2006).  
This notion of transparency as honesty has necessitated an investigation into the processes through which I come 
out as invisibly disabled, again supporting the implication of queer theories in the study of invisible disabilities. I 
have experimented with coming out by revealing my lived experience through gesture, but have also explored how 
a process of literal uncovering contributes to perceptions of the gestural body to communicate the experience of 
invisible disability. I have used my clothing, lack of clothing and the act of undressing as a way of framing my 
invisibly disabled body as a site for communication, lifting the veil of invisibility in an attempt to reveal the lived 
experience of chronic illness beneath. Clothes are a vital part in the governing of social roles (Schweitzer, 2000) 
and are used consciously in how we choose to present ourselves, both for our own self-perception and to the 
perception of others (Goffman, 1990; Whiteside and Kelly, 2016). I have examined both the construction of self 
through clothing, as in the iterations of myself in Screening My(Self): Reflections, and have also used the process of 
removing these layers of performed identity to explore how nudity might represent another method of self-
revelation (Malik, 2008). While my early thoughts that the ‘true’ self could be revealed through nudity have 
changed, as I now recognise that the body or self carries authenticity only in a continual process of identification 
through time meaning that one stable notion of a true self cannot be arrived at, my investigation did reveal that 
this method of “disclothsure” carries an emotional risk as a form of outing (Levine, quoted in Schweitzer, 2000: 
65). I used nudity in an attempt to demonstrate the vanishing point of my invisible disability, displaying my body 
which passes as able-bodied through its apparent wholeness and perfection, but could only reveal the visceral 
experience of disability through performed gesture (Fischer-Lichte, 2008; Quinlan and Bates, 2010). This 
questioned the perceived visibility of disabilities, asking the audience to move beyond their initial reactions to my 
nudity and look at me in search of the tacit embodied knowledge my gestural body communicated (Garland-
Thomson, 2006).  
By presenting my embodied experiences of chronic illness in performance, I draw upon Siebers’ call for a disability 
aesthetics that embraces bodily beauty in a form that “seems by traditional standards to be broken”, but request 
that this new aesthetics incorporate invisible rather than just visible difference – an aesthetics of invisibility (2010: 
3). I have come to see invisible disabilities as the ‘new other’ – while disabilities were for so long the unspoken and 
unacknowledged other to the norm, but have now become increasingly recognised to the point that commercially 
successful integrated or disabled dance companies such as CandoCo have become ‘establishment’ (Whatley, 
2007), the invisibility of chronic illness continues to resist recognition. If the term ‘disabled’ threatens to fix 
individual identity into an unchanging category (Kuppers, 2001), the threat to those with invisible disabilities is a 
lack of identification.  As the new other, invisible disabilities exist at a vanishing point in an occularcentric society; 
they are invisible when taking a purely visual approach to their recognition, as Phelan asserts, “The vanishing point 
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also underlines the hole in the viewer’s body: it points to what painting, and corporeal vision itself, cannot show, 
cannot see” (Phelan, quoted in Sandahl and Auslander, 2005: 138). Like artist Judith Scott’s sculptures that conceal 
objects beneath layers of yarn, the subjective experience of the soma may be unknowable through the objective 
perception that others hold of the body. This new aesthetic of invisibility therefore, relies on performativity in 
order for its subjects to reveal their embodied experiences. In my research I have taken an embodied approach to 
the communication of invisible disabilities in performance in an attempt to move away from the lack of vision 
Phelan describes. By working somatically, the performer creates material that is derived from authentic embodied 
knowledge of her condition, and performing this promotes an intersubjective reading from the audience who draw 
upon their own embodied experiences in the perception of her gestural body. The framework of performance 
offers the possibility of communicating tacit knowledge, and of forging connections through embodied experience. 
However, the new aesthetics of invisibility must recognise the position of vulnerability that self-advocacy places 
those with invisible disabilities in, a form of additional labour that those with visible differences may not have to 
undertake to make their experiences known and have their needs met (Cosenza, 2014b). As Fassett and Morella 
acknowledge, “The issue of coming out as someone with a non-visible disability cannot be contained in a theory of 
impression management.... the notion of coming out as a choice does not adequately reflect the complexities of 
human relationships” (2008: 146). Coming out as invisibly disabled is a socially complex process into which there is 
currently little research, but which is an inevitable necessity for those whose embodied differences are overlooked 
in a society which continues to make ontological judgements about disability based on visual cues (Fassett and 
Morella, 2008).  
The invisibility aesthetics that I call for encourages recognition of a more diverse range of subjectivities and 
addresses how these influence social and cultural interaction. My research has focused on my ongoing 
identification as invisibly disabled and how I communicate this identity to others in performance, what Garland-
Thomson refers to as gaining disability literacy, an embodied understanding of disability through experience, or 
“disability epistemology” (Scully, quoted in Garland-Thomson, 2017: 329). While the research has been specific to 
my circumstances, I have found that it is through the intersubjectivity of performance that we can move towards 
greater awareness and acceptance of different embodied experiences. As Kuppers states, “We need to revalue the 
body as a source of experience and difference, before we are able to move forward with identity politics” (2001: 
32). 
 
6.4 Limitations of the study 
My research has been based on subjective and personal experiences, so is intended as a starting point for my own 
and others’ research into perceptions of the invisibly disabled body in performance. As autobiographical practice, 
this act of “self-making” is subjective (Garland-Thomson, 2000: 338), as my situation in the research brings about a 
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perspectival sense that “necessarily involves not seeing that point of view itself” (Merleau-Ponty, quoted in Leder, 
1990: 12). While I have endeavoured to balance the subjectivity of my position in the research with the objectivity 
that reflexivity engenders and the objectivity of audience members’ responses, embodied experience is influenced 
by social, political, historical and cultural forces, as autoethnography investigates, and therefore cannot offer an 
objective stance from which to judge their affects (Grosz, 1994).  Bochner and Ellis warn that traditional ways of 
assessing the validity of research that look for objective claims of truth risk “delegitimizing the very essence of 
what makes the evocative autoethnography paradigm powerful”, including the generation of reflexive and self-
critical accounts that can inform and validate others’ (2016: 239). Subjectivity is however, a limitation of the study 
as my personal opinions and responses inevitably influenced what I considered noteworthy (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995). Although personal accounts should not be trivialised as they can offer authentic forms of knowing 
through embodied experience (Fraleigh, 2015; Garland-Thomson, 2017), neither can they be taken as sources of 
absolute truth (Heddon, 2008). Research such as mine, which crosses borders from autobiography to 
autoethnography, accommodates subjectivity, replacing the claim of ‘truth’ with one of ‘usefulness’, as it is less 
important how factual a perceived experience was than how it is utilised in the research (Bochner and Ellis, 2016). 
My personal accounts should be taken as a way to consider the possibility of more diverse interpretations of 
concepts such as embodiment, spatiality and temporality that may resonate with others’ experiences or prompt 
others to share their own accounts. The authenticity engendered through autobiographical practice can be 
conflated with authority, as personal experience is connected to wider examples of others’ lives (Heddon, 2008), 
so I acknowledge that the relational ethics in my work may mean that my experiences are connected to others 
within the invisibly disabled community, but I do not intend my account to stand as an authoritative text in this 
area (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011). My use of autobiographical methods is intended to provide one example of 
the lived experience of the invisibly disabled body and how it is perceived in performance as a contribution to an 
area that researchers acknowledge is lacking in exploration (Fassett and Morella, 2008; Hadley, 2008; Lobel, 2010, 
2013; Sandahl and Auslander, 2005).  
Autoethnography allows for “subjectivity, emotionality and the researcher’s influence on the research”, which has 
accommodated the flexible approach to the research design that I have had to take due to the fluctuations of ME 
(Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011: 2). While these accommodations have been necessary in managing the research 
alongside chronic illness, I acknowledge that my need for control over my health has meant making changes to my 
research approach that were conducive to my physical, mental and emotional experience as researcher/research 
subject, which has to contributed to my failure to achieve a distanced reading of my work. Living with ME for 
around 18 years, I have learnt that I am able to achieve a steady pattern of health only through careful control of 
potential triggers to my symptoms. I have formulated methods of managing my activity and rest levels, visual and 
auditory stimulation and emotional stressors through years of trial and error to manage the restrictions of my 
disability and learn to live within them (Morris, 2008). When so much of the experience of chronicity is concerned 
with monitoring and controlling the elements that are within ones power, anything that threatens control comes 
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to be seen as a risk to health, as illness intrusiveness can make managing daily activities difficult or impossible 
(Charmaz, 1991). This has been influential in some of my choices of research design as I have perceived greater risk 
in some scenarios than a researcher without a chronic health condition might. Awareness of the constraints of a 
chronic illness is likely to be more vivid for the person living with it (Morris, 2008), meaning that the decisions 
needed to manage invisible disability are often made tacitly, resisting explanation through the written or spoken 
word (Polanyi, 1961). Acknowledging the influence of these many subtle and varied needs in the context of the 
research therefore, becomes a form of self-advocacy; additional labour within the research process to mitigate 
potential criticisms that the work may be lacking in validity (Cosenza, 2014b).  
Choices such as the research setting, inviting audiences to the workshop performances, the duration of the 
performances and the processes by which I framed my embodied experience for performance have all been 
interpreted through my consideration of potential ‘threats’ to my physical, mental and emotional wellbeing. These 
considerations curtailed the ‘reckless’ creative capacity that Phelan describes young artists sometimes have (2004), 
as chronicity has taught me that recklessness comes with a pay-off of illness. If the body’s energy is the first 
element necessary for our subjective interaction with the world; to quote Morris, “that which must already be 
provided”, I have learnt to use that energy frugally (2008: 414). In this study, my difficulty in taking risks and need 
for control over the research process may be seen as a contribution to new knowledge in the area, a recognition of 
a limitation of the invisibly disabled body in performance that allows for a fuller embrace of its potential through 
deeper understanding (Heddon, 2008). As Denzin and Lincoln acknowledge, the qualitative researcher understands 
that her personal history, gender, and social and cultural background shape the research, which embraces 
“constant tensions and contradictions” (1994: 4). I recognise the ongoing tension of conducting research into 
perceptions of the invisibly disabled body, when the research subject’s tacit perception of her health needs 
influence the research; as I have previously argued, the invisibly disabled body acts as both research subject and 
gatekeeper to the research, preventing anything other than a subjective view. 
Managing my symptoms of ME has meant considering perceived risks to my health as well as logistical issues such 
as travel and the location and duration of practical research activities. The research setting of the studio at 
Canterbury Christ Church University should be viewed as a necessary adaptation in the context of my health needs. 
It allowed me to develop as near to a routine as was achievable and to see this setting as a constant in the 
unstable and unpredictable pattern of chronic illness (Mullins et al, 2017). However, the localisation of this setting 
meant that the audiences of the workshop performances were small, limiting the quantity of data from their 
responses, in particular for Untitled and Screening My(Self): Reflections. Greater publicity of the performances 
might have encouraged larger audience numbers, but this was not something I could achieve at the time, because 
the risk I perceived in sharing personal experiences through performance meant that the process was already 
emotionally loaded for me. It may also be noteworthy that despite my embodied and sensorial approach to the 
creation of movement material, none of my case studies made allowance for touch from the audience. My need 
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for control influenced the risk I perceived in sharing my body with them, meaning that although my research 
participated in discourses around the division and merger of subjective and objective perspectives, I kept the 
audience at a distance, preventing the possibility of closing the gap of perception across these points through 
touch (Grosz, 1994). My research approached the concept of invisibility in a visual way, pointing to the influence of 
visual privilege on my outlook, possibly due to my past experiences in theatre performance in which there were 
always clear divisions between myself and the audience. Although intersubjectivity implicated both starer and 
staree in a reciprocal and embodied act (Garland-Thomson, 2005b; Grosz, 1994) I relied on the visual sense as a 
source of knowledge and understanding (Garland-Thomson, 2009).  
 
6.5 Applications of the research 
This research is situated in an interdisciplinary context, existing between and across areas of practice and research 
including performance art, live art, theatre, spectatorship, feminist theory, queer theory, disability arts and 
disability studies. The driving force across these territories is a focus on embodied practice, which offers a valuable 
contribution to researchers and practitioners within the performance community exploring how different 
embodied experiences influence performance making. Researchers and practitioners are calling for a broader 
understanding of disabilities as a socially constructed identity category (Garland-Thomson, 2017; Hadley, 2014; 
Henderson an Ostrander, 2010; Marsh and Burrows, 2017; Siebers, 2010, 2015; Snyder and Mitchell, 2006). My 
work therefore, provides an account of the experience of identifying as disabled with the additional challenge of 
an invisible difference which confronts the perceived binary of ability and disability as visible presence or absence 
(Cosenza, 2014b; Fassett and Morella, 2008; McRuer, 2006). My focus on the processes through which I 
communicate my invisible disability may be of interest to researchers using queer and crip theories, as I provide 
examples of the experience of passing as able bodied and the choice to out or uncover my chronic illness that 
contribute to the understanding of invisible disability as a liminal identity category that requires performativity to 
be recognised (McRuer, 2006; Branfman, 2015; Bunzl, 1997; Cosenza, 2010, 2014b; Lindemann, 2010; Jones, 2010; 
Quinlan and Bates, 2010; Snyder and Mitchell, 2006).  
The research offers an example of a single subjectivity to stand alongside other embodied accounts in research and 
performance, offering a view of embodied differences as a “a variety of ways of being in the world”, forming a 
spectrum of lived experience in a deliberate move away from unhelpful binary distinctions of ability and disability 
(Henderson an Ostrander, 2010: 3). My work addresses the misconception that disability or chronic health 
conditions mean a lack of ability or competence, and my flexible and adaptive approach demonstrates that 
incorporating different needs and capacities into practice-based research is possible and may offer new 
potentialities to performance-making (Hadley, 2014; Kuppers, 2004; Lobel, 2010, 2013; Marsh and Burrows, 2017; 
Quinlan and Bates, 2010). This thesis uses a combination of written and practical methods, supporting the value of 
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praxis and pointing to the particular importance for the researcher with a chronic health condition to develop 
reflexive strategies to manage their research journey as they navigate the already uncertain terrain of chronic 
illness (Barrett and Bolt, 2007; Bolt, 2006; Charmaz, 1991; Freeman, 2010; Morris, 2008; Mullins, 2017; Nelson, 
2013; Kershaw and Nicholson, 2011). 
Another area of possible application of this research is to disability studies which take a somatic approach to the 
perception of illness or disability and its influence on the construction of disabled identity. Subjective and personal 
accounts are increasingly being regarded as valuable sources of data in the growing field of psychosomatic 
approaches to disability studies (Brighton and Sparkes, 2014; O’Brien, 2014; Morris, 2008; Mullins, 2017; Sparkes 
and Smith, 2007, 2011). The intersection of disability studies and disability performance means that these 
subjective descriptions are being explored through performance, as seen in Kuppers’ project Traces that sought to 
develop awareness of disabled individual’s embodied space through somatic engagement (in Sandahl and 
Auslander, 2005), and the performance Mirage by Australian company Igneous which drew on the medical use of 
mirrors to aid recovery in the experience of phantom limb syndrome (in Hadley, 2014). My concept of 
disembodied body-space used to create gestures for performance, and my autobiographical accounts of 
identifying as invisibly disabled through time may therefore, be of interest to other researchers investigating how 
subjective perception influences embodied identity (Grosz, 1994; Leder, 1990).  
My journey through this research has given me a number of lessons in disability, and offered me a reflexive view of 
the ongoing process of identifying as disabled; as Garland-Thomson re-phrases Beauvoir’s iconic phrase – one is 
not born disabled, but rather becomes disabled (2014). This embodied knowledge has helped me to develop 
disability literacy, embodied knowing through lived experience of disability. This can aid a move towards ‘disability 
cultural competence’ a strategy which Garland-Thomson describes as “a knowledge translation project through 
which the interpretive knowledge-making tools of critical disability studies... can serve as an opportunity to 
actually shape policy and practice through the field of bioethics” (2017: 325). While I acknowledge that my 
research and personal experience does not invest me with authority on the subject of invisible disabilities, and that 
as a subjective account, my work cannot stand as an example for others’ experiences, it has provided me with 
direct experience of the hurdles that those with invisible disabilities face in HE settings (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 
2011; Heddon, 2008). As Hadley argues, views about the needs and possible pathways to change in culture are 
directly influenced by the experience of disability and of claiming disabled identity (2014). As I have previously 
argued, the inherent lack of visibility of chronic conditions is a barrier to their recognition and therefore to how the 
additional needs of those with invisible disabilities are met. Even in the course of this PhD, I have encountered a 
number of situations where, despite the focus of my research, I have had to self-advocate in ways that would be 
unnecessary from those with visible disabilities (Cosenza, 2014b). Like Garland-Thomson (2017), I question the 
extent to which interdisciplinary critical disability studies, which has been emerging and operating for around 
twenty years is actually influencing policy making, as the “interpretative limits” that surround disability access are 
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particularly complex in the case of invisible disabilities (Hadley, 2014: 18). My university-based research setting has 
suggested the possibility of further research into the perception of invisible disabilities in the higher education 
community, using this thesis as a starting point. Hann’s Charter for Practice Research (2016) and Whatley’s (2007) 
integrated approach to dance on the undergraduate course at Coventry University have prompted me to make 
first steps in the development of a charter for integration specific to students with invisible disabilities or chronic 
illnesses in HE. Further research is needed in this area to investigate the support currently available for students 
with chronic health needs; my experience suggests there are issues related to invisibility that are not currently 
being addressed as their needs may be different to those of visibly disabled students and which are already 
offered. These changes may include minimising the additional labour that invisible disabilities demand through 
repeated acts of self-advocacy, and ways to adjust the concept of inclusion for students whose chronic health 
conditions do not present in predictable ways, picking up on Alexandria Mullins et al’s study (2017). I would also 
suggest further research into the influence of chronic time on the student experience, drawing on Cosenza’s 
theory that time gives a sense of belonging by recognising that the student with chronic illness is likely to feel this 
lack if they cannot keep up with the rhythms of their time-privileged peers (2014a). This investigation of time may 
also need to acknowledge that in the cyclical patterns of chronic illness, guilt may be associated with leisure time 
through the belief that it is unproductive, so new markers of achievement through time may need to be created 
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Appendix 2: Working selfies 
   
   







   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   





   
   




   
   





Appendix 3: Untitled programme 
  
The Gestural Body: A Practice-Based Study of the Perceptions  
of Physicality and Meaning Through Space and Time 
 
Abstract 
My research explores the concept of the gestural body in performance and analyses the differing ways in which 
meaning can be perceived. Rudolf Laban (1980) asserts that by deconstructing body movement, different 
moods can be created. In this workshop performance, I examine how making changes in the space and time of 
performed gestures can affect perceptions of the body.  
My research takes a phenomenological approach, assuming the theory held by Maurice Merleau-Ponty that the 
body is the lens through which we perceive the world (2002). This concept was taken up by dancer and 
philosopher Maxine Sheets who developed the notion of the ‘lived experience’ of dance, referring to the act of 
witnessing dance by both performers and audience (1966). I investigate how my body, influenced by my 
performance training, socio-cultural position as a woman and experience of living with Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome has influenced my lived experience. Following methods of autobiographical practice (Govan, 
Nicholson and Normington, 2007), I seek to challenge the assumption of the ‘hypervisibility and instant 
categorisation’ of disabled performers (Kuppers, 2001), by exploring ways of bringing my experience of Chronic 
Fatigue Syndrome as an invisible disability into visibility through performance.  
Methodology 
In my practical research I have worked somatically, to see how my internal experience of my body may inform 
my movement (Brodie and Lobel, 2012). Employing a phenomenological approach as set out by performance 
artist Susan Kozel (2007), and recording my somatic experiences through notes and video recordings has 
enabled me to develop a work-in-progress performance that describes an invisible aspect of Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome. Ferdinand de Saussure’s principles of semiotics come into play (Cobley and Jansz, 2012), as the 
gesture I have developed relies on simplicity of execution to generate meaning for the audience (Callery, 2001), 
eschewing Charles Sanders Peirce’s notion of one ‘correct’ interpretation (Cobley and Jansz, 2012). The 
performance bears similarity to the work of performer Pina Bausch, with repetitive gestures generating impact 
through time (Zarrilli, Daboo and Loukes, 2013), as well as exploring how the use of space can influence the 
gesture (Darley, 2009). I am also beginning to adopt a feminist perspective, considering how my sex and gender 
may influence the perception of my body and the gesture I perform (Butler, 1990). 
In this workshop performance, I present myself for visual consumption, standing within a demarcated space 
and performing a gesture repeatedly for 15 minutes, allowing for that gesture to deteriorate through time. The 
workshop poses questions as to how the objective perspective of those looking at me may differ from my 
subjective experience. How might the presence of an audience influence my somatic experience? What are the 
audience’s perceptions of me as a performer? 
 
 
 I invite you to move around the space and look at me. 
 What do you see? 
 What does my body tell you about me? 
 What does that lead you to expect? 
 Does your perception of me shift as the gesture I perform changes in time? 
I would like to hear your thoughts on these or any other concepts that occur to you. Please 


































(In)Visible: Tell Me What You See 
Audience Questionnaire 
 
At the beginning of the performance, did you have any assumptions about what I was going to 
do? What were they? Why did you think that? 
 
 
I performed a gesture repeatedly for 15 minutes. What do you feel this gesture expressed? Did 
your feelings change as the gesture altered during that time? 
 
 




I invited you to move around the space as you liked. Did you move around the space or stay in 
one spot? Why did you make that choice? 
 
 
At the end of the performance, I looked the same as I did at the beginning. But did you view 
me any differently having seen the process I went through? 
 
 





Appendix 6: (In)Visible: Tell Me What You See data analysis tables and transcripts of 
group discussions 
 
Performance 20th May - respondents A-I 
Performance 27th June for Performing Risk Symposium - respondents J-V 
22 respondents 
Responses are categorised by column and colour coded according to the topics the responses shared, 
which are then grouped at the end of the responses for each question 
At the beginning of the performance, did you have any assumptions about what I was going to do? 
What were they? Why did you think that? 
 Yes, had assumptions No assumptions or 
expectations 
Other 
A ‘I thought you will be performing an 
expressive role/drama and engage us 
as audience. I also thought you might 
say something like a monologue. I 
honestly did not expect you to be 
naked and perform in such a way that 
could get me engaged, thinking and 
reflecting on my personal 
experiences.’ 
  
B ‘I assumed that you would give an oral 
performance like usual and you would 
speak about it. I thought that because 
I have only attended oral acting 
performances. This is the first time I 
see something like this.’ 
  
C ‘Yes. I believed it would involve how 
the body works and the different 
positions/gestures it can perform. 
(How it can be used to create different 
positions etc.) I thought this because 
of the programme and the picture’ 
  
D ‘I didn’t know what to expect. But I 
have an idea from your handout that 
there will be some form of body 
movements. I did not expect for you 
to undress and go naked.’ 
  
E ‘I had assumptions about the use of 




this was something you were focusing 
on in your study. I had expected that 
you might have moved around, as we 
were in quite a large space.’ 
F  ‘Not at all. It was a 
complete surprise.’ 
 
G  ‘I had no idea all I knew is 
that you would be naked 
on stage’ 
 
H   ‘Yes, as I had discussed 
the work with you before 
now and seen the earlier 
iteration of the 
performance.’ 
I   ‘Yes, because we had 
discussed your ideas. 
However, the way the 
performance was 
presented (spatially) was 
unknown.’ 
J   ‘Not fair to answer this as 
I have seen it before!’ 
K ‘Clear sense that you would stay on 
the platform. It is to do with where it 
is in the space. I [illegible] where the 
audience would be’ 
  
L ‘Once the rhythm began I assumed 
you would be using it as a basis for 
moving’ 
  
M  ‘No, not really just that 
you would be naked’ 
 
N  ‘No’  
O ‘Not specifically; maybe anticipated 
additional elements of interaction 
with the audience’ 
  
P  ‘No – I suppose we had 
been ‘warned’ about 
nudity, but I thought it 
would be on a screen. I 
wasn’t sure what you 
would do.’ 
 
Q ‘I assumed you were going to perform 
something with your body because 
you emphasized your body by putting 
it on a pedestal in the centre of the 
space.’ 
  
R  ‘No, I don’t think I was  
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expecting something in 
particular. Only that you 
would be standing on the 
platform (since it was 
there).’ 
S ‘Very few prior assumptions. Perhaps I 
assumed you would perform a more 
active dance, when I saw the block 
then assumed a spoken piece. The 
room and lack of seating/props 
indicated very little so I really had no 
idea!’ 
  
T ‘None until I saw the podium in the 
middle of the studio. Then some kind 
of sculpture or display suggested 
itself, I think’ 
  
U ‘Judging by the room layout, I 
assumed it would be a simple, 
conceptual contemporary 
performance, maybe also including 
spoken word. You were dressed in 
quite neutral clothing, and except 
from small stage, no theatrical 
elements.’ 
  
V   ‘The space left a lot to the 
imagination as it was open 
and there were little clues. 
However the simplicity 
also gave a sense of 
openness that was fulfilled 
throughout.’ 
 
Assumptions of monologue/spoken drama X 4 (A,B, S,U)  
Assumptions of body movements or gestures X 7 (C,D,E, L,Q,S,U) 
No assumption X 6 (F,G, M,N,P,R)  
Previous knowledge of work X 3 (H,I,J) 
2 people expressed surprise at nudity (A, D) 
8 respondents noted the room, space or stage block (E,K,Q,R,S,T,U,V) 
 
 
I performed a gesture repeatedly for 15 minutes. What do you feel this gesture expressed? Did your 
feelings change as the gesture altered during that time? 
 What the gesture expressed Did the feelings change? Other 
A Female oppression, trying to accomplish Sense of ageing, loss of Could see her 
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something, reaching out, symbolic of life hope, weakening 
 
mother in me 
Felt like more than 
15 minutes 
B Passing of time in life – birth, youth and 
inspiration, old age and death, embracing 
ourselves 
Changed from hope to 
disappointment  
Sense of sympathy 
for whole 
performance 
C The body at its best and in its deteriorated 
form  
  
D Shocked, confused, expression of life Noticed change to hands 
and body, began to feel 
more at ease 
Thought about own 
experience of 
dancing 
E Circle of life Youth and reaching, tired 
and robotic towards end 
 
F Female aging, slow movement at end like 
end of life 
Became sad towards end  
G Outstretched, positive at the beginning, 
small, confined, vulnerable and exhausted 
at the end 
  
H Reaching out for a higher figure then 
backing down, withdrawing in 
disappointment 
  
I A continuing struggle, degrading gesture   
J  Becoming aware/or seeing 
a growing vulnerability 
through the deterioration 
of gesture and posture 
 
K The gesture was 
reaching/pleading/stretching/saluting. 
‘Although the gesture/ 
and [illegible] was the 
same, it changed with the 
rhythm and duration. My 
feelings slightly shifted 
with the changing 
soundtrack.’ 
 
L  ‘At the beginning I was 
struck at the counterpoint 
between your fluid 
movement and the 
[illegible] beat: then I was 
bored’ 
 
M Reaching and collapsing ‘I stopped looking at your 
movement and became 
interested in the changing 
view behind you.’ 
 
N Don’t know. ‘My attitude changed – I 
got curious to discover the 
reason for repetition.’ 
 
O Openness and hope. Deflation and defeat. Felt relaxing.  
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Repetition and temporal mindfulness. 
P Growth, life. Like a life cycle condensed. It seemed to be sadder, 
smaller as time went on. 
 
Q Reaching out to something, needed 
strength. 
After a while you lost 
some of the strength as 
you weren’t able to reach 
out that far anymore. 
 
R Reaching for the sky, but something was 
holding you down. 
As the gesture grew 
smaller (or so I thought), I 
got a sense of resignation, 
as the rhythm accelerated. 
 
S Time, the passing of time, aging. How time 
speeds up as you age. Transition from 
sleeping/resting body to alert/active. Old 
age limiting movement. Human evolution 
from early humans to now. 
I felt sad as I thought 
about aging. 
 
T Hope or yearning.  It changed. When the reaching 
gesture was at its 
most extended, 
your face was very 
expressive too; the 
fading of that 
seemed sad. 
U Da Vinci references [notes having seen 
poster]. Stripped down body showing 
vulnerability. Clean lines, details of the 
spine. 
  
V Longing, wanting, freedom of movement.  When the movement got 
smaller the feeling was of 
powerlessness – loss from 




Reaching out/embracing/ outstretched X 8 (A, E, G, H,K,M,Q,R) 
Life/aging/ birth and death  X 8 (A, B, C, D, E, F,P,S) 
Tired/exhausted/struggle/disappointment/weakening/deterioration/degradation X 14 (A, B, C, E, F, G, 
H, I,J,O,P,Q,R,V) 
Hope/yearning/longing X 5 (A,B,O,T,V) 
 
 
Did you feel uncomfortable at any point during the performance? When was this? What was your 
experience? 
 Uncomfortable Not uncomfortable Other 
A Expressed ‘I have to be honest. I 




wholly naked. At the beginning I 
felt I will invade your privacy by 
looking at your body’ 
B ‘I felt shy, especially when you 
were naked’ 
 ‘I learnt to accept the 
others as they are. And 
learnt to embrace 
yourself, love it and 
appreciate it’ 
C  ‘No. The performance was not 
about nudity but how the body 
functions’  
 
D ‘Yes. At the beginning when you 
undress. Because I didn’t know this 
was going to happen and there 
were men in the room as well. I 
think I would feel less 
uncomfortable if there were only 
females’ 
  
E ‘I did not necessarily feel 
uncomfortable from the nudity, 
however, as the performance (to 
me) signalled some kind of struggle 
towards the end – there was some 
uneasiness as an audience 
member’  
  
F ‘A little – how calmly and casually 
you were afterwards after having 
your body being exposed’ 
  
G ‘The beginning due to being the 
unexpected nature and towards 
the end. The music was very tense’ 
  
H ‘I sort of knew what to expect to an 
extent but that didn’t take away 
the surprise of seeing you 
completely nude in the 
performance’ 
  
I  ‘No. And I thought I might be.’  
J  ‘Not really’  
K  ‘No.’ ‘I was wondering for 
how long you would 
hold the precise 
[illegible]’ 
L  ‘No why should I have done? 
You were doing your own thing 
and that is your right in a 
democratic society’ 
 
M  ‘No – however I did want to  
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come much closer to you but 
[illegible] as I thought you 
would be uncomfortable with 
that’ 
N  No  
O ‘Mildly, when I thought I would be 
asked to hold your clothing or dress 
you’ 
  
P ‘I think with the nudity right at the 
start. In relation particularly to me 
looking at you [exclamation mark 
crossed out]. Heteronormative I 
realise, but I felt pissed off at the 
idea of the male gaze! Always the 
male gaze.’ 
  
Q  ‘Not really, although I was 
curious how long the repeated 
action was going to last.’ 
 
R ‘I did have a mild uncomfortable 
experience in the beginning of the 
piece – I always feel uncomfortable 
when many people are looking at a 
naked body. With time I started 
noticing the various shadows 
created by your movement on your 
body, which took my mind off the 
gaze of the others’ 
  
S ‘Nakedness is somewhat of a social 
taboo – getting naked and getting 
dressed felt voyeristic [sic]. But 
then I thought perhaps this was the 
point – we are voyers [sic] of 
passing time. Only slightly 
uncomfortable when dressing and 
undressing, this passed quickly.’ 
  
T ‘Yes, to start with when you 
undressed. I had to rise to the 
challenge of looking at you without 
feeling self-conscious, dealing with 
the feeling that my looking was on 
show too.’ 
  
U  ‘Not really. I knew there’d be 
nudity. Thinking back to the 
first time I saw a performance 
containing nudity, where I 
didn’t know what to do with 




watching you now.’  
V  No  
 
Uncomfortable about nudity X 10 (A, B, D, F, H, O, P,R,S,T) 
Uncomfortable about the music/movement/tension X 2 (E, G) E notes nudity could have been a factor. 
Not uncomfortable at all X 10 (C, I,J,K,L,M,N,Q,U,V) Although C and U note nudity as though it could 
have been a factor. M notes they thought I may have been uncomfortable with greater proximity, and Q 
wondered how long the repetition would last. 
 
 
I invited you to move around the space as you liked. Did you move around the space or stay in one 
spot? Why did you make that choice? 
 Moved around Stayed in one place 
A  ‘I really wanted to approach you to do 
something in solidarity. Maybe to see what you 
want to say by interacting. However, I thought 
this might spoil the performance’ 
B  ‘Because I focused my eyes and attention on 
your moves, your facial expression and every 
bit of your movement’ 
C  ‘No. Although afterwards I feel maybe I should 
have done. Probably got sucked into the 
performance.’ 
D  ‘I wanted to move. But I didn’t because I was 
afraid I might disrupt the performance 
although you did say in the beginning we 
could. But I shifted a little and this gave a 
different angle and view of your movements. I 
felt more at ease and begin to relate to other 
things in life’ 
E  ‘Where I was stood I could see the front of 
your body and your face – however, reflecting 
on this perhaps should have moved about to 
see the way your back muscles contracted. I 
would move around next time – however this 
is generally not expected of an audience 
member in ‘traditional performances ’ 
F ‘I moved around once – to see the 
physicality and facial expressions from the 
front and if that would make a difference to 
the emotion I felt’  
 
G  ‘Remained in one place’ 
H ‘Only at one point – to see the performance 




expressions or the absence of it’ 
I  ‘I actually missed the instruction to move. I 
didn’t as I felt it would disrupt the tangible 
atmosphere’ 
J ‘I was moving around as I was carried away 
by the clock ticking which propelled me to 
move’ 
 
K ‘I made a full circle around you but didn’t 
play a lot with distance from you. I wonder if 
it’d look different had I done that.’ 
 
L  ‘No (I have an awkward back) and  because 
others’ movement breaks the spect [sic]’ 
M ‘I moved, partly because you invited me to. I 
kept to the edges as that was what was 
expected of us/me – or so I felt’ 
 
N ‘I moved around to discover what the 
performance was about – also to stay 
‘entertained’ by looking at movement from a 
different perspective.’ 
 
O ‘Variation. To see different perspectives on 
you. To do a 360 degrees of space’ 
 
P ‘I wanted to see the full gesture. Also the 
body in movement is amazing, especially 
when you had to use your strength to hold 
you up. I guess it was like sculpture in 
motion’ 
 
Q ‘I moved around to look at the gesture from 
different angles and distances, much like a 
visitor in a museum.’ 
 
R ‘At first because I was encouraged to do so, 
and then because it felt like a sensible thing 
to do. Also the soundscape made [me] want 
to move.’ 
 
S ‘I stayed in one spot to begin with as I 
enjoyed watching the muscles in your back 
move but I moved to your front when I was 
curious of your facial expression. I continued 
to move to view different angles.’ 
 
T ‘It seemed the best way to experience a 3 
dimensional piece. I’m glad I did.’ 
 
U ‘I moved a bit, all way around you so I got a 
360 degree view. But only after 5-10 
minutes. I guess the impetus to move was a) 
because I know as a performer how it feels if 
it’s encouraged and no one moves, b) 
because everyone else did, c) I wanted to 




V  No, I didn’t move. 
 
Stayed still X 9 (A, B, C, D, E, G, I, L, V) one who reasoned that movement is disruptive 
Stayed still but would have liked to move X 5 (A, C, D, E, I) 3 of whom were worried about disrupting the 
atmosphere or performance, 1 noting movement is not expected in traditional performances, another 
thinking keeping to the edges was expected of the audience,  
See also previous question respondent M 
 
Moved X 11 (F, H, J,K,M,N,O,P,Q,R,S,T,U)     4 (F, H, S, U)  mentioned wanting to see facial expressions, 3 
(M, R, U) because they were encouraged to do so, 2 (J, R) expressed that the soundtrack encouraged 
their movement 
 
Descriptions of the performance in a museum-like way X 2 (P,Q) 
See also question 1 responses regarding museum/gallery/scultpure 
 
 
At the end of the performance, I looked the same as I did at the beginning. But did you view me any 
differently having seen the process I went through? 
 Viewed me differently Viewed me the same Other 
A ‘I saw the same person only I 
felt more appreciation for you 
as a strong and confident lady’ 
  
B ‘ I felt that you were moved by 
the act and the moment still 
inside you’ 
  
C ‘Because it felt like we’d been 
on a journey. Almost like you’d 
exposed your disability 
throughout the performance 
but prior to the performance 
you would have never known 
about it. Enhanced my 
awareness but didn’t see it in a 
negative light’ 
  
D  ‘Because you are the same 
person that I know before the 
performance and you look the 
same’ 
 
E ‘The performance signalled to 
me that maybe you have 
experienced some kind of 
struggle. The performance itself 




have (metaphorically) reflected 
other aspects of your life’ 
F ‘I felt more of a connection as 
opposed to viewing you as a 
stranger’ 
  
G   ‘Not sure’ 
H  ‘No – especially as the ritual of 
divesting and re-investing 
yourself with your personal 
effects before and after the 
performance meant that I could 
view your ‘performance’ self as 
distinct from the everyday’ 
 
I  ‘I can’t say I did, no’ ‘I suggest it is a brave 
performance to make’ 
J ‘Probably being aware of the 
body’s physical labour’ 
  
K ‘Perhaps. I guess I was more 
aware of your face because I 
looked quite intently on that 
during the piece.’ 
  
L ‘Yes - now as an artistic person 
and brave!’ 
  
M  ‘No – although I was concerned 
you weren’t wearing a bra and 
wondered if it were me if that 
you feel uncomfortable.’ 
 
N ‘I was more familiar with your 
body’ 
  
O  ‘No. The movement became of 
less interest to me as the piece 
progressed but I didn’t see or 
perceive you differently.’ 
 
P   ‘I thought you were 
brave as hell! But I also 
really wanted to hear 
about your thoughts on 
the work and your 
creative process. It was 
kind of shocking in a 
small space and I was 
interested in that.’ 
Q ‘I felt a little closer to you as the 
performer because I had seen a 
vulnerable part of you, so ‘the 





R   ‘Yes and no. Not sure 
how to phrase it.’ 
S  Not really. I knew more about 
your work. 
 
T ‘Of course, I had (have) seen 
you naked. The re-assertion of 
your social self with your 
clothes was a very striking 
moment. Interesting that this 
was when you spoke to us too.’ 
  
U   ---- 
V ‘At the end there was a sense of 




Viewed me differently X 12 (A, B, C, E, F, J,K,L,N,Q,T,V)   
3 because of physicality (J, N, T) ‘body’s physical labour’, ‘familiarity with body’, ‘seen you naked’ 
3 because they had seen a vulnerable side of me (C, E, Q, V) ‘exposed your disability’, ‘some kind of 
struggle’, ‘seen a vulnerable part of you’, ‘more vulnerability at the end’ 
 
Viewed me the same X 6 (D, H,I,M,O,S) 
Inconclusive X 4 (G,P,R,U) 
 
 
What words would you use to describe your experience of the performance overall?  
A Curious, eager to know more about your experience 
B New, exciting, daring, overwhelming, sexual awakening 
C Thought provoking, emotional 
D Brave and beautiful. Different from any other performance I have seen 
E It was quite hypnotic – perhaps due to the repetitions 
F Mesmerising 
G Uncomfortable, thought provoking 
H Thought provoking 
I Intriguing, voyeuristic, sculpture, art, mesmerising, hypnotic 
J Curious, voyeur, consumer, community of care 
K Interesting. I wish it was a bit longer because then the audience would stretch themselves 
more. 
L Valid as an art form – but not one that captures my interest or enlarges my imagination. 
M Beautiful body, repeating movement. Time was still yet ticking by.  
N Meditative 
O Conscious of time. Conscious of female body. Thinking about proximity and safety (felt 
performer was safe and vulnerable at same time). 
P Discomfort; but also forcing my own interrogation of my feminist values. So I guess, also 
creative and fascinating. (Their italics) 
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Q Exhibiting the body, vulnerability and strength at the same time. Liveness of the body being 
exposed. 
R Rhythm (time), and shadow (light). 
S Very interested – want to know more! 
T Not sure yet... 
U Simplistic, exposed, honest 
V Energy flow throughout, minimalism, effective and thought-provoking 
 
Brave/daring X 3 (B, D, U) 
Thought provoking/curious/intriguing X 9 (A, C, G, H, I,K,P,S,V) 
Hypnotic/mesmerising X 4 (E, F, I, N) 
Conscious of time X 3 (M,O,R) 
Physicality of the body X  4 (M, O, Q, V) 
 
 
Transcripts of group discussions 
Performance 1  
The audience members noted that the end section when I was doing least movement was most 
powerful 
One person thought she had entirely imagined that the ticking was speeding up 
One woman said that she felt uncomfortable that there were men in the room and I agreed that it 
influenced how I felt. I said it made me feel ‘more like I’m making a political statement’ 
I identified that I didn’t see my performance as sexual, that that was not my intention and another 
woman agreed, saying, ‘I didn’t see anything sexual about it, I just saw a body’ 
Another woman said that she didn’t think that what she had understood from the performance would 
have been as clear if I hadn’t been naked, ‘I don’t think you would have had the same experience if it 
was clothed’ 
 
I asked ‘In terms of the soundtrack, how do you feel that that integrated with the movement?’ 
‘The music was very tense, especially at the end, the echoing and the speed, it sort of adds to what 
obviously you’re trying to achieve with the tiredness or the exhausted nature. I think it adds to that, it’s 
definitely important.’ 
‘It took a long time for me to realise that it was accelerating. Was it accelerating?!’ He went on to say it 
took him five or six minutes to realise that it had sped up, and was probably going to continue to do so, 
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at which point he wondered ‘I wonder how fast this is going to get, I wonder if it’s going to get frantic, 
because it was dictating, you know, the speed of your movements’. He said it gave it a ‘sense of 
anticipation’ and that ‘it must be moving forward, it must be going somewhere’ 
I asked, ‘So did people find, I know we’re talking about tension, that it made you sort of 
uncomfortable?’ 
‘It made me focus a lot more on the muscle tension, because the music was getting more frantic and 
your moves were getting more frantic’ and noted that the movement of my toes in particular showed 
this tension. ‘I thought it was very interesting to watch and how the music impacted how we viewed it’ 
‘I thought I’d imagined it speeding up... because I felt that you had slowed down so much that to me the 
music was just the same metronome with some added effects’ 
The same person also said that although she hadn’t moved, he wished she had ‘For me it was very 
stressful towards the end, it felt very tense’ 
I asked her what stopped her moving. She noted audience members generally stand or sit and watch. 
‘For me that was my most comfortable position to be in’ ‘If everybody had started moving around I 
would have felt more comfortable to do that’ 
A number of people said that the performance felt much longer than 15 minutes, with one person 
saying she felt it had a quality of being ‘everlasting’.  
She expressed an urge to have approached me to do something in solidarity. I said that I didn’t think 
anyone would have interacted with me, partly because of the stage block marking out the performance 
space, which I felt set up an expectation that you wouldn’t. When I was asked what I would have done, I 
said that I had considered the possibility in advance and hoped that I would make eye contact at the 
very least, although I don’t think I had fully considered how I would react, wanting instead to leave the 
possibility open to the moment. I said that ‘ I got into the habit of it becoming a rehearsed process so I 
would have found it difficult to let go of that.’ I felt that an interruption would have been a challenge in 
terms of the rehearsed progression of the movement. 
One audience member asked how I would have felt if I could sense someone’s solidarity with me, 
standing close but not interacting ‘If somebody had stood very close to me I think I would have relaxed, 
in a funny way’ I said that the positions that people chose to take far away from me, made me feel that, 
had they been closer, I would have ‘felt more companionship, and less like an exhibit, although that it 
was what I wanted to make myself’ 
I was asked how I would have felt if it was a man who came and stood close to me, and I said that I 
would have felt more ‘confrontational’ and ‘ready to defend my confidence.’ I said that I felt it was 
‘impossible for gender not to be a facet when a woman performs in any guise, let alone unclothed.’ 
One woman said ‘There was second when I just skipped thinking about you as a female, I saw you as just 
a human being representing male and female’ and many people nodded and agreed. ‘It exceeded being 
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you, a female, it became just a human being.’ Another woman, ‘For me it felt like it was a body, rather 
than any kind of gender but maybe because that’s me talking from a woman’s perspective’ [so it’s easier 
for her to see past the shared sex?]  
One man said he would be interested to know how the women, a group of whom were standing on 
the other side of the room, would have reacted to him if he came and stood very close to me. Note 
reactions to him, not to me. He said that he was worried about their judgements, ‘one of the main 
reasons why I didn’t do it! Because actually, my relationship with the other audience members in that 
piece was complex’ 
A woman said it would depend how he stood, and he said that was down to him, another choice that he 
was aware was fraught with implications and would make him hyper aware of how to stand or not 
stand. At this point everyone laughed having experienced the feeling of not knowing how to stand 
appropriately when we are being watched. 
Another audience member noted the difference in standing to the side where there were fewer 
obvious reminders of gender. One man said that he also viewed me as a body but that ‘something that 
helped me to do that was the way you framed the performance because I think the kind of divesting 
yourself of your personal belongings as I saw it, and reinvesting yourself in those things for me helped 
really frame it for me. And for some reason when I saw you do that... it wasn’t ‘Mo’ anymore for me, it 
was just the body.’ He went on to say that ‘I don’t have words for it’ 
At this point, a woman joined the conversation, saying, ‘Could I just add to that I think what helped in 
framing yourself as a body was your choice of clothing as well, so you didn’t wear a bra you just wore a 
t-shirt and just like, shorts’ 
I explained that my choice of clothing was very careful as I wanted to appear ‘neutral’ as much as 
possible, with my clothing not attracting comment, and explained that the only reason I didn’t wear a 
bra was because I didn’t want to had someone my knickers. 
Another woman thought this was interesting, because I was ‘very generous’ with the audience in doing 
so. We talked about the manner I divested myself of my clothing, noting that it is not how we’re used to 
seeing a woman undress, I could have been more provocative. ‘That’s why it just felt like a body,’ said 
one woman. 
I said I wanted to engage the audience by asking them to help me undress. ‘It made it more personal. I 
think from an audience point of view, it made it feel like it was ok to watch you doing that because you 
were asking for our permission, for our help, so it made it more of a connection for me personally to 
watch you undress yourself, because you were engaging with us’ 
One man said that it was helpful for the audience to be with me through the process of undressing once 
I had said the performance would start, rather than seeing me standing naked already 





Discussing the interaction as I dressed and undressed, an elderly man said that it was lucky I hadn’t 
called upon him to he wouldn’t have agreed to hold my clothes as ‘I only handle my wife’s clothes’. I 
was asked what I would have done and I responded, ‘I think I would just have asked another person’. 
But how would the man’s reaction have affected other people’s reactions? Would they have felt greater 
freedom to refuse my requests now that he had done? 
Another man was uncomfortable at how the performance had made him confront his feelings about 
the male gaze theory. He said that he was uncomfortable with my nudity and had struggled to see past 
my sex, as he found me attractive, saying that ‘if it was your intention for the audience to see past my 
sex, it hadn’t worked with him’. His reflections on his own spectatorship made him uncomfortable 
because of his presumed position of upholding the male gaze theory, although he wasn’t clear whether 
he put himself into the category of active male watcher, or whether I did by arranging the performance. 
A number of audience members were interested in the concept of duration and wanted to see what it 
might bring to the exploration of spectatorship for the audience, requiring them to go further in their 
own exploration of watching. Many people suggested that be something that I pursue in the future. 
They also noted how their movement affected the atmosphere and they were consciously affected by 
the movement of others, prompting them to move as well. This meant that the audience’s movement 
came in waves that could be heard through the noise of their feet and clothes and provided a sense of 
cover if they wanted to move but had felt unable to in silent periods. One person asked if I was aware of 
their movement, and I answered that I was aware of periods when lots of people were moving at once 
as there was a change of energy in the room. At these times, I felt more like a ‘performer’ as I was aware 
of how their movement reflected the way they chose to view me, which in turn drew my attention to 










Screening My(Self): Reflections 
 
Today - all welcome! 
Tuesday 30th May  
1.00 – 1.15 Anselm Studio 2 (Ag09) 
 
A performance workshop exploring subjectivity and objectivity, spectatorship 
and the performance of self.  





























Screening My(Self): Reflections 
 
In this workshop, I explore subjectivity and objectivity in performance, using my body and my experiences 
as both subject of the workshop and means of analysis. I appear behind screens that allow you to look at 
me but which are mirrored inside so I can see my reflection.  
As you look at me, feel free to move around the space as you like. Consider your impressions of me and the 
choices you make in how you watch me. 
 




How did it feel to watch me, knowing that I couldn’t see you? Did these feelings change at any point? 
 
 
You saw me in three different changes of clothes. How did your impressions of me shift as you saw me in 
each different outfit? 
 
 
Did my behaviour change at all as my clothing changed? 
 
 









Appendix 9: Screening My(Self): Reflections data analysis tables 
 
Workshop 30th May 2017 Screening My(Self): Reflections 
4 respondents A – D 
Responses are colour coded according to the topics the responses shared, which are then grouped at 
the end  
 
When you first saw me behind the screens what were your thoughts? Did I remind you of anything 
you have seen before? 
A My first thought was how uncomfortable most people would feel with four mirrors on them. 
B Me in the changing rooms at M&S. 
C A dancer in a film. 
D Like looking into a changing room at a shop – voyeuristic, seeing you in intimate moments as 
you examine your body. Reminded me also of a ballet dancer figure on top of a music box – 
there for us to view you – a role to play. 
 
 
How did it feel to watch me, knowing that I couldn’t see you? Did these feelings change at any point? 
A It felt weirdly invasive, I wanted to watch, yet knew almost shouldn’t. After I stood close to the 
box I wanted to stay close. 
B It felt voyeuristic at first. 
C You’re very brave. 
D I think at times I was aware of other people’s movements and perceptions of other viewers – 
this affected how I responded. It was like looking into a green room – what is normally unseen 
by the audience. Privileged view of into readying for a performance. As you showed signs of 
fatigue, it became somewhat agonising to watch you suffer – to feel your pain. 
 
 
You saw me in three different changes of clothes. How did your impressions of me shift as you saw me 
in each different outfit? 
A Ballerina definitely ‘appeared’ more confident. But many layers suggested comfort. 
B You were ----- (unknowable, unremarkable?) in your underwear, and hiding in your final outfit. 
The ballet outfit was more of a performance on display. 
C The shift of different types of beauty 
D Even in putting on your ballet outfit, you changed – your demeanour. Years of training and 
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thousands of times preparing, made you assume a certain attitude of strength and assurance. 
You seemed very aware of your body, analysing it minutely. What did you see? 
Did my behaviour change at all as my clothing changed? 
A Confidence was heightened, along with insecurity. Many layers it appeared as if you were glad 
to be covered. 
B Your confidence seemed lowest at the end. 
C I think so. 
D As mentioned in previous point. Putting on the yumfies, the signs of exhaustion became more 
apparent, like you could take off the mask. 
 
 
Do you have any other thoughts or observations to add? 
A Interesting watching someone when they don’t know you can see them. 
B It was unsettling with the two-way mirrors. 
C - 
D I feel your pain. 
 
 
Voyeurism, privileged audience view 
 
“how uncomfortable most people would feel 





“what is normally unseen” 
“privileged view” 
“interesting watching someone when they don’t 
know you can see them” 




“a dancer in a film” 
“a ballet dancer figure on top of a music box”  
“there for us to view you” 
“a role to play” 
“looking into a green room”  
“audience” 
“readying for a performance” 
“ballerina definitely ‘appeared’ more confident” 
“a performance”  
“on display” 
“demeanour”  
“attitude of strength and assurance” 
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“confidence was heightened” 
Signs of fatigue, self-care, comfort, low 
confidence 
 
“signs of fatigue” 
“agonising to watch you suffer”  
“feel your pain” 
“many layers suggested comfort” 
“hiding in your final outfit” 
“appeared as if you were glad to be covered” 
“your confidence seemed lowest at the end” 
“signs of exhaustion became more apparent” 
“take off the mask” 
 
 
Audience movement, proximity “after I stood close to the box I wanted to stay 
close” 
“at times I was aware of other people’s 
movements and perceptions of other viewers – 
this affected how I responded” 
  
 
 
 
 
